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Causalité mentale et réductionnisme chez Jaegwon Kim.Lacroix, Christian 04 March 2021 (has links)
Dans ses plus récents écrits, Jaegwon Kim soutient que seule une approche réductionniste est en mesure de rendre compte de la causalité mentale tout en respectant nos convictions physicalistes. Ce faisant, il va à rencontre de la tendance actuelle en philosophie analytique de l’esprit représentée par le physicalisme non-réductif. Je tente ici d’évaluer si Kim réussit à faire du réductionnisme une approche valable et intéressante. Pour ce faire, je présente en détail et commente l’argument de Kim servant à réfuter le physicalisme non réductif, de même que les deux modèles de réduction qu’il a élaborés. Je conclus que Kim réussit à réfuter le physicalisme non-réductif, mais que le réductionnisme qu’il propose ne présente qu’un intérêt limité puisqu’il laisse de côté les qualia. Aucune solution satisfaisante ne semble donc pouvoir être apportée au problème de la causalité mentale.
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Kim's pairing problem and the viability of substance dualismVaught, J. R. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, Andrea Scarantino, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (42 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed September 17, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-42).
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The Tale of Mental Causation: Fact or Fiction?Tu, Chia-Lin 01 May 2010 (has links)
Mental causation is with us all the time. Being a table is different from being a human---although we are composed of physical particles, we have understanding, reason, or perception, which are able to make a difference in the physical world. In this dissertation, I have detail discussions of contemporary substance dualism, the mind-brain identity theory, and Jaegwon Kim's functionalism, and thus conclude that none of them can provide an appropriate account to the problem of mental causation. By distinguishing the mind from the body, substance dualists face the pairing problem: How does this particular mind unite with this particular body and thus interact? With the pairing problem, more and more philosophers accept physicalism. However, it is surprising that the problem of mental causation arises again from the heart of physicalism. It means that accepting physicalist ontology does not make this problem go away. On the contrary, basic physical assumptions can even be seen as the source of the current difficulties with mental causation. My preferred idea is that mental properties emerge from physical properties, and both of them together make an occurrence to cause an effect. Emergence makes mental causation autonomous and also avoids epiphenomenalism.
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Can non-reductive physicalism save mental causation?: assessment on Jaegwon Kim's supervenience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism.January 2012 (has links)
Wong, Wai Kin. / "November 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-116). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1: --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- Mental causation´ؤintroduction to the problem --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- "A brief introduction to physicalism´ؤlayered model, supervenience, and physical closure" --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? --- p.12 / Chapter 1.3 --- Non-reductive physicalism stated --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Commitments and generally accepted claim of physicalism --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- The non-reductive physicalist's view on mental causation --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4. --- What is next? --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Kim's supervienience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism --- p.21 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2 --- Supervenience argument --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Exclusion argument --- p.25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Implications of the supervenierice/exclusion argument --- p.28 / Chapter 2.5 --- Objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Kim on the principle of causal/explanatory exclusion --- p.33 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- Kim's realist commitment --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3 --- Kim's argument for explanatory exclusion --- p.36 / Chapter 3.4 --- From the principle of explanatory exclusion to the principle of causal exclusion --- p.38 / Chapter 3.5 --- Kim's view on non-standard overdetermination and how the gap between EEP and CEP is bridged --- p.39 / Chapter 3.6 --- Kim's view on causation --- p.43 / Chapter 3.7 --- Further implications of production causation for the exclusion argument --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Two concepts of causation and the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- The counterfactual analyses of causation´ؤa general overview --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2 --- How the dependence conception of causation helps non-reductive physicalists to avoid the causal exclusion principle --- p.59 / Chapter 4.3 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (I) --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Loewer's objections to the use of production conception in the formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- The first reason put forward by Loewer --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Loewer's argument for (2) --- p.68 / Chapter 4.4 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (II) --- p.73 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Can a non-reductive physicalist distinguish epiphenomena from a genuine causal process by the dependence conception of causation? --- p.74 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Does agency require production? --- p.78 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Kim's third objection on omissions --- p.79 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Loewer's responses to Kim's second and third objections --- p.82 / Chapter 4.4.5. --- Further discussion on Kim's second and third objections --- p.84 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Does Yablo's determination proposal help to solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism? --- p.88 / Chapter 5.1. --- Yablo's idea elaborated --- p.89 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Yablo's argument for the determination proposal --- p.91 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- The primacy of the causal status of mental events --- p.94 / Chapter 5.2 --- Evaluating Yablo's idea --- p.96 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Are mental properties determinables of physical properties? --- p.97 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The story is not ended. The crux of the issue is not whether the determination proposal is literally true --- p.100 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Why is proportionality constraint not the solution? --- p.102 / Chapter 5.3 --- What about the causal exclusion principle? --- p.107 / Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.108 / Chapter Chapter 6: --- The final conclusion´ؤthe exclusion problem remains unsolved --- p.110 / Responses to the external review --- p.Error! Bookmark not defined. / Bibliography --- p.113
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Kim's Pairing Problem and the Viability of Substance DualismVaught, Jimmy Ray 18 July 2008 (has links)
Mental causation between the material and the immaterial has been problematic for interactionist substance dualism ever since its first major proponent René Descartes. The contemporary philosopher Jaegwon Kim believes he has found an argument that shows exactly why an immaterial event cannot be said to cause a material event; he calls this the pairing problem argument. This thesis will argue that there is actually sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that Kim’s argument is unsuccessful due to one of its premises being false. Furthermore, this thesis will also argue that interactionist substance dualism is actually a philosophically viable alternative, and lastly ways are sketched of how one might go about constructing such a view responsibly.
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Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim / Supervenience and its place within Anomalous Monism : An analysis of the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon KimBeckman, Emma January 2006 (has links)
<p>Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.</p> / <p>This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.</p>
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Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim / Supervenience and its place within Anomalous Monism : An analysis of the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon KimBeckman, Emma January 2006 (has links)
Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera. / This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.
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An Evolutionary Argument against Physicalism : or some advice to Jaegwon Kim and Alvin PlantingaSkogholt, Christoffer January 2014 (has links)
According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution. Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim. Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior. If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim
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