This research focussed on the performance of individuals in work teams. The purpose of this study was to investigate the nature of the team processes which could explain time-associated differences, in the performance outcomes of individuals within work teams, in teams whose members had moderately interdependent tasks and received hybrid pay incentives. The extant literature has a large body of work on teams in general; there also exists a large amount of work on currently understood relationships between task-interdependence, pay incentives, team processes, and performance. However, although task-interdependent work teams with hybrid pay incentives are common in many labour-intensive business environments, the current literature is thin on the identification of specific team processes which link long-term performance differences in comparable teams. Secondly, few studies on work-team performance, in the current literature, incorporate time as a predictor variable. This research investigated the effects of the introduction of performance-based hybrid pay incentives to members of work teams; the research also investigated the nature of explanatory, time-linked team processes which could be associated with performance variances between these work teams. A review of the literature on work team effectiveness, pay incentives and performance in work teams, resulted in hypothesised relationships between the interdependent tasks of work team members, hybrid pay incentives for supervisors, and overall team performance over time. The research focussed on variances between the team processes for good and poor teams to design a work team process and performance model, which could be used to predict performance variance between teams over time in the field. The study was conducted on bulk-cash deposit processing teller work teams. These work teams were located at geographically dispersed processing centres (18 cash centres), where each work team was composed of an average of 6 members, comprising a team supervisor, and a combination of permanently employed tellers (regular tellers) and tellers on renewable fixed term contracts (contract tellers), in a financial services firm. Using a longitudinal research design, the study used mixed methods, incorporating a control group time-series design. Quantitative performance data included the number and accuracy of deposits processed and attendance records; the data also included ratings on behavioural measures for professionalism. Individual and team-level performance related data was collected from over 480 individuals, in monthly buckets over a period of thirty four months (N=16,358 teller data months), during which a pay incentive for performance was introduced as the first intervention (IV1), followed - after eight months - by a second intervention (IV2), which was the allocation of tellers into teams, whose supervisors received hybrid pay incentives. Using a multiple case study approach, qualitative data was collected using semi-structured individual and group interviews incorporating rating scales, for individuals and focus groups, in two phases of data collection periods. The interviews were lagged to findings from analyses performed on the quantitative data collected. Using a combination of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the quantitative component of the study, emerging-themes analysis for the qualitative component, and structural modelling techniques, 1) as expected, the introduction of pay incentives for regular tellers was associated with statistically significant increases in the volumes of deposits processed per unit time, with a large effect size; 2) the introduction of individual pay incentives for regular tellers was associated with statistically significant increases in overall individual performance, with a medium effect size; 3) the combination of the introduction of individual and hybrid incentives, and the allocation of supervisors to teams, was associated with statistically significant additional increases in the volumes of deposits processed per unit time and accuracy of deposit processing for both regular and contract tellers, within high performing teams; 4) internal team processes (intra-team communication, target-setting and coaching, progress monitoring and feedback) explained the variance in inter-team performance over time; 5) team coordination and target-setting were the intervening variables in the relationship between pay incentives and team performance. A predictive performance model for performance in interdependent work teams with a combination of individual and hybrid pay incentives was developed, based on the quantitative and qualitative findings from this study. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / pagibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

M.Comm. / Paying for performance is however not an easy solution for organisational performance problems. As stated by Wright (1991: 16), "even the most ardent supporters of performancebased reward systems recognise that it is extraordinarily difficult to manage well". There is also a school of thought that rejects the claims made of performance-based rewards. A recent survey of British Telecom executives carried out by the Society of Telecom Executives (1991: 35) revealed that only 6 per cent of those responding to the survey thought that performance-based rewards improved their performance compared with an overwhelming 70 per cent who thought it had not. Research conducted by Carmen and Wood (1992: 8) on behalf of the Institute of Personnel Management and the National Economic Development Office into payment schemes, did not confirm that performance-based pay was a motivator. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 40 personnel directors and managers from large and medium organisations. They concluded that the personnel managers interviewed were by no means certain that performancebased rewards succeed in motivating people. Most were not convinced they could unequivocally identify that performance-based rewards was increasing either individual or organisational performance. When these research findings are closely investigated, it can normally be established that specific reasons contribute to the failure of the performance-based reward systems to increase motivation and organisational performance. Armstrong and Murlis (1994: 252) believe these reasons are mostly: A failure to involve employees sufficiently in the design and implementation of the system; A mistaken belief that the performance-based reward system on its own will achieve the expected increase in motivation and performance; and The poor people skills of those managers that are responsible for managing implemented performance-based reward systems.

The purpose of this study was to determine what the motivational drives are for employees working in an investment bank and whether money plays a roll in motivating employees working for an investment bank. The target group for this study was all the employees who have been in the employment of the target organisation for one year and longer. This group was divided into subgroups of specialist transactors and specialist support personnel. The profile of these two subgroups included a variety of ages, gender, races and educational backgrounds. Data was collected using a questionnaire that was discussed with each employee who agreed to participate in the study. The study clearly illustrates that money can be the primary drive for motivation to certain employees within an investment bank. When one ranks what makes the two subgroups work, it is quite clear that the ability to earn a bonus and the ability to earn more money is highest on the list of specialist transactors, whereas the specialist support personnel enjoys the culture of the bank and has to get job satisfaction to make them work. These results reflect the motivational drives of the sample group at the time of this research. The study concludes that one of the primary motivational aspects for the subgroup of employees which was subject to the empirical study is that these employees are motivated by the mere fact that they can earn more money and a bigger bonus as well as obtaining job satisfaction and having the ability to make their own decisions. The study discussed Maslow’s and McClellands need theories as well as various other motivational theories and approaches employers can introduce to motivate employees. Maslow’s and McClelland’s need theories were directly related to the empirical study with the view whether these two motivational theories can be applied successfully within an investment bank. Based on the results of the empirical study, the researcher came to the conclusion that both these theories can be equally successfully applied to employees working in the target organisation. / Dr. K. Stanz

M.B.A. / The aim of this research study was to understand the needs of knowledge workers and to determine if the current reward system is appropriate to promote the objectives of a knowledge intensive organisation. The objectives of this study were to identify factors that motivate and satisfy knowledge workers, to determine if monetary or non monetary reward is of, greater value, to establish the benefits and shortcomings of the existing reward system in the organisation and to recommend changes to the reward system within a knowledge organisation.

Ph.D. (Human Resource Management) / Orientation: Employee retention remains an ongoing challenge for South African organisations. As a vehicle for aiding employee retention, reward and more specifically reward preferences, are not fully understood. Occupational culture and occupational group is suggested as a practical segmentation approach in researching employee preferences. Occupational culture relates to the shared values, meanings, and behaviours of occupational groups and impacts on employee preferences. In researching employee reward preferences from an occupational culture and occupational group perspective, organisations may be better positioned empirically to differentiate their reward strategies along occupational group lines. In this way reward strategies may better meet the needs of the organisation and employees and maximise the employment exchange relationship. Research purpose: The main purpose of the study was to research reward preferences from an occupational culture perspective with the view to shedding empirical light and practical evidence on the influence of occupational culture on the reward preferences of specific occupational groups in South African organisations. The primary objective of the research was to propose and evaluate a structural model of the relationship between occupational culture dimensions and reward preferences of specific occupational groups in the South African context. The additional influence of Occupational Group, Race, and Gender on the reward preferences in a model that already contains occupational culture main effects was considered as per the secondary research objectives.

Magister Public Health - MPH / Background: Low motivation, defined as an individual's lack of willingness to maintain and exerteffort to attain organizational goals, is a problem in Ethiopia. Its consequences are poor quality of health care or performance, lack of retention and inequity. This study explored influences on nurse motivation in Butajira Zonal Hospital (BZH), and specifically investigated the influences of financial and non-financial incentives on nurses' motivation at work. Methods: A qualitative methodology, consisting of both in-depth interview and focus group discussion (FGDs) data collection methods was adopted. The study population was all nurses working at BZH with more than two years of experience, from which a sample of fifteen nurses(representing a balance of age, gender and category) was purposefully selected. Following informed consent, these fifteen nurses were interviewed by the investigator, and were followed in a second stage by three focus group discussions; with six participants each (total eighteen). Both the interviews and the discussions were conducted mostly in Amharic and tape recorded, transcribed and translated by the researcher. The data was analysed using thematic analysis. After reading, transcriptions were coded in informants' own words and phrases. These were examined, categorised and consistent themes identified and then coded with keywords to represent the content,which were considered to constitute the 'emerging themes'. Findings: In both the FGDs and interviews, a number of key themes were identified relating to both nurses' self-reported motivation and the factors influencing this at BZH. Altruism and professional pride ('love of the profession') as a source of intrinsic motivation emerged as a key theme, counterbalanced by a perception of nursing as having significant job risks (e.g. contracting infections from patients). With respect to financial incentives, salaries too low to meet living costs, unfair taxation on overtime payments, and the absence of a salary grading system for nurses was all raised as negative influences on motivation. While team spirit and solidarity amongst nurses was a positive feature of the work environment, relationships between doctors and nurses were described as poor, aggravated by large salary differentials, and perceived indifference of management to nurses. Other non-financial incentives– training, recognition systems, supervision and workplace conditions– had mixed influences on motivation at BZH. Finally, personal factors, such as age, gender and origin or married in the region,influenced reported motivation. Conclusions and Recommendations: The Ethiopian health system has paid great attention to increasing numbers, expanding training of, and creating specializations for, nurses. However, less attention has been given to their working conditions and the appropriate package of financial and non-financial incentives that will sustain performance and retention. These need to be addressed at the hospital itself, at higher levels of the system and at a broader policy level. Managing motivation requires keeping a broad perspective and innovative approaches that address the range of influences identified in the study. Solutions should be context based and sensitive to influences beyond the commonly understood sources of motivation.

The Centre for Resource Solutions (“CRS”) in the USA has performed a study on tax incentives for renewable energy. The CRS has found that tax incentives are effective, powerful and highly flexible instruments to encourage the development of renewable energy. They have further identified various types of tax incentives and various guidelines for effective tax incentives. The research question was whether the tax incentives and guidelines as identified by the CRS are internationally acceptable and whether South-Africa can consider these tax incentives and guidelines to design and implement a renewable energy tax incentive policy of an international standard in South-Africa. Chapter 1 contains the background, research question, objectives and methodology of this study. In Chapter 2 the advantages and disadvantages of each type of tax incentive, as identified by the CRS, were analysed through a literature study of international views on these tax incentives. In Chapter 3 the guidelines for effective renewable energy tax incentives, as identified by the CRS, were analysed through a literature study of international views on these tax incentives. Chapter 4 contains the conclusion that the tax incentives and guidelines as identified by the CRS are internationally acceptable and that South-Africa can consider these tax incentives and guidelines to design and implement a renewable energy tax incentive policy of an international standard in South-Africa. Copyright / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Taxation / unrestricted

This thesis applies the existing agency theory into the problem of production planning in a centrally planned industry. The planner's objective is to maximize social welfare contributed by the industry, while the firms individually want to maximize utility over money compensation minus disutility over effort. The problem contains both moral hazard and adverse selection because each agent privately observes a predecision information about the production process. A model is built for determining the optimal incentive compatible scheme. The analysis starts with the problem of fixed proportions production. An optimal incentive compatible scheme is first derived in single agent settings. It is then extended to multiple agent settings. Under the optimal incentive scheme, the principal is able to derive all the rent. The solution is the first-best when the agents are all risk neutral, and strictly second-best otherwise. The subgaming issues amongst the agents are investigated. When the agents are not cooperative, a sufficient condition is given for the incentive scheme to be effective, i.e., the equilibrium induced by the scheme is implementable. It is also concluded that, if the agents are able to cooperate, there always exist some state realizations under which the scheme is not effective. Finally, a different type of production problem, namely, production with substitutable inputs, are studied. And an incentive compatible compensation scheme is again proposed. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Game theory was used to analyze compensation systems based on individual and group incentives. Payoff formulas were developed for these incentives assuming different preferences for individual and social outcomes. Two levels of contributions were considered: (1) Defection. The minimum acceptable level of contributions, and (2) Cooperation. A level of discretionary contributions above the minimum. The discretionary contributions associated with cooperation were represented as a cost to the individual. A classification scheme for uniform n-person games was developed using the approach of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) for 2 x 2 games. This classification scheme defines the natural outcome (cooperation or defection) for each game. The analysis considered the Individual motive, based on maximizing self-interest, and five social motives (Collective, Competitive, Altruism, Equity and Aggression). These motives reflect preferences for outcomes based on payoffs to self and others. The results indicate the natural outcome and game category for different values of the individual and group incentive factors. Satisficing theory was also used to analyze the natural outcome for the Individual motive. Evolutionary game theory was used to develop two simulation models for social motives. The models interpret social motives as (1) genuine preferences for specific social outcomes, or (2) indirect strategies for maximizing individual payoffs. These models explore the interaction of social motives and the resulting impact on the level of cooperation. The results were used to develop effectiveness criteria for selecting inducement systems which should promote cooperation. Additionally, cost curves were used to determine the least cost inducement system. Based on these results, inducement systems using absolute incentives are recommended over systems using competitive incentives. Competitive incentives should only be considered when there is limited need for coordination between individuals and where aggressive and/or competitive behavior is acceptable. The study has theoretical as well as practical implications. Game theory provides a method for expanding expectancy theory to include expectations about the actions of others and provides a framework for integrating expectancy theory and other theories based on social motives (e.g. equity theory). The use of dynamic models from evolutionary game theory breaks new ground in the theory of motivation.

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