The purpose of this thesis is to examine if the organisational reforms, commonly referred to as New Public Management, have led to an institutional arrangement that promotes corrupt behaviour among officials at the sub-national level. By using a theoretical framework which is based on rationality among actors within the current institutional arrangement it is suggested that these reforms have created an environment where bribes and nepotism will increase and spread. To test this theory, a statistical analysis of the relationship between the percentage of private contracting by public procurement in the elderly and disabled care, and the level of corruption in Swedish municipalities has been conducted. The results indicate that the percentage of private contracting in elderly and disabled care does not have a significant effect on the levels of corruption in the municipalities. Some guidance to why this might be the case is presented in the conclusion, where it is argued that the theoretical framework must include a wider and broader understanding of the root causes of corruption, and further studies on the relationship between public officials and private companies must be carried out.