What space does the mind occupy? A standard response to this question might be to locate the mind within the brain. However some argue that our mental processes also extend beyond the boundaries of the brain. Gallagher & Zahavi (2008) have termed these two views of the mind: internalism and externalism. In cinema, the role of editor as mediator between the cognitive activities of filmmakers, audiences and the editing equipment, makes their practice particularly suited for investigating these two seemingly incompatible views. When editors cut or join chunks of sound and image, they assemble externally what some would recognise internally as the mind’s fluctuations between one object of attention and the next. Their activities reveal a side of cinema, but also of the mind, which is usually hidden from view. The purpose of this thesis will therefore be to show how studying the process of editing contributes to our understanding of the relationship between mind and world. In order to address the question of where the editor’s mental processes are located, this study applies a phenomenographic methodology. Rather than attempt to understand cognition from a preconceived or objectively constituted position, phenomenography starts by examining variation in how a group of individuals view a particular process. This leads toward research findings that are presented from a ‘second-order perspective’ (Marton, 1981). In this thesis an understanding of how audiovisual material is selected and sequenced is revealed through fourteen interviews with British editors and directors. From the analysis of these interviews a framework emerged of five critical interrelated ways to approach the editing process. This evidence suggests that the cognitive process occurs in virtue of an editor’s physical activities, the editing equipment, plus a broader network of social and cultural relations that support the filmmaking environment. Refuting the belief that the mind is separate from the world, the editor’s mental processes are to be found distributed amongst a variety of internal and external features of their environment. The outcome of this thesis is a phenomenographic perspective on the editing process. This, I conclude, will help to inform cognitive scientists of the kinds of mental processes that editors are aware of. It also provides a wider audience of scholars with a framework for further research on variation in the process and practice of editing.

This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as well as dilemmas proposed by Jack Lyons and Michael Bergmann targeting internalism. Acquaintance foundationalism is what I will call any theory of justification that is internalist in what may justify us, foundationalist in the structure of justification, and relies on the concept of acquaintance in justifying our basic beliefs. Internalism requires that what justifies us improves the belief from the perspective of the believing subject. Foundationalism states that the justification for all beliefs depends ultimately on basic beliefs. Finally, acquaintance is a relation between a person and other things such that these other things are before the “mind’s eye” of the subject. The general idea behind each of these dilemmas, so I will argue, is to claim that acquaintance foundationalism cannot provide epistemic reasons for basic beliefs, where epistemic reason means something that contributes to justification from the subject’s perspective. Each dilemma will ask whether the alleged justifier has some feature x. However, each dilemma contends that, whether the alleged has the feature x or not, it cannot serve as an epistemic reason. For example, BonJour will ask whether our allegedly basic beliefs are cognitive or not. He argues that if they are cognitive, they need justification (and so cannot be basic), but if they are not cognitive, they cannot provide justification. Thus, no allegedly basic belief can serve as an epistemic reason. I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars’s famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour’s later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons’s dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist’s (including the acquaintance foundationalist’s) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons’s dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons’s version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism.

Moralės normatyvumo problema yra klausimas, kas pagrindžia moralės mums keliamus reikalavimus ir iš kur jie kyla. Šiame darbe teigiama, jog Christinos Korsgaard neokantiškas atsakas į normatyvumo klausimą yra sėkmingas: kantiškos prielaidos leido Korsgaard produktyviai suformuluoti normatyvumo klausimą, o šių prielaidų sintezė su psichologine praktinės tapatybės koncepcija leidžia vertinti Korsgaard normatyvumo problemos sprendimą kaip novatorišką ir bene sėkmingiausią neokantišką atsaką. Pirma, Korsgaard koncepcija sėkminga būtent dėl neokantiškų prielaidų – tai išryškėja internalizmo / eksternalizmo kontroversijos kontekste. Eksternalistai padalija pagrindimo bei motyvavimo funkcijas atitinkamai įsitikinimui ir troškimui, todėl teorinio reikalavimų pagrindimo sėkmė nelemia motyvacinės sėkmės: ryšys tarp jų atsitiktinis. Didžioji dalis internalistų (intuityvistai, ekspresyvistai, neohiumininkai) moralinių sprendinių pagrindimą laiko neįmanomu iš principo. Neokantiškos pozicijos pamatinė orientacija į pagrindimo užduotį ir proto funkcijų samprata, įgalinanti būtiną ryšį tarp diskursyvaus pagrindimo bei motyvacijos veiksmui, leidžia jiems bene vieninteliams iš kontroversijos dalyvių matyti normatyvumo klausimą kaip prasmingą ir į jį atsakyti. Antra, Korsgaard neokantiškas atsakas sėkmingas dėl to, kad susidoroja su Kanto etikos trūkumais: neredukuoja normatyvumo į formalųjį jo aspektą. Kantiškoje tradicijoje pamatinis veikėjo autonomijos normatyvumas perkeliamas tam tikriems... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Problem of moral normativity is a question of what justifies the claims that morality makes on us and of their source. In this thesis we claim that the answer to this problem proposed by Ch. Korsgaard is a success as a Kantian account. First, the analysis of the internalism / externalism controversy lets us to conclude, that the success of Korsgaard’s conception of normativity was granted, first of all, by its Neo-Kantian premisses. Externalists split justificatory and motivational functions between resp. belief and desire therefore, theoretical success of justifying moral claims does not by itself lead to motivational success: the relation between the two is purely contingent. The majority on the internalist side though (intuitionists, expressivists, the neo-Humeans) consider moral judgements impossible to justify in principle. Therefore, only the Neo-Kantians are able to treat the problem of normativity as a meaningful question and to give an adequate account of it. What enables them is the Neo-Kantian orientation to the task of justification and their conception of the functions of reason, which assures the necessary relation between the discursive justification and the motivation to act. Second, the Neo-Kantian reply by Korsgaard is successful as a solution to the difficulties which the Kantian ethics meets: she does not reduce normativity to its formal aspect only. In the Neo-Kantian tradition the essential autonomy of the agent is transferred to certain fundamental... [to full text]