In this paper, I will try to answer the question how the aesthetic idea in Kant’s aesthetic theory accounts for the universal validity of the subjective judgment of taste, and what the nature of the aesthetic idea is that makes such account possible. This claim about universal validity of the subjective judgment of taste in Kant’s philosophy is regarded to be problematic because of the seeming contradiction between the subjectivity of a judgment and its universality. What can solve this contradiction, from my point of view, is the role of the aesthetic idea that it plays in the judgment of taste and the subjective principle that puts cognitive powers of mind in a harmonious free relationship. The main feature that makes the aesthetic idea the source of the universal validity is its universal communicability expressed in the universally pleasurable feeling of the judgment of taste.

Taking the title of this page literally, I wish to say the following: In this thesis I attempt to resolve some of the metaphilosophical problems concerning the logic of philosophy (i.e. its definition, structural principles, historiography, etc.) in view of the general theory that all of philosophy is but the expression of a single idea--that of the relationship between Reason and Experience. Towards this end, and from within a Kantian framework, I undertake to examine the history of philosophy in order to demonstrate how these basic metaphilosophical problems are generated and how it is that they cannot be solved. The one original claim being made in all of this, then, is simply that philosophy only ever has one thing to say and that this thing cannot be said. If I am right about this, then I have made no contribution to human knowledge, except in the Socratic sense that we now know something which cannot be known. I draw no moral from this except to note in passing that philosophy was first defined as the love of wisdom. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Accusé par Albert Burgh de considérer sa propre philosophie comme étant la meilleure entre toutes, Spinoza rectifie : il sait seulement qu'est vraie la philosophie qu'il comprend. Mais on cherchera vainement une authentique définition, chez lui, de l'idée de philosophie, ainsi qu'un programme d'ensemble des connaissances rationnelles, comme s'appliquent à en dresser Bacon, Descartes ou Hobbes. Y a-t-il chez Spinoza une conception précise, voire singulière, de l'idée de philosophie? Étudier les occurrences, la nature de la définition, ce qu'enfin peut signifier le passage d'un titre pressenti de Philosophie à celui d'Éthique, produit autant d'indices d'une idée de philosophie conçue comme praxis de distinction ou, comme le disait Althusser, comme activité de tracer des lignes de démarcation. Mais une idée même de philosophie se constitue en ce geste, et seulement en ce geste, à savoir par le biais de relations nécessaires avec ce qui a priori n'est pas elle: le vulgaire, l'ignorant, le théologien, le souverain. L'idée de philosophie, en d'autres termes, s'autoproduit dans un système de rencontres singulières. En analyser les fruits permet alors de recomposer l'idée de « vraie philosophie» : elle est d'abord celle d'une pratique de production d'idées (comprendre, philosopher droitement, parler en philosophe) et de leur communication (s'adresser au vulgaire, au souverain, enseigner en tant que philosophe). Mais se fait jour, en outre, comme un naturel philosophe, effort s'éprouvant selon une réjouissance propre au « vrai philosophe », déjà sage en vertu de son mouvement de se perfectionner et d'accroître sa puissance. / Being accused by Albert Burgh of appraising his own philosophy as the best above all others, Spinoza rectified : only the philosophy he could understand did he know as true. But vainly will one seek any authentic definition, in his works, of the idea of philosophy, or an overall programme of rational knowledge, such as Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes endeavored to make out. Can one find in Spinoza a specific, singular indeed conception of the idea of Philosophy ? Studying occurrences, the nature of the definition, eventually what the change from the prospective title Philosophy to that of Ethics may signify, generates as many indications about an idea of philosophy conceived as a praxis of distinction, or, as Althusser would say, as activity consisting of drawing boundaries. But a very idea of philosophy constitutes itself by this movement, and only by this movement, namely via necessary relations with what, a priori, is not itself : the vulgar, the ignorant, the theologian, the sovereign. In other words the idea of philosophy generates itself within a system of singular encounters. Analyzing their fruits enables one, then, to recompose the idea of “true philosophy”: it is firstly that of a practice of producing ideas (understanding, philosophizing with rectitude, speaking as philosopher) and of communicating them (speaking to the “vulgar”, to the sovereign, disseminating as philosopher). Finally something like a philosophic natural disposition comes to light, an effort experienced in an exultation proper to the “true philosopher”, who is already wise by virtue of his movement toward perfection and his growing power.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin. / "Die ganze Abhandlung beabsichtige ich später unter dem Titel "Platos Ideenlehre in der Kritik des Aristotels zu veröffentlichen": t.p. verso. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1992. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-144). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin. / "Die ganze Abhandlung beabsichtige ich später unter dem Titel "Platos Ideenlehre in der Kritik des Aristotels zu veröffentlichen": t.p. verso. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Köln. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-128).

Thesis--Köln. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-128).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1987. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-185). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

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