Valstybinės darbo inspekcijos kompetencija yra tiksliai apibrėžta Valstybinės darbo inspekcijos įstatyme. Akivaizdu, kad jos funkcijos yra plačios. Atsižvelgiant į tai darbe akcentuotas dėmesys į darbuotojų saugos ir sveikatos pažeidimus, nelegalaus darbo reiškinių prevenciją, darbo apmokėjimo įmonėse kontrolę, darbo laiko apskaitos pažeidimus bei vykdomą aktyvią, kryptingą visuomenės konsultavimo ir informavimo veiklą. Magistrinio darbo tikslas - atskleisti Valstybinės darbo inspekcijos kompetencijos ypatumus, išanalizuoti pagrindines jos funkcijas, jų įgyvendinimą, o taip pat išskirti Lietuvos teisės teorijoje ir praktikoje kylančias problemas, teisiškai jas įvertinti, bei pasiūlyti jų sprendimo variantus. Savo veikloje Valstybinė darbo inspekcija taiko įvairius kontrolės ir prevencijos būdus: inspektavimą, darbdavių, juos atstovaujančių ar įgaliotų asmenų mokymą ir konsultavimą. Siekdama optimaliai spręsti darbuotojų saugos ir sveikatos bei darbo įstatymų problemas ji vis labiau įtvirtina konsultavimu, informaciniu dialogu grindžiamus santykius su darbdaviais ir darbuotojais. Valstybinės darbo inspekcijos veikla ir sukaupta praktika leidžia formuoti ir keisti darbo teisę. / The competence of the State Labor Inspectorate is precisely defined in the State Labor Inspection Law. It is clear that its function is wide. Considering this, the attention in my work has been focused on occupational safety and health violations, prevention of illegal employment effects, control companies pay, working time accounting irregularities and also active and purposeful management of public consultation and conveyance. The aim of master’s work is to highlight the features of the implementation of the State Labor Inspectorate, to analyze its main features, their implementation, as well as to distinguish theory and practice problems of Lithuanian law, to evaluate them legally and to propose the solutions. In its activities the State Labor Inspectorate applies different control and prevention methods: inspection, training and consulting of employers, their representatives or attorneys. In order to tackle employees’ health and safety, and employment law problems, it introduces more and more consulting, information dialogue-based relations with employers and workers. State Labor Inspectorate activity and accumulated practice allows to shape and modify the labor law.

The following article analyses the progressive process of deregulation of labour and social relations through the withdrawal of the State and public authorities, as well as public administration, control and direction of the relations of this type, both individual and collective. The comparison is made between the Spanish and Peruvian model, but especially between the regulation of the European Union and several Latin American countries. Stands in the article between “public” intervention – regulation legislative or Government– of “administrative” intervention, control by the administration of the employment relationship, especially in this case through the labour inspection bodies. / El artículo analiza el progresivo proceso de desregulación de las relaciones laborales y sociales a través de la retirada del Estado y de los poderes públicos, así como de la Administración Pública, en el control y dirección de las relaciones de este tipo, tanto individuales como colectivas. La comparativa se efectúa entre el modelo español y peruano, pero muy especialmente entre la regulación de la Unión Europea y de diversos países de América Latina. Se distingue en el artículo entre la intervención “pública” –regulación legislativa o gubernamental– de la intervención “administrativa”, control por parte de la Administración de las relaciones laborales, especialmente en este supuesto a través de los órganos de la inspección de trabajo.

Many in Germany argue that the minimum wage and other protective provisions for migrant workers will only be effective when workplace inspections by the enforcement body "Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit" (FKS) are stepped up. For this reason, a novel cooperation agreement between the FKS and migrant workers' counseling offices has been signed, in June 2021. This step is informed by the FKS' public image of being a guardian of the minimum wage and of victims of labor exploitation. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the argument of more inspections lead to less exploitation is oversimplified. Therefore, it explores the role that the FKS has for migrant workers in more detail by using regime theory and a methodological approach informed by ethnographic border regime analysis. An analysis of the FKS' formal duties codified in the law reveals its ambivalent character. Especially the concept of unlawful employment serves as an umbrella term that conflates protective as well as punitive provisions for migrant workers. In eleven qualitative interviews, FKS officers and migrant workers' counselors mostly rejected the FKS' image as a "workers' protection squad". Instead, they think that the FKS only served the interests of the state. As a consequence, exploited workers have no immediate benefit from FKS inspections, and sometimes even experience heavy detriments like the loss of their job, housing, or unpaid wages. The most severe consequences, like expulsions or deportations, result from violations of the Residence Act. For these reasons, counselors reacted differently to the new cooperation agreement. While most counselors have strong reservations or even refuse to work with law enforcement bodies, others have found ways to cooperate without putting their clients at risk. For such successful cooperation it is crucial that FKS officers take workers' and counselors' needs seriously and adapt their routines and protocols in order to instill trust. Under the current legal and institutional configuration, increasing the number of FKS inspections is not pertinent to combat the exploitation of migrant workers. The argument that vulnerabilities of migrant workers emerge from a lack of enforcement is blinding out the fact that the enforcement of labor law itself produces vulnerabilities. Institutions tasked with the enforcement of protective provisions, must not be tasked with enforcing punitive provisions against migrant workers. Instead, workers need to be given an active role in the enforcement of their own rights.