A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

This dissertation is a study of Plutarch's portrayal of military leadership in his Parallel Lives. I investigate Plutarch's use of extended military narrative to provide examples of good generalship for his readers, his conception of the importance and dangers of a military education, his attitude toward the moral use of deception in warfare, and the importance of synkrisis to the reader's final assessment of a general's military ability. I conclude with a case study of the Pyrrhus-Marius, in which I examine how Plutarch uses military narrative throughout the pair to compare the generalship of the two men. I demonstrate that Plutarch's conception of generalship in the Parallel Lives is nuanced, consistent, and often significant to the interpretation of a pair. Plutarch constructs his military narratives in such a way as to identify specific acts of generalship through which the military leaders among his readership could evaluate and improve their own generalship. Plutarch's treatment of the morality of generalship is consistent with his views on education and character; while he accepts the necessity and appreciates the effectiveness of military deception, he also recognizes its limitations and holds up for criticism those generals who do not use it appropriately. I also examine the importance of the formal synkrisis at the end of each pair of Lives to the structural integrity of the Plutarchan book and the evaluation of military leadership in each pair. These concluding synkriseis demonstrate that Plutarch had a consistent set of criteria for evaluating the generalship of his subjects, and encourage the reader to make similar judgments on military ability themselves. This process of evaluation and comparison of military leadership is particularly important to my reading of the Pyrrhus-Marius, as comparing the military careers of its subjects allows for a more complete reading of the pair than is otherwise possible.

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This thesis is about ‘military manuals’ produced in the first few centuries of the Roman imperial period. It argues that these texts merit far more attention and appreciation than they have received in the scholarship so far. I will explore areas such as the way in which their authors order and rank Greek and Roman knowledge, engage with ideas about knowledge and power, help construct identity and discuss ethics and behavior. In the first chapter I will determine whether the authors operate within a specific ‘genre’, or ‘genres’, of military writing. Then I will explore how the texts relate to other traditions of technical texts, questions of audience, and finally the issue of their practicality. The second chapter will examine how authors tackle the issue of ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ knowledge, categorize, rank and use it for self-promotion. We will see how Roman knowledge is both subverted but also praised, and how Greek knowledge is at the same time placed above Roman knowledge and integrated into a narrative of continuity with it. The third chapter will focus on the use of Greek knowledge in the construction of Roman identity. I will explore how ‘manuals’ play a part in the identity of the Roman Empire, fitting into a picture of unity in diversity, and show how they contribute to Hadrian’s self-presentation. The fourth chapter will examine the ethical component in manuals. I will determine whether there was an ethical code of conduct in battle in the Classical world and whether it was different from general ethical norms. Then, we will examine whether our texts engage in any way with this ‘code’ and whether their individual approaches have anything in common or are fundamentally different.