Cette thèse traite de l'analyse économique des conflits, et plus particulièrement de l'apport d'une méthode, la "Contest Theory". En partant du postulat simple que les agents économiques réalisent un arbitrage beurre-canons, les conflits ont pu être intégrés dans le champ de l'analyse économique. Dans le premier chapitre, nous proposons une synthèse des principaux résultats et nous décrivons le rôle décisif des Contest Success Functions dans ce cadre théorique. Le second chapitre montre que, pour traiter des conflits armés, l'identité institutionnelle des agents devrait davantage être pris en considération dans les modèles de la "Contest Theory". Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse aux motivations pouvant expliquer le commerce d'armes entre ennemis. Nous montrons que si le vendeur dispose d'une technologie militaire et non militaire plus efficace que l'acheteur, le commerce d'armes peut s'avérer mutuellement avantageux. Dans le quatrième chapitre nous proposons d'estimer et de comparer les quatre plus grandes formes de Contest Success Functions en recourant à des données provenant du monde virtuel. À partir d'un échantillon de 1957 batailles, nous trouvons que la forme ratio est celle qui a la plus grande qualité prédictive. En d'autres termes, le principal facteur expliquant la victoire sur un champ de bataille (virtuel) est le ratio du nombre de canons déployés. / This thesis deals with conflict economics, and more precisely with the contributions of the Contest Theory to the field. This method assumes that economic agents face a trade off between guns and butter's activities. By doing so, it allows the consideration of conflicts in economic mainstream. In the first chapter, we offer a survey on guns versus butter models. In particular, we focus on Contest Success Functions which are the cornerstone of the framework. The second chapter highlights one limit of the models of contest theory in conflict economics namely the lack of importance given to the identity of agents. The third chapter studies the motivation which can explain the existence of arms trade between enemies. We show that if the seller has a higher productivity both in guns and butter's activity, there exists a mutually benefficial agreement. As a result, even between enemies, arms trade may be rational. In the fourth chapter, we estimate and compare the four main forms of Contest Success Functionsusing data coming from virtual worlds. Based on a sample of 1957 (virtual) battles, we find that the ratio form is always the best-fit Contest Success Function.

There is a lack of consensus on the empirical findings in research examining the so-called ‘guns and butter’ argument – does military expenditure crowd out social expenditure or not? Feminist scholars have been arguing that militarism, affects women’s welfare in a negative way. This study investigates whether countries' increase in military expenditure leads to a deterioration in women's health and education, based on the guns and butter argument. The study intends to find out what a possible correlation looks like for two different models, one that represents the impact on women's health and another that represents the impact on women's education, by using maternal mortality and school enrollment (with a gender parity index) as dependent variables. The survey is conducted for a sampling of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia for the period 1988 to 2020. The main findings of this study indicate that increased military expenditure leads to increased maternal mortality, however, the study finds no linear relationship between military expenditure and girls' school enrollment. The study also finds no correlation between health care, education expenditure and maternal mortality. Nevertheless, it indicates that education expenditure has a positive effect on girls’ school enrollment, and health care expenditure has a negative effect on girls’ school registration.