In The Empirical Stance Bas van Fraassen sets out to uncover the spirit of empiricism: “what is empiricism, and what it could be, if it is to be a viable philosophy today?” (2002, p. 31). In answer to this question van Fraassen rejects the canonical characterization of empiricism as a philosophical position established on a thesis (such as all knowledge comes from sense experience), and argues that we must endorse empiricism as a philosophical position established in a stance. But what the empirical stance is or entails exactly, van Fraassen has failed to make clear. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and philosophically evaluate empiricism as a stance. In light of my analysis, however, I will argue that van Fraassen has not provided a concrete characterization of stance empiricism (or indeed stances in general), and that the concept remains problematically vague. In Chapter, 1 I begin with a review and analysis of The Empirical Stance. I discuss van Fraassen’s arguments against the canonical characterization of empiricism, as well as the initial sketch of what stance empiricism is or entails provided by van Fraassen. Furthermore, I offer what I see as the clearest characterization of stance empiricism that can be seen form the initial sketch van Fraassen has provided: that the empirical stance is an epistemic strategy, with a commitment to empirical inquiry. In Chapter 2, I refute a prominent critique which has been made against van Fraassen’s ‘stance-ism’ – that stances are problematically relative. This critique is particularly problematic for stance empiricism as it compromises two of van Fraassen’s proposed characteristics of empiricism. In the remaining chapters I argue that stance empiricism is a problematically vague concept. In Chapter 3, I argue that it is not entirely clear what role experience, and the empirical, is to play in the empirical stance. In Chapter 4, I discuss two characterizations of stances which are similar to that which I draw at the end of Chapter 1. I go on to argue that in light of van Fraassen’s response to such characterizations we can see that they are inadequate in being able to fully encapsulate the concept of a stance. In Chapter 5, I conclude by arguing that for stance empiricism (and indeed any stance) to be a coherent position it must be limited to something in terms of being definable by some necessary beliefs. Furthermore, I offer a potential objection to my thesis – that for van Fraassen vagueness is a nonissue; I rebut this objection by arguing that even by van Fraassen’s own lights stances are problematically vague. / Graduate / 0422 / navarre.dicarlo@gmail.com

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2008. / Submitted by Kelly Marques (pereira.kelly@gmail.com) on 2009-11-04T18:48:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_AlineOliveiraMorais.pdf: 667920 bytes, checksum: 077c6eb6829679821f96632e878b1c79 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marília Freitas(marilia@bce.unb.br) on 2010-01-19T17:01:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_AlineOliveiraMorais.pdf: 667920 bytes, checksum: 077c6eb6829679821f96632e878b1c79 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-01-19T17:01:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_AlineOliveiraMorais.pdf: 667920 bytes, checksum: 077c6eb6829679821f96632e878b1c79 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-01 / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar os principais aspectos do Empirismo Construtivo de Bas C. van Fraassen, particularmente no que diz respeito ao problema da explicação científica. O Empirismo Construtivo defende que o objetivo da ciência é elaborar teorias que sejam empiricamente adequadas e, nesse sentido, afasta-se de outras correntes anti-realistas e, particularmente, do Realismo Científico. A diferença entre esta concepção e outras correntes anti-realistas situa-se no uso que faz da concepção semântica de teorias científicas. Quanto ao Realismo Científico, a diferença diz respeito ao objetivo da ciência e ? crença envolvida na aceitação de teorias. No que concerne ao problema da explicação científica, van Fraassen oferece uma teoria pragmática da explicação cujo objetivo é apresentar a explicação sem o apelo a qualquer ontologia, no qual o contexto cumpre papel determinante na explicação e procura com isso, conter os argumentos realistas baseados no poder explicativo das teorias. _____________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This work aims to present the principle aspects of Bas C. van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism, particularly with regard to the problem of scientific explanation. Constructive Empiricism defends the objective of science as being that of formulating theories that are empirically adequate and, in this way, abstains from other anti-realist lines of thought and, particularly from Scientific Realism. The difference between this notion and other anti-realist views is based on its use of semantic conceptions of scientific theories. In terms of Scientific Realism, the difference deals with the objective of science and with the belief involved in the acceptance of theories. Regarding the problem of scientific explanation, van Fraassen offers a pragmatic theory of the explanation whose objective is to present the explanation bereft of any ontology, in which the context plays a determinant role in the explanation and, by this, seeks to contain the realist arguments based on the explanatory power of theories.

Univ., Diplomarbeit--Münster

Zugl.: Münster (Westfalen), Univ., Diplomarbeit, 2007

In this paper I will argue that the controversial process of inferring to the best explanation (IBE) can be made more coherent if its formulation recognizes and includes a significant inductive component. To do so, I will examine the relationship between Harman’s, Lipton’s, and Fumerton’s positions on IBE, settling ultimately upon a conception that categorically rejects Harman’s account while appropriating potions of both Lipton’s and Fumerton’s accounts. The resulting formulation will be called inductive-IBE, and I will argue that this formulation more accurately describes the inferential practices employed in scientific inquiry. The upshot of my argument, that IBE contains a significant inductive component, will be that any conclusion born from such types of inductive inference must be, at best, likely, and not a necessity. And, although previous accounts of IBE have accepted the defeasibility of IBE, I will argue that inductive-IBE is more descriptive because it tells us why this fallibility exists. That is, although the Liptonian conception of IBE acknowledges that IBE is fallible, my account specifically addresses this characteristic and, thus, is more descriptive and informative in this regard. I will use inductive-IBE to argue, contra van Fraassen, that IBE can be a legitimate form of inference that leads science to true theories and real entities.

In this paper I will argue that the controversial process of inferring to the best explanation (IBE) can be made more coherent if its formulation recognizes and includes a significant inductive component. To do so, I will examine the relationship between Harman’s, Lipton’s, and Fumerton’s positions on IBE, settling ultimately upon a conception that categorically rejects Harman’s account while appropriating potions of both Lipton’s and Fumerton’s accounts. The resulting formulation will be called inductive-IBE, and I will argue that this formulation more accurately describes the inferential practices employed in scientific inquiry. The upshot of my argument, that IBE contains a significant inductive component, will be that any conclusion born from such types of inductive inference must be, at best, likely, and not a necessity. And, although previous accounts of IBE have accepted the defeasibility of IBE, I will argue that inductive-IBE is more descriptive because it tells us why this fallibility exists. That is, although the Liptonian conception of IBE acknowledges that IBE is fallible, my account specifically addresses this characteristic and, thus, is more descriptive and informative in this regard. I will use inductive-IBE to argue, contra van Fraassen, that IBE can be a legitimate form of inference that leads science to true theories and real entities.

abstract: This is a study of scientific realism, and of the extent to which it is undermined by objections that have been raised by advocates of various forms of antirealism. I seek to develop and present a version of scientific realism that improves on past formulations, and then to show that standard antirealist arguments against it do not succeed. In this paper, I will first present my formulation of scientific realism, which conceives of theories as model-based and as fundamentally non-linguistic. I advocate an epistemic position that accords with indirect realism, and I review and assess the threat posed by theses of underdetermination. Next, I review and discuss three important views: the antirealist constructivist view of Thomas Kuhn, the realist view of Norwood Hanson, and the antirealist constructive empiricist view of Bas van Fraassen. I find merits and flaws in all three views. In the course of those discussions, I develop the theme that antirealists' arguments generally depend on assumptions that are open to question, especially from the perspective of the version of realism I advocate. I further argue that these antirealist views are undermined by their own tacit appeals to realism. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2013

Orientador : Michel Ghins / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-18T14:53:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dutra_LuizHenriquedeAraujo_D.pdf: 69169130 bytes, checksum: 622c2383a337e1a7ba534c87874d91de (MD5) Previous issue date: 1993 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Bas van Fraassen argues that inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a probabilistically incoherent rule (1989). Anyone following IBE is open to being Dutch booked. According to one of the most interesting and popular responses to van Fraassen’s argument, van Fraassen misrepresents IBE in probabilistic terms. With the proper probabilistic representation, it is claimed, IBE is not inconsistent with Bayesian rationality constraints. Building on the work of IBE’s proponents, I first propose a minimal account of what makes one explanation better than another. I then argue that, even on this minimal account, the alternative probabilistic model of IBE does not work, and hence fails to successfully respond to van Fraassen’s argument.

Bas van Fraassen argues that inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a probabilistically incoherent rule (1989). Anyone following IBE is open to being Dutch booked. According to one of the most interesting and popular responses to van Fraassen’s argument, van Fraassen misrepresents IBE in probabilistic terms. With the proper probabilistic representation, it is claimed, IBE is not inconsistent with Bayesian rationality constraints. Building on the work of IBE’s proponents, I first propose a minimal account of what makes one explanation better than another. I then argue that, even on this minimal account, the alternative probabilistic model of IBE does not work, and hence fails to successfully respond to van Fraassen’s argument.