Diss. (sammanfattning) Växjö : Växjö universitet, 2008. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

It is often claimed that interactionistic substance dualism is causally problematic. In this paper I review some of the most common causality-based objections to interactionistic substance dualism: the problem of interaction, the exclusion problem, problems from the conservation laws of physics and Chalmers' argument from psychons. The claim that the nature of causality precludes causal relations between the physical and the non-physical is argued to lack sufficient support. It is also argued that the dualist does not need to accept the causal completeness of physics or that the conservation laws of physics applies universally. Further, I argue that Chalmers' argument from psychons rests on incorrect assumptions about the relation between conceivability and possibility and that Kims’ pairing problem can be solved by the soul existing in space. The conclusion is that while we can't be absolutely certain that there is a non-physical substance, there are no obstacles for such a substance to relate causally to the physical if it exists. / It is often claimed that interactionistic substance dualism is causally problematic. In this paper I review some of the most common causality-based objections to interactionistic substance dualism: the problem of interaction, the exclusion problem, problems from the conservation laws of physics and Chalmers' argument from psychons. The claim that the nature of causality precludes causal relations between the physical and the non-physical is argued to lack sufficient support. It is also argued that the dualist does not need to accept the causal completeness of physics or that the conservation laws of physics applies universally. Further, I argue that Chalmers' argument from psychons rests on incorrect assumptions about the relation between conceivability and possibility and that Kims’ pairing problem can be solved by the soul existing in space. The conclusion is that while we can't be absolutely certain that there is a non-physical substance, there are no obstacles for such a substance to relate causally to the physical if it exists.