Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Theologie--Göttingen--Georg-August-Universität, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 273-279.

For Kant the religious is less an independent domain of consciousness with its own laws of synthesis than a contested territory which critique must defend against both the dogmatic pretensions of speculative philosophy and an ecclesiastical orthodoxy determined to deprive reason of its authority. The result is a religion within the limits of reason alone, a rational faith which resists the false promise of knowledge through transcendent revelation but yields a practical faith in the immanent field of action. It is traditionally asserted that Kant's rational faith is the most refined expression of the aporia at which the Enlightenment arrives when philosophy and religion, rational and positive authority, become opposed. This thesis addresses the way in which Kant's confidence in the idea of an invisible church as the natural meeting-place of religion and philosophy - and to which all belong by virtue of their reason - is modulated by his understanding of the necessity of the visible church as an institution that, given certain precautions, can mediate the political concern with coercive law and the philosophical concern with freedom. The thesis has an Introduction and a Conclusion. The main body of the text divides into two sections, the first with two chapters, the second with four. The Introduction gives an account of the Enlightenment diremption between religion and philosophy, faith and reason, and its genesis in the Reformation. In the first chapter, we assess Kant's treatment of the speculative proofs in the light of Mendelssohn's description of him as der Allzermalrnende, the restricted role he retains for transcendental theology and the Ideal, and the light this sheds upon his alleged Deism. In the second, we discuss his moral proof and ethicotheology and the conjunction of ethics and religion that this necessitates. Section Two addresses the genesis of his realisation that the visible, institutional church must assume the responsibility for the preparation of the establishment of a divine ethical state on earth: chapter three considers the issue of censorship surrounding Kant's religious writings and the notion of religion as the 'focal point of Enlightenment'; chapter four, Kant's notion of the visible, its relation to what we shall formulate as the logic of the staff, and the development of the concept of the exemplarity of Christ; chapter five, the concept of the expedient as a figure which dictates the function of the letter and historical faith in their relation to the visible church; chapter six, Kant's defence of ethics and religion against the dangers of fanatical interiority and the corresponding attempt to balance out the political duty to civil society and the rational duty to the ethical commonwealth. In the Conclusion, we address the question of why Kant's philosophy of religion was to offend both the religious orthodox and the philosophical Enlightenment.

How do concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world? This is the main topic of John McDowell's Mind and World where McDowell attempts to dissolve a number of dualisms making use of a particular philosophical methodology which I identify as a version of Wittgenstein's quietism. This thesis consists of a critical analysis of a number of dualisms which McDowell attempts to dissolve in Mind and World. These include the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding, the dualism of conceptual versus non conceptual content, the dualism of scheme and content and the dualism of reason and nature. These dichotomies are all intricately intertwined and can be seen to be subsumed by the main topic of this thesis, namely, thinking and the world. McDowell persuasively draws attention to the unsustainability of particular philosophical positions between which philosophers have 'oscillated' such as coherentism and the given. However I claim that he does not go far enough in his attempt as a quietist to achieve peace for philosophy as traditional dichotomies such as that of realism and anti-realism still appear to exert a grip on his thinking. In this regard, 1 argue that, although McDowell’s work indicates the viability of quietism in addressing seemingly intractable philosophical positions, it would have gained by incorporating insights from European phenomenologists, such as Heidegger, who have been as intent as McDowell on reworking traditional dualisms. McDowell’s quietist methodology plays an important role in Mind and World and some of the criticism that has been directed towards his work displays a lack of appreciation of this method. I claim that a proper understanding of McDowell's version of quietism is important for a correct understanding of this text.

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學哲學部. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [1]-[2] (last group)). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue zhe xue bu. / 序 --- p.i／ iv / Chapter ´¡ --- 康德体系之存有論與形上學循环運動 --- p.1／72 / Chapter ´Ł --- 「越渡／反越渡」與主動解釋 --- p.73／133 / 註解 / 書目

劉桂標. / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部,1994. / 參考文獻: leaves [1-4] (3rd group) / Liu Guibiao. / 引文簡稱 / 序言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章： --- 道德原則的基礎一意志及義務 --- p.5 / Chapter (一） --- 廣義的意志及意志與意念的區分 --- p.5 / Chapter (1) --- <<原則>>中的幾處不同的說明 --- p.5 / Chapter (2) --- <<形上學>>中的有關引文及其闡釋-Wi lie和 Wi1lkur 的異同和關係 --- p.6 / Chapter (3) --- 廣義的Wille、狹義的Wille和Willkur的番翻譯及<< 原則>>中幾處說明的意義 --- p.17 / Chapter (二） --- 善的意志 --- p.20 / Chapter (1) --- 善的意志是道德原則的唯一的決定根據 --- p.20 / Chapter (2) --- 經驗事物只具相對價值 --- p.22 / Chapter (3) --- 唯有善意才具絶對價值 --- p.30 / Chapter (三） --- 義務、人類意念及道德情感. --- p.36 / Chapter (1) --- 義務的主觀的和客觀的意義 --- p.36 / Chapter (2) --- 人類意念和行動的強制性 --- p.38 / Chapter (3) --- 道德感是服從法則的一種動力 --- p.45 / Chapter (4) --- 康德“道德情感´ح說商榷 --- p.57 / Chapter 第二章： --- 道德的最高原則-定然律令與意志自律原則 --- p.63 / Chapter (一） --- 定然律令的意志及其與假然律令的區別 --- p.63 / Chapter (1) --- 命令與律令的意義 --- p.63 / Chapter (2) --- 兩種律令的區分及其與兩種命題形式的關係 --- p.65 / Chapter (3) --- 略述假然律令的進一步區分 --- p.69 / Chapter (二） --- 定然律令程式的意義及其區分 --- p.70 / Chapter (1) --- 定然律令程式的意義 --- p.70 / Chapter (2) --- 定然律令的基本程式及其附屬程式的區分 --- p.72 / Chapter (3) --- 三基本程式的意義及其相互關係 --- p.74 / Chapter (4) --- 略述三附屬程式的意義及其作用 --- p.75 / Chapter (三） --- 定然律令三基本程式及意志自律原則 --- p.79 / Chapter (1) --- 第一程式的意義 --- p.79 / Chapter (2) --- 例證的意義 --- p.85 / Chapter (3) --- 意義務的分類 --- p.86 / Chapter (4) --- 四個實例的分析與商權P --- p.92 / Chapter (5) --- 第二程式及其例證分析與商榷 --- p.98 / Chapter (6) --- 第三程式及意志自律的意義 --- p.107 / Chapter (7) --- 意志自律是唯一真正的道德原則 --- p.110 / 結語 --- p.123 / 註釋 --- p.135 / 參考書目

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This dissertation argues for the truth of two fundamental premises: that testimony is the primary source of knowledge in human beings, and that testimony accounts for the emergence and formation of human minds. The thesis argues that the human ability to perceive as…, to remember as…, and to infer as…, is due to the say-so of others. All human beings, in virtue of being sentient beings, are able to experience both the external world and their own private states of consciousness, this work contends, however, that our ability to experience as… is a consequence of our emergence in a world of epistemic transactions and encounters, the most basic of which are explicated by the epistemological notion of testimony. The work argues, then, that we live in an interpreted world – a world interpreted by those who have gone before us. The thesis argues further, that the world-view that is built within us as a consequence of the sayings of others, induces and forms human minds. The work makes a strong commitment to the Kantian categories and that philosopher’s thesis of Transcendental Idealism. On the shoulders of the Kantian a priori, however, the dissertation argues that the formation of human doxastic structures is due to what one’s epistemic elders say about what is. As such, the thesis seeks to establish a fundamental link between ontology, epistemology, and the concept of mind. The work proposes a view of the concept of truth that synthesises the Correspondence Theory of Truth, the Coherence Theory of Truth, with a theory of meaning – I name this synthesis a Unified Theory of Truth. Extensive consideration is given to the concept of evidence and the role of trust in epistemic transactions. The work concludes with a consideration of the possibility that human beings may be able to have experiences as… that transcend the ways of ‘seeing’ that are due to testimony. An explanatory theory is posited that the writings and testimonies of mystics provide evidence that human beings are capable of meaningful experiences which cannot be accommodated by the conceptual structures that otherwise make meaning possible. The dissertation is argued in seven chapters and is constructed thus: Chapter One The thesis is stated in four premises: 1. that the testimony of others, with respect to what is the case (or may be the case), is the primary source of our beliefs about what is the case (or may be the case) 2. that the testimony of others provides adequate relevant grounds for one to claim to know what is the case 3. that education is testimony 4. that the formation and emergence of mind is due to testimony Significant presuppositions are identified and discussed. A brief argument in support of the thesis is posited. Reference is made to the evolution of the argument and the overall structure and organisation of the project is elucidated. Chapter Two The second chapter is dedicated to a detailed and extensive analysis of epistemic justification. I argue that the ‘evidence condition’ of the tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge is sometimes misapplied by those who argue that its function is to verify propositions. I argue that its function is to justify beliefs and that it does not verify that p – the evidence condition ‘tracks’ the belief condition, not the truth condition. I also examine the concept of evidence itself. Chapter Three A detailed examination of the concepts of ‘testimony’, ‘epistemic dependence’ and ‘epistemic independence’ is undertaken. I argue for the centrality and primacy of testimony in the formation of beliefs and subsequently one’s doxastic structures. I argue that testimony plays a fundamental role in the process of education and that this fact points to its significance and importance in epistemic transactions and the emergence of rational and self-reflective minds. Chapter Four In the fourth chapter I advert to the difficulty encountered in (a) embracing a strong commitment to intellectual autonomy and (b) accepting the say-so of others on trust. In the light of this observation, I undertake a linguistic conceptual analysis of the concept of trust and then examine the role trust plays in the acquisition of beliefs. I argue that the concept of trust does not exclude critical appraisal, but that when one trusts, one must be disposed to act in a certain way. I argue that although trust does play a fundamental role in formation of beliefs induced by the say-so of others, this does not make impossible critical appraisal of the attestations of others. Chapter Five In this chapter I note my agreement with other philosophers that testimony is the speech-act of attesting, but put up an argument that it is also the speech-act of informing. In consequence I undertake an analysis of the concept of information and examine the mechanisms and processes which are at work that enable ‘bits’ to become information for an entity or system. I argue that because testimony is the speech-act of informing, it is involved in the actual formation of human minds and, therefore, that we can attribute to testimony a deeper purpose than merely attesting to certain states of affairs. I argue that testimony builds, for human beings, a world-view and that it plays a fundamental role in how we come to interpret the experience of being. Chapter Six In the sixth and penultimate chapter I develop my thoughts on the relationship between a priori understandings, testimony, and meaning. I argue that there is a logical relationship between belief acquisition, meaning, and the emergence of fully developed human minds. In this chapter I give consideration to the possibility of thought, belief, and the existence of mind in non-human animals and pre-linguistic humans. I argue that there are good reasons to believe that non-human animals think and maybe develop understandings, but that the possession of mind, in the sense that one can be mindful and therefore attach meaning to experience and be conscious of self, is limited to human beings. I underwrite this view by adverting to the centrality of testimony within the human condition. Chapter Seven In the final chapter of this dissertation I move to a more speculative mode of philosophising and consider whether or not there may be meaningful human experiences which are not interpreted through the conceptual schema acquired as a consequence of the say-so of others. I undertake this speculation by examining the testimony of those who claim to have perceived God directly and those who seek to speak of purported mystical experiences. I also consider some counter-arguments to my thesis that have not been examined in previous chapters. I conclude that there may be meaningful experiences for human beings that lie beyond interpretation and that concepts such as ‘ineffability’ point to our attempts to speak of experiences which transcend our doxastic structures.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Melissa Merritt, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (44 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

Univ., Diss./2006--Tübingen, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. [159] - 165.

Texte remanié de: Ph. D. thesis--Oxford. / Bibliogr. p. 294-300. Index.