This program of research examined whether mock-jurors could more accurately discriminate between correct and false eyewitness identifications after exposure to the identification procedure instead of—or in addition to—the witness’s testimony. In Experiment 1, 332 eyewitnesses exposed to staged crime videos attempted to identify the “criminal” from lineups. Lineups contained either the “criminal” or a replacement foil, were presented simultaneously or sequentially, and were conducted under double-blind, single-blind, or post-identification feedback conditions. In Experiment 2, 432 mock-jurors viewed a subset of the eyewitnesses from Experiment 1 (n = 48). Each mock-juror viewed a single eyewitness making their identification decision and/or testifying about the crime, their identification, and the officer. More mock-jurors believed that the eyewitnesses had made correct identifications if they viewed the testimony—with or without the identification procedure—compared to exposure to the identification procedure alone. Furthermore, more mock-jurors believed eyewitnesses who received post-identification feedback or had made their identifications from sequential lineups. These differences in belief, however, did not translate into a difference in accuracy; overall, mock-jurors believed 62.96% of correct identifications and 56.48% of false identifications. Exposure to the identification procedure did not improve mock-jurors ability to determine the accuracy of an identification; however, these mock-jurors were more aware of the post-identification feedback. Videotaping identification procedures may make triers of fact more aware of biased lineup procedures; nonetheless, exposure to these videotapes will not improve the accuracy of mock-jurors’ decisions. / Thesis (Ph.D, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2008-07-24 15:00:30.512

Despite the high prevalence rates of rape, the rates of reporting, arrest, and conviction for this crime are quite low. To help remedy this problem, it is important to study factors that influence juror decisions in rape trials. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the influence of three independent variables, type of rape, complainant alcohol consumption, and defendant alcohol consumption, on mock juror verdicts. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions varying on the three independent variables. Participants were surveyed about their perceptions of rape myths, alcohol beliefs, defendant guilt, and complainant and defendant responsibility. Overall, the complainant’s alcohol consumption had a larger effect on guilt ratings and perceptions of complainant and defendant responsibility than the defendant’s alcohol consumption and the relationship between the victim and defendant. Jurors’ beliefs about alcohol also correlated with perceptions of the situation, complainant, and defendant.

This study examined the relationships among participants’ emotional intelligence and participants’ sympathy for an alleged rape victim[1], sympathy for a defendant, and verdict in a mock rape case. Participants were 219 (127 female, 92 male) United States jury eligible individuals between the ages of 18 and 66. Participants were given a rape trial summary accompanied by a manipulated emotional facial expression of the alleged rape victim (angry, sad, afraid, or neutral), or no photograph. Participants were asked to render an individual case verdict and complete a questionnaire with measures to test sympathy for the alleged rape victim, sympathy for the defendant, self-emotional intelligence, other-emotional intelligence, and rape-myth acceptance. Results provided evidence that self and other-emotional intelligences are positively correlated; sympathy for rape victim and sympathy for the defendant do have an effect on case verdict; and, participant characteristics including gender, age, and race are predictive of rape myth acceptance, sympathy for the defendant, sympathy for the victim, and emotional intelligence. Further research should expand on emotional intelligence as a juror characteristic in the United States as well as internationally. [1] The term rape victim, rather than rape survivor, is used in this study to refer to an individual’s victim status in the context of the legal system.

abstract: There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2016

This study examined the relationships among participants’ emotional intelligence and participants’ sympathy for an alleged rape victim[1], sympathy for a defendant, and verdict in a mock rape case. Participants were 219 (127 female, 92 male) United States jury eligible individuals between the ages of 18 and 66. Participants were given a rape trial summary accompanied by a manipulated emotional facial expression of the alleged rape victim (angry, sad, afraid, or neutral), or no photograph. Participants were asked to render an individual case verdict and complete a questionnaire with measures to test sympathy for the alleged rape victim, sympathy for the defendant, self-emotional intelligence, other-emotional intelligence, and rape-myth acceptance. Results provided evidence that self and other-emotional intelligences are positively correlated; sympathy for rape victim and sympathy for the defendant do have an effect on case verdict; and, participant characteristics including gender, age, and race are predictive of rape myth acceptance, sympathy for the defendant, sympathy for the victim, and emotional intelligence. Further research should expand on emotional intelligence as a juror characteristic in the United States as well as internationally. [1] The term rape victim, rather than rape survivor, is used in this study to refer to an individual’s victim status in the context of the legal system.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Psychology / James Shanteau / In many situations, people are called on to make judgments about the likelihood of an event. Research has shown that when people make these judgments, they frequently equate or confuse conditional probabilities with other conditional probabilities. This equating or confusing of conditional probabilities is known as the confusion of the inverse. Research investigating this problem typically focuses on clinical and medical decision-making and the use of statistical evidence to make diagnoses. However, one area in which the confusion of the inverse has not been studied is in juror decision-making. Thus, the purpose of this dissertation was to (1) determine if the confusion of the inverse influences juror decision-making, (2) interpret reasons why this confusion occurs, and (3) attempt to eliminate it from juror decision-making. Jurors were presented with four court cases gathered from local and federal courthouses in a small Mid-western city. In each of the four cases, a single piece of evidence was presented (statistical only) which was to be used when rendering verdicts. Finally, each case contained juror instructions for the specific case type: murder, kidnapping, arson, sexual assault. Overall, jurors fell prey to the confusion of the inverse, equating the probability of the data given the hypothesis [P(D|H)] with the probability of the hypothesis given the data [P(H|D)]. However, the research was unable to reduce the effect, much less eliminate it from the task. Interestingly, jurors tended to ignore the statistical evidence (i.e., estimations about probability of a match) in favor of their own personal believe in the strength of the evidence. Although the original intent of reducing/eliminating the confusion of the inverse was not accomplished, the dissertation did accomplish three things. First, researchers have hypothesized three reasons why people engage in incorrect probabilistic reasoning, and the dissertation affirmed that it is indeed a function of the confusion of conditional probabilities – the confusion of the inverse. Second, it seems that the use of statistical evidence in a trial is ignored by most jurors in favor of their own personal belief in the evidence’s strength. Finally, the criteria needed for “beyond a reasonable doubt” may be too stringent.

This dissertation investigates auditor independence by examining the effects of various factors on independence, both in fact and as perceived by several distinct groups. The first study examines the effects of auditing students' cognitive moral development and client risk on students' judgments related to an audit partner's acquiescence to client pressure in an earnings management scenario. The results indicate that students with higher levels of moral reasoning evaluated earnings management as less ethical and were also less likely to accept earnings management by an audit client. The results also indicate that subjects in a high client risk scenario evaluated earnings management as less ethical and were also less likely to accept earnings management by an audit client. Furthermore, this study investigated whether client risk moderates the effect of cognitive moral reasoning on ethical judgments and behavioral intentions. The results do not indicate an interaction. The second and third studies deal with potential consequences associated with the perceived impairment of auditor independence. Specifically, the second study deals with the effects of auditor-provided non-audit services on the client company's bond rating. If financial statement users believe that auditors providing non-audit services impairs the auditor's independence, they are likely to recognize an increase in information risk associated with such impairment (Johnstone et al. 2001). This could occur regardless of the true nature of the auditor's independence and would suggest a negative relationship between the amount of non-audit services purchased from the company's auditor and the company's bond rating. The results of this study support that contention. The third study investigates the effects of client importance and audit firm size on juror evaluations of auditor liability and damage awards. Previous research in accounting shows that client importance can affect sophisticated financial statement users' perceptions of auditor independence. However, no study has investigated perceptions of auditor independence in a litigation context. The results indicate that when an auditor is involved in litigation associated with an audit client that is financially more important to the auditor, jurors' evaluations of negligence are higher and they assess more in punitive damages. No effect of audit firm size on negligence ratings or damage awards is found. / Ph. D.

The present study investigated mock juror perceptions of hate crimes in the courtroom, specifically whether a victim’s religion (Atheist, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim) influenced the likelihood that a mock juror would render a hate crime verdict. I employed a mock juror methodology where participants read an assault trial summary, rendered a verdict, and answered a series of rating questions about the victim and defendant. Two theoretical explanations were proposed to explain the main effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions; that participants would be most likely to render a guilty verdict when the victim is considered an in-group member (i.e., same religion) or when participants perceived the victim’s religion to be commonly targeted in religion-motivated hate crimes. The results showed a main effect of victim religion on participant verdict decisions, such that the Jewish victim received the highest percentage of hate crime verdicts. Participant perceptions of the victim’s trustworthiness and the defendant’s bias mediated the relationship between participant religion (Christian or Jewish) and verdict decisions. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for law enforcement, social psychology, and policy.

The nature of capital punishment cases makes mortality a highly salient factor during trial proceedings. Previous research has explored the effect of mortality salience on human’s decision making in a legal context. This study extends this vein of research by examining the role death plays in jurors’ psychological processes when sentencing a defendant who is severely mentally ill in a capital trial. The current experiment measured mock jurors’ (n=169) and college students’, n=116) Mental Illness Worldview (MIWV), and then experimentally manipulated type of mortality salience (dual-focused: mock jurors who were specifically asked to contemplate their own mortality and were exposed to trial-related death references vs. trial focused: only exposed to death references) and the type of defendant (severely mentally ill vs. neutral) accused of a capital offense. We found that mock jurors perceived mental illness to be a mitigating factor when dual (i.e., self) focused mortality salience was induced, whereas participants only exposed to trial-related death references considered mental illness to be an important aggravating factor in sentencing.

The current study looks to examine the possible effects expert witness trustworthiness and testimony quality depending upon participant need for cognition. The study involves 139 participants taken from Amazon's Mechanical Turk and an undergraduate research pool where they were asked to take part in a web-based survey. Participants read a capital sentencing summary and were randomly selected into one of four expert witness conditions that vary in trustworthiness and quality. Participants took the short form Need for Cognition scale and filled out a questionnaire about their perceptions of the expert's trustworthiness and testimony quality. Results indicated a marginal main effect of the trustworthiness condition as well as a marginal three-way interaction. Additionally, significant main effects for the sample and death qualification status of participants were found. Results are discussed in the context of the current study and past research and possible limitations and extensions of the current study are considered.