This study aims to examine the Russian lessons from the Russo-Japanese War and compare them with the lessons from the Crimean War to understand the larger patterns of Russian military learning during this period. Previous research has enabled this study to identify its research problem by demonstrating that there is most likely a research gap in this field. Previous studies have studied different Russian lessons from the two wars but not their differences and similarities. This research gap, combined with the fact that the research problem is interesting both scientifically and for military history makes the research problem relevant to study. The problem and purpose have been answered by asking what the Russian lessons from the Russo-Japanese War were and what the differences and similarities are compared with the lessons from the Crimean War. The material used to answer this question is taken from translated and published lectures held at the Russian General Staff Academy shortly after the war. This study uses Stephen Peter Rosen’s book about how and why military organizations change and innovate as its theoretical framework and a qualitative comparative analysis as its method. The study then answered its question by highlighting the different lessons from the two wars and the differences and similarities between them. Furthermore, it showed that Russian military learning during this period did not function optimally because several lessons from the first war reappeared together with new lessons after the Russo-Japanese war, indicating that they did not learn. This result is relevant and important for understanding Russian military learning during this period and in general.

According to many historians, the Russo-Japanese War 1904ー1905 was considered to be the first war fought between two equal industrialized powers. The war attracted much attention from the major powers in the world due in part to the use of many new military innovations and technologies, especially on the tactical level. In Sweden, lessons observed from the naval war came to heavily influence the debate regarding the armament of the Swedish Naval Defence. However, barely any previous research has sought to analyze what tactical lessons the Swedish Army learned from the war. The purpose of this study is therefore to analyze what tactical lessons Sweden learned from the Russo-Japanese War 1904ー1905. The research questions presented in this study are: What lessons did the Swedish Army identify from the war relating to the three main arms of the Army: the infantry, the artillery and the cavalry? Which pitfalls occurred during the learning process? To what extent were the lessons implemented? The theoretical framework for this essay is based on Brent Sterling’s theory regarding recurring pitfalls when learning from foreign wars. To identify the lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War, articles published in the journal of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences during and after the war have been analyzed, as well as a compendium published by the Swedish General Staff. The methodology used to analyze the source material is a qualitative text analysis with a hermeneutical approach. The results from the study show that many different lessons from the war relating to the three arms were identified. Among these were the impressive effectiveness of the machine gun, the devastating indirect fire wrought by howitzers and the importance of correctly utilizing the cavalry. However, multiple pitfalls also occurred during the learning process relating to the all three arms as well. Lessons learned from the war also paved the way for the implementation of the machine gun and the howitzer in the Swedish Army.