The institutional relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) is ostensibly predicated on shared values and interests. In the area of European security, this relationship has been observed to be both cooperative and competitive; both ineffectual and progressive. In practice, there are numerous accounts of the competitive gridlock at the bureaucratic level and member state in-fighting that counteracts any tactical progress. This analysis examines the relationship between NATO and the EU and the conditions under which they cooperate effectively, or devolve into open competition. Through the lens of three demanding humanitarian crises, this analysis argues that the keys to effective cooperation are institutional autonomy over security and defense measures, and clear positioning of their role in institutional interactions. The first formative interaction between the EU (WEU) and NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-1995, 2004) established that Europe required a security infrastructure separate from the NATO's existing military behemoth. It also crucially revealed that international recognition and legitimacy plays a significant role in the behavior and formation of these institutional identities. Months later, the open rivalry between NATO and the EU...

Thesis advisor: David A. Deese / My research builds upon the resource curse and external democracy promotion literatures to assess the prospects of transparency advocacy in non-democratic resource-rich countries. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are all rich in hydrocarbons; however, in the last two decades, they have shown significant variation in terms of the transparency of oil revenues and expenditures. While Azerbaijan undertook substantial reforms to make its government revenues from oil almost completely transparent, Turkmenistan refrained from disclosing its revenues from natural gas exports. Finally, Kazakhstan, while undertaking some reforms, lagged behind Azerbaijan in pursuing a fully transparent revenue management policy. In authoritarian countries, transparency-related governance reforms are shaped by an interaction between international and domestic factors. Transparency in natural resource revenues is promoted by global actors including states, international financial institutions, and transnational networks as a measure to prevent or minimize corruption and mismanagement of revenues. In all three of my cases, the lack of public accountability and limited civil society activism prevented domestic agents from carrying out successful institutional reforms. In each case, the preferences of the elites have been important determinants of the degree of economic reform. I argue that transparency promotion from outside is expected to lead to institutional reform when it is matched with strong incentives for compliance. These incentives are created mostly by external actors, including states, international organizations, and international companies; yet they are also conditioned by the domestic economic and political landscape. Three cases from the Caspian region fully demonstrate the potential for different institutional outcomes among resource-dependent countries. A comparison of these countries' experiences will not only shed light on our understanding of the resource dependency and institutions, but also explain the institutional variance among the many non-democratic countries. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: James Cronin / The Northern Ireland conflict has often been viewed as parochial, closed off from the currents of international opinion and foreign influence. Yet nationalists, unionists, and pacifists consistently recruited supporters and confronted their adversaries on an international stage. The relative success or failure of these groups within the Northern Ireland political system was based in large part on their ability to navigate the changing global context. This dissertation demonstrates that to understand the development of the conflict and that of the peace process, it is necessary to take a comprehensive look at the role of the international community. The conflict in Northern Ireland was fundamentally international from its inception in the late 1960s and grew increasingly so over the next thirty years. Many of the ideas that motivated the groups involved in the Northern Ireland conflict were global in nature and origin, as were the institutions and organizations that became important players in the conflict and its resolution. Given that international ideas, institutions, and organizations were so central in forming the contours of the conflict, the conflict must be analyzed within a framework of international history. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: History.

This study fills what has long been recognized as a major gap in the field of International Relations (IR): an account of when and how change occurs in the structure of the international system. Attempts to create social change, to create or to alter intersubjectivity, are relatively common; the crucial question is why some attempts succeed while most fail. I argue that social change is itself a rule-governed social activity, which I term institutional politics, and that attempts to create social change are more likely to succeed if they are pursued in a manner consistent with what H.L.A. Hart called secondary rules, or rules about rules. This central hypothesis is investigated in three cases: the emergence of great power management following the Napoleonic war, attempts to ban war as an instrument of state policy in the inter-war period,and the period of institutional contestation instigated by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Available evidence in all three cases provides strong overall support for the central hypothesis and for the other core expectations of my theory. In addition to achieving important descriptive and explanatory advances with respect to the dynamics and morphology of the international system, the study makes significant contributions to the constructivist literature in IR; namely, it suggests a basis on which to improve conceptual consolidation and comparability, and it moves beyond a primary focus on norm promoters to include explicit theorization of the evaluative acts of their audiences. The most important policy implication of the study is the need for explicit renovation of the contemporary international system’s stock of secondary rules, to counter a decline in their legitimacy among a much more heterogenous set of members.

This study fills what has long been recognized as a major gap in the field of International Relations (IR): an account of when and how change occurs in the structure of the international system. Attempts to create social change, to create or to alter intersubjectivity, are relatively common; the crucial question is why some attempts succeed while most fail. I argue that social change is itself a rule-governed social activity, which I term institutional politics, and that attempts to create social change are more likely to succeed if they are pursued in a manner consistent with what H.L.A. Hart called secondary rules, or rules about rules. This central hypothesis is investigated in three cases: the emergence of great power management following the Napoleonic war, attempts to ban war as an instrument of state policy in the inter-war period,and the period of institutional contestation instigated by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Available evidence in all three cases provides strong overall support for the central hypothesis and for the other core expectations of my theory. In addition to achieving important descriptive and explanatory advances with respect to the dynamics and morphology of the international system, the study makes significant contributions to the constructivist literature in IR; namely, it suggests a basis on which to improve conceptual consolidation and comparability, and it moves beyond a primary focus on norm promoters to include explicit theorization of the evaluative acts of their audiences. The most important policy implication of the study is the need for explicit renovation of the contemporary international system’s stock of secondary rules, to counter a decline in their legitimacy among a much more heterogenous set of members.

The accession into NATO and the EU, from the perspective of the new Central and Eastern European members, symbolized their ‘return to Europe’. However, as the former outsiders have become insiders, they have become subjected to a new form of hierarchy. This is even reflected in international relations literature that studies the socialization of the new members into ‘European’ or ‘Western’ states (Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, etc.). The new members continue to be perceived as geographically and culturally on the ‘verge of Europe’, ‘not quite European’ or ‘in transition’ (Wolff 1994; Kuus 2004a; Mälksoo 2010; Zarycki 2014). Their status as ‘latecomers’ in Western institutions has become a stigma. This dissertation asks how stigmatization and subjection to tacit hierarchies, constructed through discourse, affect a state’s foreign policy. It focuses on the East-West relation in the European Union as one example of a hierarchy within this community of states. This dissertation looks at Poland’s foreign policy in the EU. Analytically, I build on the concept of strategic culture, a set of collective, historically shaped ideas and norms guiding a state’s pursuit of security. I go beyond the existing literature to argue that the guiding principle of a state’s strategic culture is the pursuit of not just physical but ontological security, which refers to stable subjectivity (Giddens 1991; Kinnvall 2004; Mitzen 2006a; Zarakol 2010). The recognition as a full member of the ‘Western’ and ‘European’ identity community is essential for Poland’s ontological security. This dependence on recognition makes Poland particularly sensitive to stigmatization within that community. In three case studies, the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the 2013/4 Ukraine crisis, I study how its ‘latecomer’ stigma, and quest for recognition as a full-fledged member of ‘Europe’, and the ‘West’, affects Poland’s foreign policy. I show how Polish foreign policy-makers alternate between two possible responses to stigmatization, adaptation and contestation, and how, paradoxically, both of these strategies often reinforce stigmatization.

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In this dissertation I develop a theory that seeks to account for the variation in order present across regions. I propose that the observed variation in regional order in the international system is rooted in the domestic politics of region members. Unlike other attempts at explaining regional order, I account for domestic politics in the political capacity of member states. Measured as the relative ability of states to extract resources from their domestic societies, political capacity provides a measure of institutional and cultural constraints upon the ability of states to engage in costly foreign policies, such as conflict. The more extensive these constraints, the more likely a state will engage in cooperative behavior, resulting in more extensive regional institutions or trade interdependence. I show that regions comprised of high capacity democracies, like Europe, are highly cooperative, while those comprised of high capacity autocracies, like the Middle East, are more conflictual. The more cooperative the region, the greater the degree of interdependence and institutional architecture that will emerge. Finally, because the presence of regional order is contingent upon the domestic characteristics of constituent states, I develop a novel means of identifying regions for the proper measurement and identification of regional variables of interest. Using an opportunity and willingness framework, I define regions as stable geographic spaces of interacting states behaving uniquely from the broader international system. The resulting empirical analysis is a new dataset that provides not only a necessary means of case selection for the regional level variables included in this dissertation, but a specification of regions broadly applicable to regionalist research.

Based on the assumption that security institutions are designed rationally, I study the variations in design schemes and their possible effects on institutional performance. Military alliances vary with respect to their membership size, level of security obligations undertaken by the allies, incorporation of non security clauses such as economic agreements, level of institutionalization, specified duration of existence, as well as the conditions under and reasons for which they are formed. This dissertation studies the effects of above mentioned design features on the probability of security alliances expanding their scope by addressing non-security agreements such as free trade agreements and conflict management clauses. I find support for the argument that states include economic agreements within a military alliance as a means to bolster the credibility of an otherwise weak security alliance. Results indicate that allies facing high levels of external threat and low levels of intra alliance cohesion are more likely to include conflict management provisions in the alliance. Finally, I conduct a systematic study of the possible effects of variation in structural design on the durability of an alliance. I find that design features that increase the costs of breaking the alliance increase the duration of an alliance.

Fisheries straddling or migrating between international maritime boundaries represent a typical case of the tragedy of the commons. Over two dozen Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) have been created to manage these fisheries, which means it also represents a typical case of 'regime complexity' or 'governance architecture'. These literatures recognise that such institutions do not operate independently and therefore institutional functions such as attracting participants, practising their regulatory role, and performing their mandate should be understood as interdependent. This thesis proposes that we study such institutions together with actors and architectures of relations between and among them, which together I term 'governance complexes', by means of a relational approach. This relational approach combines relational theory, which posits the operation of endogenous relational mechanisms alongside exogenous explanations such as institutional design, with network methods that enable structural insights and robust inference that takes into account these interdependencies. The dissertation comprises two main parts that describe and explain the global fisheries governance complex, respectively. The first describes how the governance complex's three main components, states, RFMOs, and states participation in these RFMOs, have evolved. A topological typology utilising key network concepts is proposed and employed to show that the global fisheries governance complex is not fragmenting but becoming more overlapped and nested. The second part explains how this governance complex has evolved in terms of (1) participation, (2) practice, and (3) performance. First, it finds that while states find institutional design features such as an RFMO’s internal organisation attractive, relational mechanisms such as popularity and closure also provide important heuristics for participatory decisions in complex settings. Second, it finds that high levels of organisation also enables higher regulatory activity, but so do relational mechanisms such as coercion or imitation. Third, it proposes the concept of net effectiveness to gauge an institution’s "take-home" performance once its position in the broader governance complex has been taken into account. The result is not only an explanation of the evolution of global fisheries governance but also a developmental step towards an institutional relationalist theory of governance complexes.