In Sweden, there is an intense and politicized debate about the phenomenon of firearm-related violence by criminal gangs, especially among Sweden's parliamentary parties. The purpose of the following study is to explain how a phenomenon is constructed and managed politically by the government and the opposition. The focus will be on how framing and accountability are exerted concerning gang-related shootings in Swedish politics. The theory that will be used to analyze the political game is Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell's theoretical framework about framing and crisis exploitation. The study shows that even though different frameworks are used, there is an existing consensus among the political parties Socialdemokraterna, Moderaterna and Vänsterpartiet that firearm-related violence by criminal gangs is considered a crisis in Swedish politics. It is evident that the government chooses to deny responsibility while the opposition focus on blaming the government. It was therefore concluded that the outcome of the political game regarding firearm-related violence by criminal gangs will be a ‘blame showdown’, where the political implications are difficult to apprehend.

In this paper I set out to explore the concept of framing and framing contests, as modelled by scholars of international relations Krebs and Jackson in their model of rhetorical coercion. I proceed to conduct a frame analysis on the case of the Ukraine crisis, using statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen concerning the events. I do this by a research method known as content analysis, more specifically its qualitative version. Qualitative content analysis is an established method in the sub-discipline of international relations, and combining it with frame analysis provides an interesting analysis of this case. In line with Krebs and Jackson’s theory, I find that without a common frame among the actors, the debate is indeed fundamental and wide-ranging, with Russia and NATO not only having different positions on issues, but first and foremost speaking about different issues altogether concerning the Ukraine crisis. Lastly, while I find qualitative content analysis satisfactory in analysing framing contests, other areas of their model of rhetorical coercion is lacking, more specifically that their description of the causal relations in rhetorical coercion is inapplicable on the international dynamic of politics, and suggest that a new causal model be created by integrating qualitative content analysis and foreign policy analysis.