Stora företagsbedrägerier och skandaler såsom Kreuger, Enron och Worldcom där fordringsägare led omfattande förluster, följs ofta av en debatt om revisionens syfte och omfattning. Efter påtryckningar från EU om att minska den administrativa bördan, öka konkurrenskraften och stimulera Europas ekonomi, avskaffades revisionsplikten för mindre aktiebolag i Sverige 2010. Fordringsägare i form av bland annat kreditgivare och investerare är parter som kan drabbas vid en konkurs och har därför behov av att ha en fungerande relation med företaget. Tillsammans med kompletterande information från revisorer bidrar kreditbetyg till en bättre bild av kreditrisker som fordringsägare utsätter sig för. Syftet med studien är att öka förståelsen för revisionens betydelse i värderingen av ett litet företags betalningsförmåga när det sedan 2010 inte längre är ett lagstadgat krav att ha revisor. Studien ger även möjlighet till att bättre bedöma revisionens påverkan på kreditrisken för fordringsägare i händelse av konkurs. Detta är en triangulerande studie, där insamling av data har skett genom både kvalitativa intervjuer och kvantitativ information från 57 konkursbon av små bolag från 2009 och 61 från 2012. Intervjuerna har gjorts med 10 respondenter inom revision, kreditgivning och konkursförvaltning. Resultaten har analyserats utifrån framförallt agent- och intressentteorin. Studien har kommit fram till att användandet av revisor är en funktion som värderas högt. De har en viktig roll när det gäller att hjälpa företagare att leva upp till de ekonomiska kunskapskrav som omvärlden ställer. Även när det gäller bedömningen av företagets fortsatta drift kan revisorns kunskaper bidra till att minska risken för en obeståndssituation. Studien har dock inte kunnat fastställa att underskottens storlek i konkurserna har påverkats av om bolaget har haft revisor eller inte. Varken respondenterna eller sambandsanalysen styrker någon skillnad i påverkan på prioriterade borgenärer efter avskaffandet av revisionsplikten. För både 2009 och 2012 har många konkurser små underskott medan få har stora, vilket indikerar att kreditgivare i det flesta fall har kunnat göra rimliga kreditbedömningar. / Major fraud and scandals in corporations such as Kreuger, Enron and Worldcom where creditors suffered significant losses, are often followed with debate around the purpose and scope of corporate audits. After pressure from the EU in order to reduce the administrative burden, increase competitive capacity, and stimulate the European economy the mandatory auditing was abolished for small enterprises in Sweden in 2010. Creditors of which some are banks and investors are parties that who can be affected by a bankruptcy and are therefore dependent on a working relationship with the enterprise. Together with additional information from an auditor credit ratings will aid a creditor in the assessment of exposed risk. This study aims to increase the understanding of audit significance in the aspect of credit rating of small companies and their ability to fulfil payments to prioritised creditors in case of bankruptcy as the legislated audit no longer is a requirement. It will also provide a possibility to assess the influence of auditing on the credit risk creditor is subject to in the event of bankruptcy. The study is using a triangulating method where data is collected using both qualitative interviews and quantitative data from 57 bankruptcies of small enterprises from 2009 and 61 bankruptcies from 2012. The interviews were conducted with 10 respondents representing auditing, loans, and Insolvency practise. The results have been analysed from the perspective of Agent- and Stakeholder theories. The study has derived to the conclusion that the use of auditors does carry a significant value. They have an important role to play when it comes to assisting entrepreneurs to live up to the expectation and skills their counterparts have on them. Even the assessment made by auditors on the company’s ability to continue operation, going concern, is knowledge which can contribute to the prevention of a future situation of insolvency. The study has not been able to prove any relationship between the company's level of debt in bankruptcy and if the company has chosen to have an auditor. Neither respondents in the qualitative data collection nor the search for correlation in the quantitative data has been able to support findings of difference on the impact on the prioritised creditors between the companies using auditors and the ones not using auditors from the time after the abolishment of mandatory audits. From both 2009 and 2012 most bankruptcies have low deficits and a small number have high, which indicate creditors have been able to make reasonable credit assessments.

South African company law has provided for the rescue of financially distressed companies since 1926 when the statutory procedure of judicial management was introduced by the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Unfortunately, judicial management has never been regarded as a successful corporate rescue procedure and for most of its existence it has been severely criticised on many grounds. The Companies Act 61 of 1973 that replaced the Companies Act 46 of 1926 did very little to improve this situation and judicial management remained underutilised. As a result, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 now introduces two newly-created corporate rescue procedures in the form of business rescue proceedings and the compromise with creditors. This study analyses judicial management and the new corporate rescue procedures to establish whether the identified weaknesses of judicial management have been adequately and effectively addressed in the new procedures. A comparative study with similar procedures in England and Germany is undertaken to determine whether the South African legislature has delivered on its promise to create a system of corporate rescue that will meet the needs of a modern South African economy. Several weaknesses in the new procedures are identified and a number of recommendations are made to improve the relevant provisions and to assist in providing South African company law with an efficient and acceptable corporate rescue regime. / Mercentile Law / LLD (Mercentile Law)

South African company law has provided for the rescue of financially distressed companies since 1926 when the statutory procedure of judicial management was introduced by the Companies Act 46 of 1926. Unfortunately, judicial management has never been regarded as a successful corporate rescue procedure and for most of its existence it has been severely criticised on many grounds. The Companies Act 61 of 1973 that replaced the Companies Act 46 of 1926 did very little to improve this situation and judicial management remained underutilised. As a result, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 now introduces two newly-created corporate rescue procedures in the form of business rescue proceedings and the compromise with creditors. This study analyses judicial management and the new corporate rescue procedures to establish whether the identified weaknesses of judicial management have been adequately and effectively addressed in the new procedures. A comparative study with similar procedures in England and Germany is undertaken to determine whether the South African legislature has delivered on its promise to create a system of corporate rescue that will meet the needs of a modern South African economy. Several weaknesses in the new procedures are identified and a number of recommendations are made to improve the relevant provisions and to assist in providing South African company law with an efficient and acceptable corporate rescue regime. / Mercentile Law / LLD (Mercentile Law)