Inaug.-dis.--Bonn. / Vita. "Die dissertation bildet den 2. hauptteil der schrift: Der begriff des belief bei David Hume, abgedruckt als. nr. xvii der Abhandlungen zur philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, herausgegeben von Benno Erdmann, Halle, Max Niemeyer."--Note (verso of t.-p.)

Inaug.-diss.--Erlangen. / Lebenslauf.

Inaug.-diss.--Halle. / Lebenslauf.

Thesis--University of Michigan, 1970. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 217-228).

Inaug.-Diss.--Bern.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Leipzig. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-49).

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich 1--Universität Gesamthochschule Siegen, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 349-360. Index.

I provide an interpretation of Hume’s argument in Treatise 1.2 Of the Ideas of Space and Time that finite extensions are only finitely divisible (hereafter Hume’s Finite Divisibility Argument). My most general claim is that Hume intends his Finite Divisibility Argument to be a demonstration in the Early Modern sense as involving the comparison and linking of ideas based upon their intrinsic contents. It is a demonstration of relations among ideas, meant to reveal the meaningfulness or absurdity of a given supposition, and to distinguish possible states of affairs from impossible ones. It is not an argument ending in an inference to an actual matter of fact. Taking the demonstrative nature of his Finite Divisibility Argument fully into account radically alters the way we understand it. Supported by Hume’s own account of demonstration, and reinforced by relevant Early Modern texts, I follow to its logical consequences, the simple premise that the Finite Divisibility Argument is intended to be a demonstration. Clear, abstract ideas in Early Modern demonstrations represent possible objects. By contrast, suppositions that are demonstrated to be contradictory have no clear ideas annexed to them and therefore cannot represent possible objects—their ‘objects,’ instead, are “impossible and contradictory.” Employing his Conceivability Principle, Hume argues that there is a clear idea of a finite extension containing a finite number of parts and therefore, finitely divisible extensions are possible. In contrast, the supposition of an infinitely divisible finite extension is “absurd” and “contradictory” and stands for no clear idea. Consequently, Hume deems this supposition “impossible and contradictory,” that is, without meaning and therefore, descriptive of no possible object. This interpretation allays concerns found in the recent literature and helps us better understand what drives Hume’s otherwise perplexing argument in the often neglected or belittled T 1.2.

RIBEIRO, Andreh Sabino. Paixões propulsoras e razão diretiva na ciência moral de David Hume. 2010. 95f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-20T15:33:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_asribeiro.pdf: 762851 bytes, checksum: 9cbc3a73ac39049b43717d921acad47d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-23T14:28:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_asribeiro.pdf: 762851 bytes, checksum: 9cbc3a73ac39049b43717d921acad47d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-23T14:28:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_asribeiro.pdf: 762851 bytes, checksum: 9cbc3a73ac39049b43717d921acad47d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / This work is intended to show that David Hume‟s moral philosophy associated reason to feeling, both in mental and social domains, like an inseparable compound in moral action and distinction. He believed that the artificiality of institutions did not implicate the negation of nature, but its extension. Thus, virtues and vices are recognized by humans as actions which respectively please and unplease them. This is because we share a nature in common that enables us to discern the utility of behavior for our survival according to the circumstances of time and space. Then, it means a refusal of the methaphysical objectivism and the religious authority as the foundation of morality. Hume understood his project as a complement to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, extending the use of experimental method in the field of morality. / Este trabalho pretende apresentar a filosofia moral de David Hume a partir da associação entre razão e sentimento, a formarem um composto inseparável na ação e na distinção morais. Para tanto, considero sua teoria no domínio mental e no social. O filósofo acreditava que a artificialidade das instituições não implicava a negação da natureza, mas sua extensão. Assim, virtudes e vícios são reconhecidos pelos seres humanos enquanto ações que, respectivamente, lhes agradam e desagradam. Isto porque compartilhamos uma mesma natureza que nos capacita discernirmos a utilidade das condutas para nossa sobrevivência de acordo com as circunstâncias de tempo e espaço. Recusa-se, então, um objetivismo metafísico e uma autoridade religiosa como fundamento da moralidade. Hume entendia seu projeto como um complemento da Revolução Científica do século XVII, ao estender o uso do método experimental no campo da moralidade.