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De leer van den zedelijken zin bij HutchesonWestendorp Boerma, N., January 1910 (has links)
Proefschrift (Th. D.)--University of Groningen, 1910. / Includes stellingen. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 6-7).
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De leer van den zedelijken zin bij HutchesonWestendorp Boerma, N., January 1910 (has links)
Proefschrift (Th. D.)--University of Groningen, 1910. / Includes stellingen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 6-7). Also issued in print.
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The moral philosophy of Francis HutchesonBishop, John Douglas January 1979 (has links)
The main object of this thesis is to explain in a systematic fashion Francis Hutcheson's moral theory. Such an attempt will necessarily involve a discussion of the various philosophical problems which are inherent in his theory. For example, I discuss the issue of whether Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense is to be interpreted in an intuitionist or an emotivist fashion. It is argued that some aspects of his moral sense theory favour the former and some the latter interpretation. Hutcheson's theory of benevolence is outlined and his arguments against the psychological egoists are discussed. Perhaps the most important problem with Hutchesoh's moral sence theory is the problem of motivation. Any moral theory which locates the virtue of virtuous actions in the motive from which they are done, as Hutcheson's does, will encounter problems in explaining how knowledge of right and wrong can influence us to be virtuous. Hutcheson's ingenious solution to this problem and his theory of moral motivation, which I suggest have not been adequately discussed previously to this thesis, are explicated at length. Hutcheson's criticisms of the moral rationalists are considered, as are Price's criticisms of Hutcheson. A final chapter attempts to show how the development of Hutcheson's thinking was the result of his realizing the implications of his own theories, especially his theory of moral motivation.
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What motive to virtue? Early modern empirical naturalist theories of moral obligationHoback, Brady John 01 May 2016 (has links)
In this dissertation, I argue for a set of interpretations regarding the relationship between moral obligation and reasons for acting in the theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume. Several commentators have noted affinities between these naturalist moral theories and contemporary ethical internalism. I argue that attempts to locate internalist theses in these figures are not entirely successful in any clear way. I follow Stephen Darwall's suggestion that addressing the question “why be moral?” is one of the fundamental problems of modern moral philosophy. Since, as some have argued, there is a tension between accepting internalism and providing an adequate response to the “why be moral” question, I argue that each figure maintains a distinctive response to this question given the sort of internalism, if any, he would accept. In the introduction, I provide the key distinctions that arise from contemporary discussions of ethical internalism, and I motivate my project of looking for insight into the relationship between internalism and amoralism in the British Moralists.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the moral theory Hobbes who, I argue, would accept a version of constitutive existence internalism because he holds that there is a necessary connection between one's being contractually obligated and one's being in certain rationally motivating states. I then present the fool's objection as an objection to the assumption of a relevant similarity between divine obligation and contractual obligation. I argue that, irrespective of this dissimilarity, the fool has some rational motive to keep his covenants in virtue of the fact that making covenants changes one's decision situation in such a way that it becomes reasonable to treat covenants as if they imposed categorical constraints on behavior. I claim that Hobbes's response to the fool is, at least in part, that the fool fails to understand what moral obligation consists in.
In the remainder of the dissertation I turn my attention to two classical sentimentalist moral theories. I examine the theories of Hutcheson and Hume because it is not clear what resources moral sentimentalism has available to it in order to address questions about the reasonableness of moral action. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an interpretation of Hutcheson who, because he distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons, is able to say there is some non-derivative sense in which moral actions are reasonable. I argue that he develops a theory whereby moral obligation is to be understood in terms of the non-motivating states of approval of moral spectators, and I do not think, contrary to Darwall, that there is anything puzzling about his doing so. I argue that Hutcheson does not accept a version of motive internalism, but that he shares much in common with internalist views: he claims that there is a very strong, if contingent, connection between our states of approval and our motivational states. I offer an explanation of how Hutcheson could respond to the amoalist, which holds that we ought to be moral because, in part, we all already have the motives for and the interests in doing the sorts of things of which moral spectators approve.
In chapters 5 and 6, I turn my attention to Hume who, because he makes no distinction between motivating and justifying reasons, does not seem to have anything to say about the non-derivative reasonableness of moral action. I argue that a textually grounded interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions provides us with more reason to favor an (appraiser motive) internalist reading over an externalist reading of his moral theory. Much of my argument depends on an interpretation of Hume's claim that it is possible for agents to be moved to act from a sense of duty alone. When we ask what Hume can say to the question “why be moral,” some of the options that Hutcheson pursues are initially open to him. However, I argue that Hume thinks philosophical theorizing must give way to the operations of psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for inspiring agents to act morally by giving rise in them to particular kinds of affections.
I conclude with some general remarks about the problems surrounding Darwall's interpretation of Hume's theory of justice, and use this discussion to lend further support to the claim that the actual theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume do not neatly fit into the taxonomies that Darwall seems to think they do.
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Hutcheson's arguments against egoism in An inquiry concerning moral good and evilDesautels, Guy. January 1976 (has links)
No description available.
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Hutcheson's arguments against egoism in An inquiry concerning moral good and evilDesautels, Guy. January 1976 (has links)
No description available.
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Der "Moral-Sense" bei Gellert, Lessing und Wieland : Zur Rezeption von Shaftesbury und Hutcheson in Deutschland /Engbers, Jan. January 2001 (has links)
Diss.--Techn. Univ.--Berlin, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 157-161.
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Shaftesbury's und Hutcheson's verhältnis zu HumeMartin, John J., January 1905 (has links)
Inaug.-diss.--Halle. / Lebenslauf. "Litteratur": p. [123]-124.
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Early eighteenth-century British moral philosophers and the possibility of virtueVeitch, Emma January 2017 (has links)
The general aim of this thesis is to further undermine the convention that British moral philosophy of the early eighteenth century is best conceived as a struggle between rationalist and sentimentalist epistemologies. I argue that the philosophers considered here (Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, Gilbert Burnet, John Balguy and John Gay) situated their moral epistemologies within the wider framework of an attempt to prove the ‘reality' of virtue in terms of virtue being an achievable, practical endeavour. To this end, they were as much concerned with the attributes that motivated or caused God to create in the way that he did – his communicable attributes - as they were with our own natural moral abilities. I maintain that this concern led Clarke, Burnet and Balguy to look beyond a rationalist epistemology in an attempt to account for the practical possibility of moral action. I claim that it led Hutcheson to develop a moral theory that reflected a realist theistic metaphysics that went some way beyond an appeal to providential naturalism. I argue that it led Gay to try to synthesise the approaches of rival moral schemes in order to offer a unified account of agency and obligation. The thesis has three key objectives: 1) to examine the relationship of rationalism to obligation and motivation in the work of Clarke, Burnet and Balguy, and 2) to explore the relative roles of sense and judgment in the moral epistemologies of Hutcheson, Burnet, Balguy and Gay and to (re) examine the nature of Hutcheson's moral realism, and 3) to investigate the theistic metaphysical claims made by all parties with respect to their arguments about moral realism.
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A STUDY OF HUTCHESON’S AND HUME’S THEORIES OF AESTHETIC TASTEGao, Weining 01 January 2018 (has links)
This thesis examines the aesthetic theories by Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, two of the most influential philosophers of the eighteenth century. Focused on the interpretation of both theories, it concentrates on the issue of human taste, in particular, aesthetic taste, including questions concerning people’s external sense (sensation) and internal sense (sensations), what the differences are between better taste and worse taste, how people possible improve taste by practice, examples, customs, education, and the like. It concludes with a criticism on both philosophers’ works and a positive argument on the explanation of better and worse taste. Primary texts include Hutcheson’s Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design and Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste.
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