本研究主要探討公司設置獨立董監事及其專業性，對於分析師進行公司盈餘預測時是否會產生影響。由於上市櫃審查準則的規範，本研究將樣本分為兩群，第一群樣本為受此準則規範，須強制設置獨立董監事之IPO公司，第二群樣本為不受此準則規範之上市櫃公司，以研究透過獨立董監的設置，是否會對分析師行為產生影響。 研究結果發現，獨立董事的設置有助於降低分析師預測離散度，尤其是具有專業背景之獨立董事，對於降低分析師的預測誤差及預測離散度有顯著影響；在獨立監察人方面，僅具專業背景之獨立監察人對於提升分析師跟隨人數有顯著影響。另外，亦發現受規範公司樣本對於分析師預測行為之影響力明顯大於不受規範公司樣本，本研究推論其原因為國內除了新上市櫃有因應法規之需求而設置獨立董監事外，一般上市櫃公司並無強大誘因促使其設立獨立董監事，造成自願設置之樣本數量過少，而導致其實證結果不顯著。 / This study investigates the effect on the forecasting behavior of analysts through employing independent directors or independent supervisors and their professional background. According to the listed examination criterion of TSEC and OTC, the samples are classified into two groups: companies regulated by the law and non-regulated companies. The empirical results suggest that independent directors contribute to reducing forecasting dispersion of analysts. Furthermore, independent directors who have professional background contribute to reducing forecasting dispersion and forecasting error of analysts. In terms of independent supervisors, only people who have professional background are positively related with analyst following. The results also show that regulated companies have more significant influence on analysts than non-regulated companies do, indicating that in response to the listed examination criterion of TSEC and OTC, regulated companies have to employ independent directors and independent supervisors. On the other hand, there is no motive for non-regulated companies to employ independent directors and independent supervisors, resulting in no significant impact on forecasting behavior of analysts.