This thesis analyses the use of remote sensing technologies in efforts that seek to combat wildlife crime in East and Southern Africa. Companies and organisations working on the development of remote sensing technology used for anti-poaching efforts, in the study region, are identified through the creation of a database. The social impacts and risks involved in using these technologies are then outlined by analysing the responses to a research survey from those in the conservation community working with wildlife crime. The species focus is on rhino and elephant poaching, thus, the thesis begins with a background on the legislation surrounding both the hunting and trade of these species. Stockpiling of rhino horn and elephant tusk will be discussed as well as other anti-poaching strategies that do not use remote sensing technology. Three key research questions are then answered: Which remote sensing technologies are in use and what kinds of companies and organisations are mainly working on their development? What are the main risks of using remote sensing technology to specifically target wildlife crime in this region? And can the increased use of remote sensing technologies to combat wildlife crime be regarded as an extension of the militarised approach to conservation? The last question is discussed in relation to existing research on this topic. Considering the findings from this paper, recommendations for further research are then made.

Two obstructionist ways of doing politics on contentious wildlife management issues currently reflect a legitimacy deficit in official channels for public engagement. The first is that of a pernicious “direct-action” politics, in the form of resort by hunters in rural Sweden to illegal killings of protected wolves over whose policy they contest. The second obstruction is when environmental non-governmental organizations routinely file appeals in higher-level courtrooms contesting democratically mandated wolf cull decisions. Although markedly different when it comes to their categorically deliberative values as well as fidelity to the law, we argue both extra-legal and the litigative phenomena reflect disenfranchisement with the participation channels in which such controversies may be resolved through a public dialogue. We also argue that both possess negative systemic deliberative value inasmuch as they frustrate goals of reaching deliberative consensus, by contributing to a stalled public communication on wolf management. We address this deficit by appeal to recent developments in the theory and practice of mini-publics that promote both the categorical and systemic deliberative value of channeling contestation. In particular, we appeal to a novel conception of hunter-initiated, but citizen controlled, mini-publics as a vehicle for re-starting stalled public communication on wolf conservation.

In this paper, we determine whether illegal hunting should be construed as a crime of dissent. Using the Nordic countries as a case study where protest-driven, illegal hunting of protected wolves is on the rise, we reconsider the crime using principles of civil disobedience. We invoke the conditions of intentionality, nonevasion, dialogic effort, non-violence and appeal to parameters of reasonable disagreement about justice and situate the Nordic illegal hunting phenomenon at a nexus between conscientious objection, assisted disobedience and everyday resistance. This examination leads us to contend that the crime has heretofore received an inadequate response limited to punishment and deterrence. This contention finds support in the worsening predicaments of illegal hunting following harsh sanctions and stigmatization. Although hunters publicize injustices through their crimes, we find that killing wolves as a means to deliberative ends disqualifies hunters’ dissent as legitimate disobedience, creating an obligation of deliberative uptake on the part of society. Nonetheless, in a critical contribution to the field of criminal justice, we argue that it is instead the conditions of deliberative suboptimality experienced by hunters that create this obligation of uptake. Hence, in order to fulfill this obligation, we contend that the burden falls on regulatory agencies to better articulate the justifications for the policies that coerce hunters. We also advocate creating novel institutions to provide hunters with effective opportunities for contesting wildlife conservation directives.