abstract: When managers provide earnings guidance, analysts normally respond within a short time frame with their own earnings forecasts. Within this setting, I investigate whether financial analysts use publicly available information to adjust for predictable error in management guidance and, if so, the explanation for such inefficiency. I provide evidence that analysts do not fully adjust for predictable guidance error when revising forecasts. The analyst inefficiency is attributed to analysts' attempts to advance relationship with the managers, analysts' compensation not tie to forecast accuracy, and their forecasting ability. Finally, the stock market acts as if it does not fully realize that analysts respond inefficiently to the guidance, introducing mispricing. This mispricing is not fully corrected upon earnings announcement. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Accountancy 2012

The overall purpose of this three-part dissertation is to specify and estimate various components of inefficiency in the production and profit-generating processes. Flexibility in inefficiency-measurement techniques is introduced using stochastic fun ctional forms to overcome the restrictions of the simplifying assumptions used in previous studies. In addition, the profit function approach is used to measure firm specific inefficiency and to view profit inefficiency in the multiple output context. Empirical application of each approach is also attempted. Application of the measurement of the inefficiency component in the first two essays is made using data taken from Indian agricu lture. The multiple output model of the third essay is applied to data of the U. S. unit bank taken from the Functional Cost Analysis programme of the Federal Reserve banking system. In the first essay, a quasi-translog production function is introduced and allocative, technical, and scale infficiencies are estimated for Indian agriculture with large and small farm divisions. Results obtained contradict earlier conclusions regarding the efficiency of Indian farms. In the second essay, a Normalized Restricted Profit function is used to estimate allocative, scale, and profit inefficiency for the same set of farms. Empirical results confirm the conclusions of the first essay. Technical inefficiency cannot be isolated in this case, because the impact of technical inefficiency is confounded in the measure of profit inefficiency. In the third essay, a translog profit function is used to estimate profit and allocative inefficiency in U. S. banking operations.

If the market of military procurement conforms to the double auction (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983), the government and the manufacturer can try to reach a binding agreement and maximize the monopoly profit. When they both comply with the agreement, the game constitutes a cooperative game. The government and the firm can extend the periods of the game from one to two through signing the research and development contract. When they carry out the research and development contract in the second phase, the trading probability in the first phase that is double auction model will rise. However the R&D contract causes an increase of transaction probability, the market offers an opportunity let the ineligible manufacturer participate in the defense procurement. We can find the trade-off relationship between the advancement of trading probability and the appearances of unqualified firm. The result is consistent with Inefficiency theorem that an incentive-compatible mechanism which is ex post efficient will not be individual theorem.

It is widely recognized that broadcast spectrum is utilized inefficiently. The principle technical cause of this inefficiency is inexpensive receiver design. In addition, the economics of the industry are such that users do not pay the opportunity costs of spectrum associated with these receivers. In this paper, I develop an approach that would internalize the spectrum opportunity costs so that consumers will make decisions that are economically more rational in terms of their choice of the program delivery channel.

Spending trends vary greatly across medical conditions. Nervous system conditions comprising epilepsy has shown an increase in spending growth contrary to a decrease observed in aggregate spending growth of 15 condition categories from 2000 to 2010. Increases in total spending of a medical condition can be explained by an increase in either costs per case or the number of cases or in both elements. Determining the number of epilepsy cases and the cost to treat an individual with epilepsy helps to explain spending trends of the disease. Significant variation in overall Medicare spending across geographic regions unrelated to health outcomes has been well-documented. It is uncertain whether reducing payment rates to high-cost areas would curb spending growth without adversely affecting health care quality for Medicare beneficiaries. Reducing geographic variation is therefore, desirable only if the measured variation represents inefficiencies in the health system. In terms of health care, efficiency is a function of cost of care and quality of care. The identification of factors contributing to inefficiency may guide policy change for its improvement. OBJECTIVES The overall objective of this research was to evaluate the potential for change in prevalence of epilepsy cases, the magnitude of maximum inefficiency and factors contributing to inefficiency for the treatment of epilepsy among Medicare beneficiaries. The first specific aim was to determine whether there has been change in the prevalence of epilepsy among Medicare beneficiaries since 2005. The second aim examined the effects of two value-based programs on the geographic variation of Medicare spending per beneficiary. The third aim sought to identify influential factors driving inefficiency in inpatient care among the beneficiaries with epilepsy by examining cost and quality, accounting for spatial dependence. METHODS Analyses for all specific aims included individual-, county-, and state-level data. Individual-level medical data including beneficiaries’ age, race, sex, zip code, and utilization information five percent random sample were obtained from US Medicare administrative data (2011 to 2013). Epilepsy prevalence information for Medicare beneficiaries (2001 to 2005) was estimated by a previous study. County-level data were obtained from Area Health Resources Files (AHRF) and the American Community Survey. State-level data were obtained from State Physician Workforce Data Book; Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; Tracking Accountability in Government Grants System; US Department of Commerce; National Association of Epilepsy Centers; and US Census Bureau. Epilepsy cases were defined using Medicare claims data with any of the following International Classification of Disease-Version 9-Clinical Modification (ICD 9-CM) diagnostic codes: At least one ICD 9-CM 345.xx (epilepsy), or at least two ICD 9-CM 780.3x (seizure) claims occurring at least 30 days apart. Inpatient inefficiency was defined as a function of cost over quality. Inpatient cost was defined by state-level average adjusted inpatient services spending per hospital stay (AIH). The proxy measure for the quality of inpatient care for beneficiaries with epilepsy was the proportion of hospital stays with an epilepsy or seizure admission diagnosis (PHE). Association analysis was performed using the Spearman correlation coefficient. Generalized linear models with log link and gamma distribution were used for the adjusting and modeling of cost dependent variables. Spatial regression models were used when appropriate to account for spatial dependence. RESULTS The prevalence of epilepsy among older Medicare beneficiaries was estimated to be 22.2 cases per 1,000 persons (2011 to 2013). An increase was observed for all racial groups. However, the subgroup with highest prevalence estimate shifted from the younger age group of 65 to 69 years to the female, 85 years and older. Black beneficiaries persistently had the highest prevalence compared to other racial groups. Analysis for the second specific aim showed that state-level total medical expenditures per beneficiary with epilepsy varied from 11,690 to 29,048 (average 19,890, SD 3,774, US$ 2013), 5.3 times the spending variation for those without epilepsy which ranged from 6,466 to 9,458 (average 7,631, SD 710, US$ 2013). Post-implementation of two value-based programs (hospital readmissions reduction program (HRRP) and the hospital value-based purchasing program (HVBP)), spending variation decreased for both the epilepsy and non-epilepsy cohorts (-14.6% and -9.0% respectively). The primary factor contributing to spending variation was health status for beneficiaries with epilepsy (51.9% of variation) and location of the beneficiary for those without epilepsy (26.1% of variation). Analysis conducted to address the third specific aim showed that different factors influenced inefficiency in inpatient care of beneficiaries with epilepsy among US census regions. For the Northeast region, the number of primary physicians was an inefficiency factor. For the South region, inpatient inefficiency factors included the number of medical residents and fellows, proportion of physicians who were primary care physicians, and retention of physicians who graduated from an institution in the state of practice. Some evidence of defensive medicine was detected in the West region while no specific factors were influential to inpatient inefficiency in the Midwest region. The highest and lowest state-level average adjusted inpatient services spending per hospital stay (AIH) were observed in the District of Columbia (13,376 US$ 2013) and South Dakota (7,901 US$ 2013). Rhode Island (1.06%) had the lowest while Idaho (11.29%) had the highest proportion of hospital stays with an epilepsy admission diagnosis (PHE). Rhode Island also had the lowest inpatient inefficiency index or least inefficient (86) compared to the highest inpatient inefficiency index or most inefficient observed in Idaho (1,417). CONCLUSION The prevalence of epilepsy among Medicare beneficiaries appeared to have increased from previous estimates. Heterogeneity among the 48 contiguous states and District of Columbia with respect to inefficiency in inpatient care was detected. Across-the-board cost reduction policy based on cost alone may not be appropriate for all geographic areas across the US and may even be detrimental to health outcomes in some areas. On both national and regional level, inpatient inefficiency was significantly associated with PHE but not with AIH, indicating that the focus to decreasing inpatient inefficiency for beneficiaries with epilepsy should be based on increasing quality or decreasing PHE. Changes made to decrease PHE (increase in quality) may also increase AIH (increase in cost); therefore, it would be wise to monitor both cost and quality when considering policy change while focusing on quality improvement. Programs such as the HVBP and HRRP that link cost to outcomes appeared to be successful in reducing geographic variation of medical expenditures. Instead of total spending per individual, updated knowledge of the prevalence and cost per case treated for specific chronic medical conditions may better assist resource allocation, budget planning, and health program development.

Investors rely on secondary information sources, like cover stories, as market indicators due to time, information and resources constraints. However, studies in the US market gave mixed results about the potential use of cover stories while no publish research could be found in South Africa related to investors reaction to cover stories or whether an understanding of investment periods, company specific characteristics or bounded rational behaviour would yield superior abnormal returns from cover stories.In total, 1218 cover stories related to publicily listed companies were recorded from FinWeek and Financial Mail for the period 1985 to 2008 and categorised based on the Likert scale developed by Arnold et al. (2007). Event study methodology was used in the research.The research found evidence that investors did pay attention to very optimistic cover stories. Positive an neutral cover stories were contrarian indicators, while negative cover stories were momentum indicators of future company investment performances and the abnormal returns for an investment portfolio based on these cover story effects were optimised by short-selling cover story companies from healthcare, general retail and general mining industries and buying shares in control companies from the same industries and company sizes. The ability to earn long-term abnormal returns proofed weak form market inefficiency for the JSE. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

One of the key indicators of port performance lies in port’s efficiency in minimising port congestion. However, the port of Durban like many other ports in Africa and the world is faced with a congestion challenge. This study aimed to identify the causes of congestion and proffer a solution to alleviate congestion. By understanding the causes of congestion, adopting incremental solutions can achieve the desired outcome. A qualitative, exploratory research study was conducted with 14 participants from the maritime sector that have experienced port congestion. Data analysis was done through thematic analysis where all data collected was transcribed and the researcher observed and articulated emerging themes to attach meaning to the respondents’ interpretations and perceptions of their own lived reality on what causes port congestion in Durban and possible solutions thereof. The key findings confirmed that Wind, Labour issues and Equipment are the main causes of congestion in the Port of Durban. Further research to determine the impact of climate change on congestion is needed. The incremental and radical solutions proffered by the participants was compared to the causes of congestion. This study contributes to the field of maritime studies, by understanding the causes of congestion in the Port and the field of innovation studies by contributing to innovative theory. / Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

Change orders occur frequently in most construction projects, where contract modifications that increase the contract value between 5 to 10% are expected. Changes occur not only because of errors and omissions, but also for other reasons such as scope of work changes, or changes because of unforeseen conditions encountered on the site; a problem which is very common in most heavy construction projects. Changes themselves might not cause productivity losses; in this case the damage calculation will be straightforward. However, changes may cause disruption in unchanged work where the working conditions are impacted, and as a result, lost productivity (inefficiency) is encountered. Delay and loss of productivity are the two main types of damages experienced by the contractor when the owner issues a change order. Courts have recognized Critical Path Method (CPM) schedule analysis as the preferred method of identifying and quantifying critical delays. As for the inefficiency damages, there is no way of directly measuring inefficiency due to its qualitative nature and the difficulty of linking the cause of the productivity loss to the damage. Most of the scholarly work published in this area was based on productivity data supplied by the contractors. The owner's viewpoint was seldom considered; and that explains why there are discrepancies between what the contractor asks for and what the owner believes the contractor is entitled. This research focuses on analyzing the change orders and the productivity loss from public owner data. The study addresses the need for a statistical model to quantify the change orders and the productivity loss from verifiable owner's data such as owner's daily reports, change orders, drawing, and specifications, rather than rely on contractor surveys. Two models are developed and validated; the first model is to quantify the percent increase in the contract price due to the change orders. This model will provide the owner with an estimate of the cost of the changed work, where it can be used for forward pricing or retrospective pricing of the change orders. The second is to quantify the productivity loss of the piping work due to the change orders. The productivity loss study analyzed two set of data; the first included all the predictor variables which both parties, the owner and the contractor, contributed to the productivity loss, and the second one included the predictor variables, from the legal view point, only the owner is responsible for. The study showed the difference between what the contractor asked for and what he is actually entitled. This model can be used by both the owner and the contractor to quantify the productivity loss due to change orders.

This dissertation is comprised of four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to economic growth and discusses the topics covered in each of the following chapters along with some main results therein. In Chapter 2, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium of innovation and imitation in which once a higher quality good is developed, there is an exogenously given rate at which the good is targeted for imitation. However, the innovator can undertake expenditure to protect the good from imitation and thereby lower the effective probability of imitation. It is shown that the total expenditure toward property right protection is inversely related to the cost of property right protection and the effectiveness of the property right system. Moreover, a subsidy that reduces the per unit cost of property right protection leads to an increase in the intensity of innovation. In the long run, the economy exhibits a constant steady state growth. I further show that an improvement in the efficiency of the property right system has an ambiguous effect on overall consumer welfare. Chapter 3 develops a two-good, closed economy model, that provides a possible explanation for the existence of misallocation of resources and examines the long-run consequences. In the model, inefficiencies arise as a result of lobbying by firms to establish or prevent barriers to the competitive allocation of factors of production (labor). First, I show that the extent of the inefficiency is determined by the relative lobbying power of the firms. The inefficiencies lead to a static welfare loss, which increase in the relative lobbying power of firms seeking to establish barriers. I further show that if the relative lobbying power of firms seeking the barriers is large, the economy will end up producing a ``wrong'' mix of goods in the long-run, relative to the perfectly competitive equilibrium. The resulting welfare loss depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, and in the case when the two goods are poor substitutes, the total utility may go to zero in the long-run. In Chapter 4, I apply the model of lobbying developed in Chapter 3 to understand the link between misallocation of resources, international trade and economic growth. Misallocation leads to the possibility that the benchmark competitive free trade equilibrium is not achieved. This leads to a reduction in trade volume and consequently to welfare losses even for a country without domestic barriers. Further, domestic barriers cause a reduction in output growth in the short run. In the long run, however, there is a convergence to the competitive growth rates. / Ph. D.

This thesis documents, using an unbalanced panel of Top 1000 World banks with observations for 2005 - 2009, three main aspects related to cost and profit efficiency in banking. First, it established that there is no correlation between a bank's rank in the Top and its rank given by the efficiency scores. However, the size of the banks plays a positive role on the cost efficiency of the institution, big banks having higher cost efficiencies than small banks. Conversely, the profit efficiency is equal across different sizes. Second, it verified that for 2005 - 2009 there is no evidence that banks from the developed countries are more efficient than banks from emerging economies. This finding is further supported by the third aspect, which shows that banks originating in the developed economies, with large exposures to more sophisticated banking products, have been hit the hardest by the financial crisis. However the banks managed to shrink their cost inefficiency while losing efficiency on the revenue side. The post crisis, 2009, proved to be a year in which banks across countries and regions converged in terms of efficiency and plateaued at about 10% and 25% for cost and profit inefficiency respectively.