This dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of the 27 th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed on the two divisions after they were attached to the 11 American Corps. especiallý their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training received under the supervision of British officers. The 11 American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and operated entirely independent of 11 American Corps. The týýo American divisions that h, oth remained with the British, the 27t and -3 , relied heavily upon their coalition partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly, tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from being th -, oth amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27 and -) Divisions became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Arrný during the final campaigns of the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western Front in 1918, the 11 American Corps suffered heavý casualties during its limited operational experience and. in many ways. failed to take advantage of lessons learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917. This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the 27 th and 30'hDivisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the tNNo ,a llies became Brothers-in-Arms.

The study of soldier’s experience is important to understanding the effect that wars have on society. In the latter part of the 19th century the experience of warfare changed due to advances in weapons technology. The defensive tactic of trench warfare gained new importance. The most prolific use of trench warfare occured on the Western Front in the First World War, but it was during the siege of Petersburg in the American Civil War that extensive trenches were first used with technologically advanced weapons. By comparing the siege of Petersburg with the Western Front, it is clear that similar conditions elicited similar emotional reactions from soldiers. The most common reactions were fraternization and war neurosis. Fraternization was more prevelant during the siege of Petersburg than at other times during the war. Fraternization was also common on the Western Front. The reasons for this vary, but are all linked to the nature of trench warfare. War neurosis was also caused by the conditions of the trenches. It was a bigger problem at Petersburg and on the Western Front than it was for soldiers in other conflicts. Trench warfare created these emotional reactions. / Master of Arts

This dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of the 27th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed on the two divisions after they were attached to the II American Corps, especially their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training received under the supervision of British officers. The II American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and operated entirely independent of II American Corps. The two American divisions that remained with the British, the 27th and 30th, relied heavily upon their coalition partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly, tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from being amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27th and 30th Divisions became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Army during the final campaigns of the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western Front in 1918, the II American Corps suffered heavy casualties during its limited operational experience and, in many ways, failed to take advantage of lessons learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917. This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the 27th and 30th Divisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the two allies became Brothers-in-Arms.

No description available.

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the interplay between the technology, tactics and organisation of the First AIF. Warfare in the twentieth warfare is characterised by the presence of certain technologies that give it a distinctive nature and which first appeared in the Great War. It was in the Great War that the highly dispersed form of tactics that we know today emerged. Thus, it is a natural starting point not only for the examination of warfare in the era of technology but for considering the nature of technological change itself. My Australian perspective enabled issues to be looked at to a depth that would not be possible in a work of this length with a broader view. I have argued that the Great War was characterised by the problem of trench warfare, and I have traced the progress of tactical, technological and organisational developments that ultimately supplied the solutions. I have also shown how the Great War was not only a war of technology in which new technologies were introduced and developed, but also one which saw the spread of new ways of thinking about military technology. In preparing this thesis, I have inspected the actual battlefields in France, Belgium and Turkey. I have drawn on a broad range of published material, but the thesis is largely based upon the primary documents found in the Australian War Memorial and Australian National Archives.

Mechanization signaled the end of the cavalry but the renaissance of heavy cavalry doctrine. The tank heralded the return of breakthrough operations and maneuver warfare. Initially, the western cavalries refused doctrinal revision and chose instead to fight bitter rear guard actions against Fullerist zealots. / The Canadian Cavalry, prompted by Blitzkrieg's triumphs, effortlessly evolved into a tank force---virtually overnight. Canadian doctrine, however, was ersatz. Denied its own vast training areas, the RCAC was sandwiched into southern England and saddled with British warfighting techniques developed in the Western Desert. In Normandy, Canadian operational art was driven by Generals Simonds and Crerar, both gunners, who had neither the skill nor experience to conduct armoured warfare. Hampered by General Montgomery's inability to reproduce a strategic offensive comparable to that demonstrated on the Russian front, Allied armoured forces were squandered in mismanaged frontal attacks. / In the United States, the attempts to protect the horse forced a praetorian's revolt that ended with General Chaffee garroting the US Cavalry, eliminating it from future battlefields. The doctrinal dominance of the American Armored Force was subsequently threatened by a cabal under artillery General Leslie McNair who imposed the Tank Destroyer philosophy. Internecine squabbles and economic nationalism prevented America from producing a tank capable of meeting German panzers on even terms. Though failing technically, the US Armored force succeeded doctrinally via the Louisiana maneuvers and produced a balanced Armored Division. General Bradley's 12th Army Group arrived in France with a purposeful dogma that had been further refined at the Combat Command, Divisional, and Corps level in North Africa and Sicily. / American armour maneuvered during Operation Cobra but it did not fight massed panzers; this was soon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reached tactical maturity. Canadian armour fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring, Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. American and Canadian armour's best opportunity for strategic victory occurred in Normandy. The Canadians, despite better tanks and favourable terrain, failed operationally and received no second chance.

The First World War and the Australian Imperial Force have generated thousands of books and articles. Many studies adhere to the emphasis of C.E.W. Bean, and recount the history of the infantry or a particular infantry battalion. Others examine both the short term and long-lasting effects of the war on the Australian psyche. Some historians have acknowledged that a particular group of non-fighting combatants has been neglected, but generally, this group has been employed in dangerous and difficult pursuits. Very few historians have studied the roles of non-fighting combatants whose contribution is considered as lacklustre, such as the Australian Field Bakeries. When I began my research, I could not understand why the Australian Field Bakeries did not play any part in the historiography of World War One. An examination of the Anzac legend revealed an emphasis on the characteristics of the Anzac, especially masculinity and heroism. I argue that the bakers’ employment might be considered as being situated within the woman’s sphere and therefore unmasculine, whilst that same employment did not offer the chance for acts of heroism. Because of an emphasis on the exciting exploits of the infantry within Anzac historiography, the Australian Field Bakeries and their role as support troops have been ignored and omitted. Comparing demographic statistics and the war experiences, values and attitudes of the Australian Imperial Force and the bakers, I conclude that the bakers of the Australian Field Bakeries were extraordinarily similar to the men of the Australian Imperial Force. Only those experiences and statistics directly related to the two groups’ specific fields of employment are significantly different. I argue that specialised skills and a perceived lack of masculinity and heroism have seen the men of the Australian Field Bakeries excluded from all existing Anzac historiography.

No description available.

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Dissertationsschrift ist das zumeist als Revolution of Military Affairs wahrgenommene Auftreten der ersten Panzer. Diese „Tanks“ der Jahre 1916-1918 mit den ihnen innewohnenden Möglichkeiten, das blutige Patt des Stellungskrieges an der Westfront aufzuheben, beeinflußten der Legende nach das Kriegsende 1918 erheblich. Die Alliierten erkannten das Potential der neuen Waffe, ließen sich von frühen Rückschlägen nicht entmutigen und besaßen gegen Ende des Krieges eine gepanzerte Speerspitze ihrer nun modern auf Feuer und Bewegung ausgelegten Offensiven, denen man deutscherseits angeblich nichts entgegenzusetzen hatte. Die deutsche Führung, anscheinend geprägt durch technikfeindliche und geradezu blauäugig agierende Köpfe, verpaßte bis zuletzt ignorant jede Chance, ihrerseits auf diese die Landkriegführung bis heute prägende Waffe zu setzen und selbst Tanks in Massen zu produzieren. Im Sommer 1918 kollabierten die deutschen Linien, als britische, französische und amerikanische Tankgeschwader unaufhaltsam auf sie und ihre technisch und taktisch plötzlich hoffnungslos unterlegenen Verteidiger einstürmten. Inwieweit diese plausibel erscheinende Darstellung den Realitäten in höchsten Führungskreisen beider Seiten und auf den Gefechtsfeldern entsprach, ist eine grundsätzliche Frage innerhalb der vorliegenden Dissertation. Anhand der operationsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung der namhaftesten Tankeinsätze zwischen dem ersten Auftreten der neuen Waffe im September 1916 und ihrem Siegeslauf im Sommer 1918 wird geklärt, welcher Anteil am alliierten Sieg den frühen Panzern zuzubilligen ist und inwiefern sich die deutsche Führung tatsächlich eines letztlich katastrophalen „Versagens“ schuldig machte. / The central theme of this thesis is the appearance on the battlefield of the first armoured vehicles, an event generally held to have been a revolution in military affairs. The exploits of these so-called ‘tanks’ of 1916 -1918, which had the inherent capability of breaking the bloody deadlock of trench warfare, contributed greatly during the interwar period to the promotion of a myth, which went roughly as follows: The Allies had recognised the potential of this new weapon; did not allow themselves to be deflected by early setbacks and so, towards the end of the war, their modern offensives, founded on the joint principles of fire and manoeuvre, possessed an armoured spearhead, against which the Germans had no answer. The German High Command, seemingly technophobic and blundering, ignored right to the bitter end, the chance to throw their weight behind the development and mass production of weapons, which to this day play a key role in land warfare. In the summer of 1918 the German lines simply folded in the face of British, French and American tank squadrons which rolled forward unstoppably to assault a defence which was suddenly and hopelessly tactically and technically inferior. The fundamental question of this thesis is to what extent this apparently plausible representation of the facts actually corresponds to the reality, both in the High Commands of both sides and on the battlefield. On the basis of historical-operational analysis of the most notable tank actions between the first appearance of the new weapon in September 1916 and its advance to victory during the summer of 1918, the thesis explores how much credit for the Allied victory is due to these early armoured vehicles and to what extent the German High Command itself was actually responsible for this final, catastrophic failure.