This study aims to examine the Russian lessons from the Russo-Japanese War and compare them with the lessons from the Crimean War to understand the larger patterns of Russian military learning during this period. Previous research has enabled this study to identify its research problem by demonstrating that there is most likely a research gap in this field. Previous studies have studied different Russian lessons from the two wars but not their differences and similarities. This research gap, combined with the fact that the research problem is interesting both scientifically and for military history makes the research problem relevant to study. The problem and purpose have been answered by asking what the Russian lessons from the Russo-Japanese War were and what the differences and similarities are compared with the lessons from the Crimean War. The material used to answer this question is taken from translated and published lectures held at the Russian General Staff Academy shortly after the war. This study uses Stephen Peter Rosen’s book about how and why military organizations change and innovate as its theoretical framework and a qualitative comparative analysis as its method. The study then answered its question by highlighting the different lessons from the two wars and the differences and similarities between them. Furthermore, it showed that Russian military learning during this period did not function optimally because several lessons from the first war reappeared together with new lessons after the Russo-Japanese war, indicating that they did not learn. This result is relevant and important for understanding Russian military learning during this period and in general.