This study aims to generate a deeper understanding of the revival of analog photography by examining intentionally slow artistic processes. In this study, the link between the analog photographic process and creativity is examined, as well as what influence pace in the process has on the experience of creativity. The method of the study consists of undertaking two versions of the analog photographic process in its entirety. An autoethnographic methodology is used to gather data from personal experience, which in turn is analyzed using Flow Theory to understand the connection between the process and creativity from a larger perspective. The results show that the analog photographic process contains demanding aspects which contribute to the possibility of achieving a state of optimal experience. The results also indicate that the challenging nature of the process generates an increase in the perceived value of the product. These results contribute to further understanding in the resurgence of the analog technique, along with increased knowledge within the field of purposely slow processes in artistic practice.

Previous research on human judgment and decision making has demonstrated systematic and predictable biases of judgment in experimental settings. One example of this is the tendency to intuitively violate the conjunction rule - a simple rule of probability. This was well illustrated in the famous Linda-problem. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). According to the dual-process theory of reasoning, (Kahneman, 2011) reasoning fallacies such as the conjunction fallacy occurs when people fail to use analytic reasoning and instead overly rely on their intuition. The dual process theory proposes that cognitive processes underlying our intuitive impulses and our conscious reasoning constitutes two different modes in the mind –system 1 and system 2- and that the intuitive system 1 are not able to compute probabilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that processes that are labeled system 1 are fast whereas system 2 are thought to be slow. We tested these time course assumptions of dual process theory in a within-subject design by comparing response time latencies between conjunction fallacy judgments and accurate probability judgments. The results showed that inducing accurate responding did not result in delayed response latency. This indicates that making accurate probability judgments does not require more processing time which goes against what would be expected by the dual-process framework. / Tidigare forskning om mänskligt beslutsfattande och bedömningar har i experiment påvisat systematiska och förutsägbara bias. Ett exempel på detta är tendensen att intuitivt gå emot konjuktionsregeln- en enkel regel gällande sannolikhet. Detta illustrerades väl i det berömda Linda- problemet (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Enligt två-systemsteorin (Kahneman, 2011) om problemlösning, uppstår bedömningsfel såsom konjuktionsfelet när människor inte använder sig av analytiskt tänkande och istället förlitar sig för mycket på sin intuition. Två-systemsteorin menar att de kognitiva processer som ligger till grund för våra intuitiva impulser och vårt medvetna resonerande utgör två olika aktörer i vårt tänkande- system 1 och system 2- och att det intuitiva system 1 inte kan beräkna sannolikheter. Processer som betecknas som tillhörande system 1 är enligt två-systemsteorin snabba medan system 2 föreställs vara ett långsamt system. I denna studie testades antagandet om tidsåtgång för de två systemen i en inomgruppsdesign genom att jämföra responstider mellan bedömningar där konjunktionsfelet begåtts och bedömningar där det inte begåtts. Resultaten visar att korrekta sannolikhetsbedömningar inte resulterar i långsammare responstider. Detta indikerar att det inte tycks vara mer tidskrävande att göra riktiga sannolikhetsbedömningar, vilket motsäger två-systemsteorins antagande om snabbt och långsamt processande.