Inaug.-diss.--Strassburg. / Lebenslauf.

Thèse de doctorat--Droit--Rennes, 1904.

Texte remanié de: Th.--New Brunswick (N.J.)--Rutgers university. / Bibliogr. p. 229-245. Index. Bibliographie (p. [229]-245) et index.

The main claim of this dissertation is that Hume’s theory of the self can be interpreted in terms of a causal or functional theory of mind. It is a thesis about Hume’s identification of mental particulars―impressions and ideas―in terms of the kind of roles that each plays in the cognitive system that it is a member of. The true Humean idea of the human mind is to understand it as a system of different mental states and processes, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect. Functionalism as such can be construed as both teleo-functionalism and psycho-functionalism. The former is rooted in his teleological characterization of the mind according to which the bundle of perceptions persists over time by maintaining functional continuity, whereas the main source of Hume’s psycho-functionalism lies in his Representational Theory of Mind. Hume, however, Hume expresses his strong dissatisfaction with his earlier treatment of the topic, and confesses that he now finds an inconsistency in his original account. He does not make clear in his recantation what he finds problematic in his earlier account. And although more than a dozen interpretations have been suggested, no consensus as to what Hume’s worry is has emerged. I claim that Hume’s functionalism, as presented in the main body of the Treatise, stores a problem for him and when he arrives at the Appendix he realises the problem and confesses that he is unable to resolve it. The problem that leads to the inconsistency has two main possible sources: First, the principles of constancy and coherence may successfully account for the arising belief in the idea of the continued and distinct existence of external objects and the idea of personal identity, but they fail to explain our belief in other minds (selves). Second, Hume’s functionalism is circular because it presupposes personal identity. The central idea is that if Hume is right to say that something like functional continuity would suffice for persons to persist through time, then he must show that we can have a complete account of how one’s mental states produce the idea of a persisting self without making assumption about the identity condition of their subject or bearer. And of course, psycho-functionalism, including Hume’s, identifies a mental state in terms of its functional relations to other mental states that are the states of the same person. This is straightforwardly circular.

<p> Sceptical passages in Hume's writings tend to lead readers to assume that he opposes theories of evidence and methods for judging the truth and falsehood of our knowledge claims. But interpretations such as this overlook passages where Hume insists that we have methods of judging the truth of our claims about a priori relations of ideas and matters of fact and real existence. My intention is to make sense of these passages, taking them literally, and thereby avoiding both the sceptical and sceptically based naturalistic interpretations. I do not oppose the view that Hume is sceptical about metaphysical claims, such as our knowledge of the existence of impression-causing objects, but I argue that he is not sceptical of scientific claims in the sense that we have no reasonable basis for judging their truth or falsehood. The point is made by formulating Hume's theory of scientific judgement.</p> <p> The focus of this interpretation is on Hume's conception of philosophical relations, which provides the basis for predication and judgement. Predication arises by the comparison of ideas; a priori judgement is the "agreement or disagreement" of an idea with other ideas, while empirical judgement is the correspondence of an idea with an existing object (impressicn). </p> <p> The bulk of the dissertation formulates the scope and content of each of the seven philosophical relations as they are divided into those judged a priori, those judged by an immediate sense impression, and those judged by empirical reasoning in terms of cause and effect. In each case we find that Hume is neither sceptical of our methods for judging truth, nor is any method grounded in a presuppositional "natural" belief.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

While perhaps the most recognizable hallmark of David Hume's moral philosophy is his commitment to an anti-rationalist theory of ethics, I argue that Hume came to reject this position found the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) in his later Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In the Treatise, Hume endorses the view that reason is wholly inactive and cannot be the source of our sense of morals. According to the Treatise, our human reasoning does not give rise to the feelings of pleasure that we associate with an action being right. Instead, the determination we make that an action is right arises from feelings of approval that are rooted solely in natural sympathy and fellow-feeling, and these feelings never arise from reason. Yet, I argue that in the Second Enquiry, Hume abandons these anti-rationalist commitments and allows rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that ultimately approve our actions. In this paper, I argue for two claims about the role of reason in Hume's moral philosophy. First, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume is committed to a strong form of anti-rationalism where reason has no role in the process in which we approve/disapprove actions that are right or wrong. Second, I argue Hume moves away from these strong anti-rationalist commitments in the Treatise to a version of his moral theory where reason plays a role in making determinations of morality by allowing rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that approve actions. Finally, I argue that Hume makes these changes in the Second Enquiry to rule out an egoistic interpretation of his theory, and by accepting a rationalistic sentimentalism, Hume can defend his moral theory from an egoistic interpretation and prevent his system from collapsing into egoism. / Master of Arts / In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued for a moral theory where the rightness or wrongness of any action could be determined by our feelings of pleasure or pain that we feel when we have an idea of that action. While contemporary historians of philosophy agree that in the earlier Treatise version of his theory Hume did not allow these feelings associated with moral rightness to arise from reason, I argue that Hume fundamentally changed his theory in the later Second Enquiry to do just that. In particular, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume did not believe that our feelings about rightness or wrongness could arise from rational judgments. Nevertheless, in the Second Enquiry, Hume changed is theory to allow rational judgments about what is useful to give rise to those moral feelings. I then conclude that Hume made these changes to his theory to prevent his moral philosophy from reducing to a theory where only those actions that are in my self-interest could be considered morally right.