Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 158 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-158).

Gulf War (GW) veterans are a unique cohort of individuals who were exposed to numerous neurotoxicants in theater. These exposures include pyridostigmine bromide pills, pesticides, chemical warfare agents, vaccines, combustion byproducts from oil well fires, and solvent fumes from chemical agent resistant coating paint. After returning home from deployment, GW veterans began reporting a constellation of symptoms that encompassed multiple body systems and has since been collectively termed Gulf War Illness (GWI). Research immediately following the war has linked several of the neurotoxicant exposures to adverse health outcomes including cardiovascular, neuropsychological, and neuroanatomical effects. Over the years, GW research has transitioned to focusing on the illness as a whole and to investigating its potential biomarkers and mechanisms. Much of this research has compared veterans with and without GWI, however this grouping may be problematic given that veterans without GWI may have been exposed to the same neurotoxicants but present without symptoms or health effects or with symptoms below the threshold for current GWI diagnostic criteria. Additionally, some neurotoxicant exposures, without initially producing overt signs of toxicity, may produce delayed and persistent effects. As GW veterans begin to age, neurotoxicant exposures may exert delayed effects that may be different from symptoms initially experienced after the war. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to continue to characterize health effects from neurotoxicant exposures in GW veterans. This dissertation aims to investigate the effects of individual neurotoxicant exposures on cardiac risk, neuropsychological functioning, and brain morphology in GW veterans, nearly 30 years post-war. The first study examines the impact of these exposures on cardiac risk using the Framingham 10-year cardiovascular disease risk score, as well as the prevalence of cardiovascular and cerebrovascular medical conditions. The second study examines the impact of these exposures on neuropsychological and mood functioning, using an extensive battery of neuropsychological tests as well as the Profile of Mood States questionnaire. In the third study, the effects of these exposures on brain volumes of the Yeo functional networks are examined. The results of this dissertation will serve as a comprehensive update on GW veteran health regarding specific neurotoxicant exposures.

Cheung Mong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-121). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables and Figures --- p.vi / Abbreviations --- p.viii / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction: Why Different Policy Responses in Two Similar Crises? --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Central Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Main Argument --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Layout --- p.4 / Chapter Chapter Two --- A Theoretical Framework for Analysis: The Concept of Strategic Culture --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Competing Explanations --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Theory of Strategic Culture --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- Defining Strategic Culture in this Research --- p.29 / Chapter 2.4 --- Research Method and Data --- p.37 / Chapter Chapter Three --- The Dual Sources of Strategic Culture in Postwar Japan --- p.39 / Chapter 3.1 --- Paradigm in the Ruling Level: Yoshida Doctrine --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2 --- Paradigm in the Social Level: Pacifism --- p.47 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Interaction between the Two Paradigms on Policy --- p.52 / Chapter 3.4 --- Summary --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Japan's Responses to the Gulf Crisis: The Gap of Two Paradigms (1990-91) --- p.59 / Chapter 4.1 --- Searching for a New Identity: Four Views to Japan's Security --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Two Competing Paradigms in the Eve of the Gulf Crisis --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3 --- A Strategic Cultural Explanation to the Reluctant Response on Overseas Dispatch --- p.72 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Japan's Responses to the Anti-Terrorism War: Moving towards An Unitary Paradigm (2001) --- p.82 / Chapter 5.1 --- "Japan's Emerging New Identity: The Notion of ""the Normal Nation""" --- p.83 / Chapter 5.2 --- Decline of the Pacifism --- p.92 / Chapter 5.3 --- Japan after the 911: Sending the SDF Overseas --- p.98 / Chapter Chapter Six --- Conclusion --- p.118 / Chapter 6.1 --- Japan Between the Pacifist Nation and Great Military Power --- p.109 / Chapter 6.2 --- The Significance and Limitation of the Research --- p.112 / Bibliography --- p.115

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-235). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: The effectiveness of airpower against ground forces in Operation Desert Storm. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2006. / Typescript. Film produced by Damul Films. Director, Moonsik Chung. Cast: Jonathan Flanigan, Ashley St. John-Yantz, Greg Petralis, Jesse Knight. Co-writer, Oreathia C. Smith.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, George H.W. Bush achieved the rhetorical success that had escaped his prior speaking endeavors. If the aforementioned assessments regarded Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric as a rhetorical triumph, in light of prior damning criticism of his rhetorical abilities, then an explanation for that triumph is in order. Bush’s rhetoric differed from his Presidential predecessors by virtue of two factors. First, as the first U.S. president of the Post-Cold War era, Bush’s rhetoric faced different rhetorical constraints than those faced by his predecessors, as he no longer had the narrative framework of the Cold War to explain U.S. foreign policy action. Second, Bush rhetorically juxtaposed American exceptionalism and realism within his rhetoric itself. This differed from the rhetoric of his immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, whose rhetoric employed American exceptionalism without reference to realism, although that rhetoric was strategically geared toward achieving realist foreign policy ends. Bush’s success was also considerable in that he faced significant rhetorical constraints created or exacerbated by Reagan. Reagan’s reputation as the “Great Communicator,” contrasted with Bush’s less-than-stellar reputation as an orator, makes Bush’s rhetorical success particularly worth understanding. President George H.W. Bush relied on three particular arguments to facilitate a U.S. military victory during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. These arguments differed considerably from foreign policy arguments offered by the Reagan administration with respect to the manner in which they addressed issues concerning the United Nations and the Vietnam War. First, Bush promoted U.N. diplomacy as a subsidiary of U.S. foreign policy. For Bush, the U.N. served as a venue where world opinion could be galvanized and action serving United States interests would not be constrained so much as legitimized. Second, he compared and contrasted U.S. action in the Gulf to the Vietnam War. In doing so, he combined the moral urgency of prior foreign policy efforts with the hindsight necessary to avoid a repeat of the American experience in Vietnam. Third, in retrospectively assessing the Gulf War, Bush depicted the conflict as a discrete foreign policy event in which he narrowly defined victory. Bush defined victory as the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in an attempt to shape a historical consensus on the significance of U.S. action.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1995-96. / Title from title screen (viewed Mar. 30, 2004). "June 1996." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1993-94. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 9, 2003). "February 1995." Includes bibliographical references.

In this thesis I attempt to show that there is no apparent good reason why one ought to embrace the sceptic’s claim that international relations lies beyond the pale of moral inquiry. The state, in the sceptic’s view, grounds its foreign policy in the national interest and not in morality. To assert otherwise is to mistake the fundamental essence of international relations--a claim resting on the assumption that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or epistemologically distinct objects of study. On reflection, however, one must have--at the very least--some kind of conceptual understanding about the idea “the national interest” before such a claim can be sustained. Although much has been said by many authors about the kinds of substantive policies which, in their respective views, actually serve the national interest-- e.g., policies which contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of national power--the idea of “the national interest” itself has attracted very little conceptual scrutiny. In this study, then, I attempt to shift the focus away from a concentration on the standards for determining whether this or that policy actually serves the national interest to a concentration on the idea of the national interest itself. Before this logically prior task is completed--an immense task for which my contribution can be interpreted as only a small one--there is no reason to embrace the notion that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or categorically distinct. This is particularly true if, through such an analysis, “the national interest” proves to be a categorically moral idea--viz., if it proves to be a proper object of study for students of moral and political philosophy.