This dissertation analyzes the interaction between individuals and institutions, with a particular focus on how individuals make economic decisions within legal frameworks. It uses quasi-natural experiments and descriptive analyses to provide direct empirical evidence on these decisions. Chapter 1 investigates the extent to which mutual funds represent individual investors. Although mutual funds have widely varying voting patterns and predictable ideological disagreements, little is known about whether their underlying investors have similar preferences or sort by ideology into funds. I provide the first systematic documentation comparing the voting preferences of individual investors in the United States to those of the mutual funds they invest in. I find that individual investors are highly ideological in their voting and that Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) funds have an ideologically distinct shareholder base of individual investors whose preferences are reflected in the votes of the ESG funds. ESG funds are unique in this respect; although funds have distinct voting ideologies, as do individual investors, a mutual fund’s voting choices generally have little or no relationship with those of its underlying investors. Chapter 2 —joint work with Alon Brav and Matthew Cain— studies retail shareholder voting using a nearly comprehensive sample of U.S. ownership and voting records over the period 2015–2017. Analyzing turnout within a rational choice framework, we find that participation increases with ownership and expected benefits from winning and decreases with higher costs of participation. Even shareholders with negligible likelihood of affecting the outcome have non-zero turnout, consistent with consumption benefits from voting. Conditional on participation, retail shareholders punish the management of poorly performing firms and are more likely to exit the firm after voting against incumbent management. We show that retail voting decisions are impactful, altering proposal outcomes as frequently as those of the “Big Three” institutional investors. Overall, our evidence provides support for the idea that retail shareholders utilize their voting power as a means to monitor firms and communicate with incumbent boards and managements. Chapter 3 studies the effects of a selective tax on contract design and tax timing. Taxation affects income via both a compensation contract response and a worker response. I show that executive contracts adjust to a tax on severances, and executives shift their taxable income timing in response to the interaction of tax and contract. In particular, “golden parachute” severances tend to bunch at a threshold (tied to taxable income) where the tax rate discontinuously increases, and CEOs exercise stock options in bulk to raise their taxable income and boost their threshold. Identification comes from a bunching analysis exploiting a discontinuous change in exercise incentives over time and variation across CEOs in contract incentives and deal timing. The chapter demonstrates the role of contract structure in tax avoidance and additionally shows how contract structure affects worker behavior.

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This dissertation studies topics in financial economics. In the first chapter, The Corporate Supply of (Quasi) Safe Assets, I examine whether the demand for safe assets affects nonfinancial corporations in the US. Investors value safety services in financial assets, such as the ability to serve as a store of value, to serve as collateral, or to meet mandatory capital and liquidity requirements. I present a model in which investors value safety services not only in traditional safe assets such as US Treasuries, but also in corporate debt. Shareholders thus maximize the value of the firm by complementing standard business operations with safe asset creation. Based on this theoretical framework, I use the CDS-bond basis to derive a measurement of the safety premium of corporate bonds. I document substantial cross sectional variation in the safety premium of corporate bonds, which allows me to test the model’s predictions. I show that a high safety premium leads toa marked increase in debt issuance by relatively safer firms. These debt proceeds have a small impact on real investment and are largely used instead for equity payouts. This mechanism can explain why, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, non-financial investment grade companies significantly increased their debt issuance and equity payout while investment remained weak. The second chapter, The Cross-Section of Risk and Return, focuses on a common practice in the finance literature which is to create characteristic portfolios by sorting on characteristics associated with average returns. We show that the resultant portfolios are likely to capture not only the priced risk associated with the characteristic but also unpriced risk. We develop a procedure to remove this unpriced risk using covariance information estimated from past returns. We apply our methodology to the five Fama-French characteristic portfolios. The squared Sharpe ratio of the optimal combination of the resultant characteristic efficient portfolios is 2.13, compared with 1.17 for the original characteristic portfolios. In the third chapter, Should Information be Sold Separately? Evidence from MiFID II, we examine whether selling information separately improves its production. We use a recent regulation in Europe (MiFID II) that unbundles research from transactions to investigate this question. We show that unbundling causes fewer research analysts to cover a firm. This decrease does not come from small- or mid-cap firms but is concentrated in large firms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the reduction in the coverage quantity is accompanied by an increase in the coverage quality. Further analyses suggest that the enhancement of analyst competition could drive the results: inaccurate analysts drop out (extensive margin) and analysts who stay produce better-quality research (intensive margin). Our findings suggest that selling information separately improves information quality at the cost of reducing information quantity.

The thesis develops a series of field experiments on both the investor side and the startup side to understand both investors' investment preferences and entrepreneurs' collaboration preferences in the U.S. entrepreneurial financing system. On the investor side, Chapter 1 studies whether early stage investors are biased against female, Asian, and older startup founders using two complementary field experiments consisting of a correspondence test and an incentivized resume (IRR) rating experiment. Chapter 2 provides causal evidence of investors' general investment preferences for multiple startup characteristics, including both the human capital characteristics and the non-human capital characteristics, using the same experimental design. On the startup side, Chapter 3 studies whether startup founders are biased against female and Asian investors using a symmetric IRR experiment. Chapter 4 investigates how investor's human capital characteristics and funds' organizational capital characteristics affect founders' collaboration interest, which explains VC funds' performances through attraction of potential deal flows. These experiments constitute a field experimental system in the two-sided matching market, providing crucial causal evidence addressing several fundamental questions in the entrepreneurial finance literature.

This dissertation studies topics in financial economics. In the first chapter, Raising Bond Capital in Segmented Markets, I study the cost of bond capital. The cost of bond capital to firms that is determined at issuance often exceeds yields trading in secondary bond markets. I find that the difference between yields at issuance and in secondary markets, the ``issuance premium'', spikes in bad times, increasing firms' costs of capital. This suggests that the economics of the relatively understudied primary bond markets -- where firms sell new bonds via underwriters to investors -- are important for understanding firms' costs of capital and access to credit over the cycle. Leveraging new data on bond issuance, I estimate a model of primary markets that explains the issuance premium and its impact on bond issuance volume. Using high-frequency variation in bond supply as an instrument, I find that investors are more sensitive to issuance premiums than the remainder of credit spreads. As issuance premiums rise in bad times, the share of more price-elastic short-term investors endogenously increases, supporting bond volumes. The preferences of primary market investors therefore directly affect the transmission of shocks to firms' costs of capital and bond issuance volume, as well as the price impacts of corporate bond purchase policies. The second chapter, Bond Market Stimulus: Firm-Level Evidence from 2020-21, is co-authored with Olivier Darmouni. We use micro-data on corporate balance sheets to study firm behavior after the unprecedented policy support to corporate bond markets in 2020. We find that as bond yields fell, firms issued bonds to accumulate large and persistent amounts of liquid assets instead of investing. Conceptually, the benefits depend on how highly bond issuers valued this liquidity at the margin. We show they generally had access to bank liquidity that they chose not to use: many issuers left their credit lines untouched, while others used bonds to repay existing loans. Moreover, equity payouts remained high: almost half of issuers still repurchased shares in Spring 2020. In the third chapter, Global Demand Spillovers: the Role of Underwriting Networks, I study the role of underwriter networks in transmitting demand shocks across global jurisdictions. Using novel data and a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that central bank corporate bond purchases spill over to foreign jurisdictions through bond underwriting networks. The diff-in-diff exploits the European Central Bank's 2016 corporate sector purchase program. I compare U.S. firms connected to underwriters with more or less Eurozone clients. Firms connected with banks with more European clients had larger orderbooks and issued more at lower costs. Treated firms do not increase real investment, but rather increase equity payouts. I identify bond underwriting networks as a novel channel through which demand shocks spread across borders. These results matter for understanding the overall impact of corporate quantitative easing programs.

This dissertation aims to develop a grounded theory explaining how Chinese stock investors construct risk through their communication practices. Many of the previous studies attribute the risk in the stock market to greedy or unprofessional investors who speculate in stocks. In order to explore this topic further, this dissertation applies a grounded theory approach to develop a detailed local case showing the communication practices of Shanghai investors with respect to stock investment. By examining how investors produce meanings of risk and the relevant risk positions, the dissertation explains why investors keep speculating in the stock market. It uses interviews with 35 investors, in-depth interviews with 12 investors, and on-site observations of four stock exchange halls, investors’ home and working places in Shanghai from 2012 to 2014. The findings show that the investors consider risk to be the uncertainties about the accuracy of the information and the speed by which it is obtained. Ideally, they would obtain public information, make sense of public information professionally, and then generate directional information on which they can base their stock trades. However, with the devaluation of public information due to the corrupt social system, investors are forced to communicate more accurate information in a private way to position themselves to have a privileged risk position, which produces certainties for them but uncertainty for others. The belief in professionalism is eroded through the surge in demand for insider information based on interpersonal relations (guanxi). Because of the lack of insurance and security when circulating information privately, investors have shifted away from long-term stock investments to speculate in stocks. Although the mechanism of stock speculation produces risk for almost all investors, they still produce and reproduce this mechanism. The reason for this is that these investors are trapped in a paradox of risk and security without realizing that their practices to produce security are in fact producing uncertainties for them. / 本論文研究上海的股票投資者是怎樣在傳播實踐中構建風險的意義的。很多研究將金融風險歸咎於投資者的貪婪或不專業的過度投機行為。為了進一步研究這一課題，本論文採取紮根理論的研究方法，構建一個詳實的關於上海投資者傳播實踐的案例。由此，本論文研究了當地投資者怎樣通過傳播實踐構建風險的意義以及不同的風險處境，並由此對投資者進行投機行為進行理論性的闡釋。本論文的數據收集時間為2012年至2014年，其中主要包括對4所上海的投資交易大廳的實地觀察，對35個投資者的訪談，以及12個深入訪談以及追踪觀察。研究發現，投資者將風險與對信息的正確性以及傳播速度的不確定性相關聯。理想狀態下，投資者通過獲取公共信息，專業解讀信息以將其轉化為導向性的信息，之後進行股票交易。然而，由於腐敗等問題，各類公共信息都產生了貶值，投資者被迫用更私人的方式傳播更準確的信息，以使自己能處於有利地位，並將對信息的確定性建立在其他投資者對信息的不確定性之上。專業主義被瓦解了，取而代之的是建立在人際關係之上的對內幕消息的傳播。投資者們也從專業的、長期的投資專為短期的投機。而那些處於不利地位的投資者所面臨的不確定性亦將反過來加諸於有利地位的投資者之上。儘管投機的體系將風險加諸於幾乎所有投資者之上，投資者仍繼續投機行為。本論文認為其原因是投資者被困於“風險矛盾”之中——投資者通過實踐來尋求保障，未曾意識到其實踐造成了自己乃至於經濟體系更大的風險。 / Mao, Zhifei. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 203-222). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on 15, September, 2016). / Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

Using a multi-case study, three Ponzi schemes were investigated: Road2Gold, Bernie Madoff’s empire, and the Earl Jones affair. This grounded study used an inductive bottom-up methodology to observe and describe stakeholder mobilization in reaction to corporate fraud. This research on stakeholder behaviour in Ponzi schemes articulates new theory for describing stakeholder behaviour and possible determinants for successful mobilization to action. The data presented here point to a useful distinction in the stakeholders in a corporate fraud: reluctant and engaged stakeholders. Reluctant stakeholders seek only interest-based ends, whereas engaged stakeholders have additional identity and ideological goals shared by a mobilized group. / viii, 85 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm

In the first essay we explore and establish a direct link between investor attention to advertising videos viewed on social media, and trading activity in a firm's securities. We find a positive relation between views of these advertising videos and volume, and a negative relationship between views and bid-ask spread. Returns are positively related to change in views. The positive price pressure is reversed over the following two weeks. The decreases in spread and temporary increase in returns are consistent with increased purchasing by individual investors who view the advertising videos. Our results support the hypothesis that the number of views (attention) is more important than advertising dollars. Views are tested concurrently with Google Abnormal Search Volume Index (ASVI), and the empirical results suggest that views and ASVI provide measures of attention for different investor groups. Our results also suggest that the link of ASVI to individual investors may be diminished in more recent periods. In the second essay, using a unique data set provided by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts along with Dallas County, Texas Appraisal District files and Multiple Listing Service (MLS) sales, we examine whether residential properties sold through a multiple listing service sell at similar prices compared to properties that do not sell through a multiple listing service after controlling for Grantor (seller) type. We find a 1.8% premium for properties sold through a MLS by individuals after controlling for different grantor types. Our results indicate that only individuals receive this premium.

This work covers a substantial mosaic of related concepts in utility theory as applied to financial decision-making. It reviews some of the classical notions of Benthamite utility and the normative utility paradigm offered by the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory; exploring its major pitfalls before moving into what is postulated as an entropic notion of utility. Extrinsic utility is proposed as a cardinally measurable quantity; measurable in terms of the expected information content of a set of alternative choices. The entropic notion of utility is subsequently used to model the financial behavior of individual investors based on their governing risk-return preferences involving financial structured products manufactured out of complex, multi-asset options. Evolutionary superiority of the Black-Scholes function in dynamic hedging scenarios is computationally demonstrated using a haploid genetic algorithm model programmed in Borland C. The work explores, both theoretically and computationally, the psycho-cognitive factors governing the financial behavior of individual investors both in the presence as well as absence of downside risk and postulates the concepts of resolvable and irresolvable risk. A formal theorem of consistent preference is proposed and proved. The work also analyzes the utility of an endogenous capital guarantee built within a financial structured product. The aspect of investor empowerment is discussed in terms of how financial behavior of an investor may be transformed if he or she is allowed a choice of one or more assets that may gain entry into the financial structured product. Finally there is a concluding section wherein the different facets are placed in their proper perspective and a number of interesting future research directions are also proposed.

<p>I analyze a large number of investment decisions based on theories that have been developed and formalized over the past 50 years. Previous work in this field unveils a number of biases which affect ones choices when the outcome is uncertain. In my thesis I find evidence of these already known biases and focus on finding rational explanations for their existence. I also introduce two unexplored biases; the homeboy bias and the menu bias.</p><p>The results clearly indicate that sophisticated investors are generally less subject to these biases. Since pension schemes in many nations are shifting towards defined contribution schemes, investment decisions and risk preferences will be of great consequence to investors’ personal economy and ability to consume, affecting the economy in general. It is therefore of great importance that policy makers do all that they can to increase investors sophistication and create a playing field which facilitates economically sound investing.</p>