Thesis--Basel. / "Literatur": p. [vii]-viii.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 1938. / Thesis note on verso of t.p. Photoprinted. Bibliographical references in "Footnotes" (leaves 28-35) and "Footnotes to appendix" (leaves 56-60).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1996. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 244-245).

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-79). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

A revision of the author's thesis, Tübingen, 1959. / Bibliography: p. 213-215.

No description available.

Socrates and Theaetetus consider and reject three different definitions of knowledge in the Theaetetus. The first of these is the thesis that knowledge is perception. According to the received reading Plato's consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception is limited to the consideration of the naive and implausible thesis that immediate sense-perception is knowledge and there is no knowledge apart from immediate sense-perception. This reading, which limits the philosophic interest of Platos consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception, follows from a widespread misunderstanding of Socrates' reasons for introducing Protagoras and Heraclitus which circumscribes their role in the dialogue to supplying two theses, epistemological relativism and metaphysical flux, which are sufficient or perhaps necessary conditions for the thesis that knowledge is perception. I will show that Socrates introduces Protagoras and Heraclitus, not simply because they provide the epistemological or metaphysical framework within which Theaetetus' definition holds good, but because each man is committed to the thesis that knowledge is perception. Protagoras' sophistic expertise will be classed as a kind of empirical knowledge which bases itself on past and present perceptions and makes educated predictions of future perceptions. While Heraclitus' theory of flux will lead to a radical skepticism which rejects the possibility that there should be any knowledge of the world apart from perception. Socrates will give arguments against both of these ways of understanding the thesis that knowledge is perception. Plato thus articulates, develops, and ultimately rejects three different ways of understanding Theaetetus' initial definition of knowledge. / text

Zugl.: Palermo, Univ., Diss., 2008

The purpose of this study is to investigate modernity as a phenomenon in the history of ideas, and specifically to problematize its strict delimitation between the categories of philosophy and poetry. The foundation of the study consists of a comparative analysis of the fragments of pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus and of the Swedish poet Lars Norén, functioning as examples of these respective categories. This is achieved with the help of the theoretical abutments offered by Plato, Sven-Eric Liedman and Iain McGilchrist. The conclusion of the study is that there has been a cultural shift in the Western world since antiquity pertaining to a certain form of philosophizing activity, and that 'the old way' of exploring physics in many ways is the same as 'the new way' of creating poetry.

This doctoral dissertation examines the interrelation between three aspects of Heraclitus’ thought: (1) his interest in perspectival or context-dependent conceptions of the opposites; (2) his views on the obstacles to and limitations of human (as contrasted with divine) knowledge; and (3) his conception of reality as a unity, along with the divergent kinds of unity that he associates with the divine and the human perspective. This dissertation argues that Heraclitus conceives of reality as an undifferentiated unity that can only be understood from a “perspectiveless” state. In other words, reality is such that it can only be grasped from a state unconditioned by the perceptual and cognitive features arising from one’s idiosyncratic “creaturely” constitution – especially one’s needs and values. This perspectiveless state also corresponds to the divine “perspective.” Heraclitus’ logos, this thesis argues, is a method for recognizing the underlying structure of human thought and discourse, and the view of reality that this structure yields. However, this method, when used consistently and globally, serves to undermine both the logos itself and the human perspective that it reflects. Through an analysis of Heraclitus’ perspective juxtapositions, this thesis shows that a full engagement with the logos’ method of evoking the unity of opposites allows the audience to achieve a (temporary) collapse of perspective and apprehension of reality as a unity free of oppositions and differentiations. By viewing Heraclitus’ statements concerning human knowledge in this light, we can resolve certain puzzles in Heraclitus’ conception of unity, his preoccupation with the perspectival (despite his rejection of the idiosyncratic) and his attitudes towards human knowledge. The unity of opposites, while not part of the nature of reality, plays an essential part in the common structure of human thought. By cleaving to this common structure, and by engaging fully with the conflicting perspectives which it brings together, and which are equally idiosyncratic with respect to the true nature of reality, the audience overcomes the limitations of the human perspective, and achieves a temporary apprehension of a reality which cannot be grasped from within its constraints.