Taking the profit out of crime' has been considered as one of the effective countermeasures to drug traffickers in the last decade. A growing interest in various approaches taken to secure the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking offences in order to combat drug trafficking more effectively has resulted in the development of different national and international perspectives. Despite the acknowledgement of the United Nations of the provisions and proceedings for confiscation in late 1980s, some countries have adopted enforcement provisions and powers which are extraordinary wide, considered as either draconian and trespassing with the rights of citizens. At the other end some regard them as weak, inefficient, and lacking effective strength. Unlike many developed countries, Britain has a specific confiscation system for drug trafficking offences (DTA 1994). Some of the provisions of the British confiscation proceedings have been seen as invading individual freedoms and rights. Therefore, the thesis is devoted to examining the British concept and values of confiscation order, highlighting the principles and critiques accompanying its various provisions' development at different stages of the British political, juridical and law enforcement systems. The thesis advances and assesses the similarities and dissimilarities among different systems of confiscation beyond the borders of English and Wales. The aim is to determine the definitions, limitations, credibility and legality of principles, application and practices of confiscation laws perceived by different systems. The American, the Kuwaiti and the Egyptian systems are also chosen as relevant points of variability with respect to the British system. It is within this framework, that the British confiscation system is scrutinised. There is an attempt to expose the strains existing in the system and also finding the best way forward. The current oscillation between either reparation or punishment which seems to occur regularly is believed to be a critical stake and a crucial problem for producing a better understanding of the implications of confiscation orders. Interviews conducted in England and Wales, United States (Washington DC), Kuwait and Egypt have provided a background to confiscation enforcement, revealing the extent of powers, restrictions and difficulties in implementing the order in line with its current principles.

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This study of systems for dealing with young offenders takes as its starting point the contrast between recent developments in the United States and Britain. These developments have occurred as a result of questions which have been raised, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the role of the juvenile court in combating delinquency. In the United States the resulting re-appraisal of the court’s function has been characterised by an emphasis on the fact that the court is part of the criminal justice system, and that it therefore cannot ignore the need to protect society against harmful conduct and to observe the requirements of due process. In England and Scotland, on the other hand, the movement has been towards the creation of tribunals which pay less attention to the child’s offence and which exercise a jurisdiction which tends to blur the distinction between offenders and non-offenders. From an analysis of this contrast the thesis moves to an examination of a significant similarity between the emerging Anglo- American systems. Although different solutions have been adopted to the problem of re-defining the role of the Juvenile court, the reforms in each of the countries studies have been accompanied by a desire to narrow the jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion which emerges from an examination of British and American experience is that, instead of seeing the juvenile court as an all-purpose delinquency-control agency, it should be viewed as an agency whose inherent limitations must be recognised if best use is to be made of its distinctive capabilities. This conclusion raises four related problems which the thesis considers in detail. First, attention is given to the task of attempting to define the court’s role, and an effort is made to determine which functions it can effectively and appropriately perform. Second, on the basis of this analysis, consideration is given to the formulation of criteria which indicate with precision the types of case which should be referred to court. Third, the design of an effective sieving device is discussed: machinery must be created which will ensure that the court receives only those cases which are appropriate to its re-defined role. Fourth, reference is made to the types of informal services which are required to deal with the cases diverted from the court. Against this comparative and theoretical background aspects of New Zealand’s system for dealing with young offenders are considered. This part of the study takes the form of an historical analysis of its development and a description of the system in operation. Because of the conclusion reached regarding the importance of limiting court intake particular attention is focused on the procedures and criteria employed in making the decision as to whether or not a child should be prosecuted. Hence the fieldwork on which much of the New Zealand material is based concentrates on the Youth Aid/Social Welfare conference. An attempt is made to describe and analyse the day-to-day working of this type of sieving device. The findings are discussed, and certain features of the conference system are criticised. The thesis concludes with comments on some of the difficulties which must be taken into account in implementing a policy which emphasises the informal handling of young offenders.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / The matrix of this thesis is that the determining of liability according to the occurrence of the actual harm which results from the actor's course-of-conduct permits chance to determine criminal liability. The criminal law is posited on the notion that proof of two elements constitutes an offence: a mental element, mens rea and a physical element, the actus reus. Neither element is defined. An analysis of the offences comprising the four categories of offence identified in Part One indicates that - - the mens rea necessary of proof in the majority of these offences is translated loosely to mean intention; - intention is future-oriented and result-focussed; - the determining of liability according to proof both of actual harm and of intention (or, to a lesser degree, recklessness) takes no account of the hiatus which exists in time and in space between the actor's mental element and the actual harm which results; - circumstances beyond the actor's knowledge and control can determine liability and punishment. The object of Part Two is the formulation, within the context of existential philosophy, of a scheme whereby the ability of chance to influence liability and punishment is virtually eliminated. The scheme proposed modifies the doctrine of attempt liability. The analysis of that doctrine in the Second Part indicates that the word "intention", used in its pre-meditative, result-focussed and future-oriented sense, refers to the offence the actor has in mind. Liability is incurred when the actor makes sufficient progress in pursuit of that intention to be dangerously close to completion. The modified theory of attempt liability in Part Two reduces the ability of chance to determine liability in these ways: - the actor's intention to commit an offence is evidenced in her progress in her course-of-conduct to a stage dangerously proximate to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander; - the actor's liability is dependent upon proof of her knowledge (or belief) and control of the circumstances immediately surrounding the initiation and execution of that course-of-conduct. Intention is evidenced in a course-of-conduct dangerously close to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander. Existentially irrelevant, intention resumes its former, presumptive role. Liability is established on proof of mental elements both existentially relevant and contemporaneous with that course-of-conduct. The ability of chance to determine liability and punishment is virtually eliminated.

This study of systems for dealing with young offenders takes as its starting point the contrast between recent developments in the United States and Britain. These developments have occurred as a result of questions which have been raised, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the role of the juvenile court in combating delinquency. In the United States the resulting re-appraisal of the court’s function has been characterised by an emphasis on the fact that the court is part of the criminal justice system, and that it therefore cannot ignore the need to protect society against harmful conduct and to observe the requirements of due process. In England and Scotland, on the other hand, the movement has been towards the creation of tribunals which pay less attention to the child’s offence and which exercise a jurisdiction which tends to blur the distinction between offenders and non-offenders. From an analysis of this contrast the thesis moves to an examination of a significant similarity between the emerging Anglo- American systems. Although different solutions have been adopted to the problem of re-defining the role of the Juvenile court, the reforms in each of the countries studies have been accompanied by a desire to narrow the jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion which emerges from an examination of British and American experience is that, instead of seeing the juvenile court as an all-purpose delinquency-control agency, it should be viewed as an agency whose inherent limitations must be recognised if best use is to be made of its distinctive capabilities. This conclusion raises four related problems which the thesis considers in detail. First, attention is given to the task of attempting to define the court’s role, and an effort is made to determine which functions it can effectively and appropriately perform. Second, on the basis of this analysis, consideration is given to the formulation of criteria which indicate with precision the types of case which should be referred to court. Third, the design of an effective sieving device is discussed: machinery must be created which will ensure that the court receives only those cases which are appropriate to its re-defined role. Fourth, reference is made to the types of informal services which are required to deal with the cases diverted from the court. Against this comparative and theoretical background aspects of New Zealand’s system for dealing with young offenders are considered. This part of the study takes the form of an historical analysis of its development and a description of the system in operation. Because of the conclusion reached regarding the importance of limiting court intake particular attention is focused on the procedures and criteria employed in making the decision as to whether or not a child should be prosecuted. Hence the fieldwork on which much of the New Zealand material is based concentrates on the Youth Aid/Social Welfare conference. An attempt is made to describe and analyse the day-to-day working of this type of sieving device. The findings are discussed, and certain features of the conference system are criticised. The thesis concludes with comments on some of the difficulties which must be taken into account in implementing a policy which emphasises the informal handling of young offenders.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / The matrix of this thesis is that the determining of liability according to the occurrence of the actual harm which results from the actor's course-of-conduct permits chance to determine criminal liability. The criminal law is posited on the notion that proof of two elements constitutes an offence: a mental element, mens rea and a physical element, the actus reus. Neither element is defined. An analysis of the offences comprising the four categories of offence identified in Part One indicates that - - the mens rea necessary of proof in the majority of these offences is translated loosely to mean intention; - intention is future-oriented and result-focussed; - the determining of liability according to proof both of actual harm and of intention (or, to a lesser degree, recklessness) takes no account of the hiatus which exists in time and in space between the actor's mental element and the actual harm which results; - circumstances beyond the actor's knowledge and control can determine liability and punishment. The object of Part Two is the formulation, within the context of existential philosophy, of a scheme whereby the ability of chance to influence liability and punishment is virtually eliminated. The scheme proposed modifies the doctrine of attempt liability. The analysis of that doctrine in the Second Part indicates that the word "intention", used in its pre-meditative, result-focussed and future-oriented sense, refers to the offence the actor has in mind. Liability is incurred when the actor makes sufficient progress in pursuit of that intention to be dangerously close to completion. The modified theory of attempt liability in Part Two reduces the ability of chance to determine liability in these ways: - the actor's intention to commit an offence is evidenced in her progress in her course-of-conduct to a stage dangerously proximate to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander; - the actor's liability is dependent upon proof of her knowledge (or belief) and control of the circumstances immediately surrounding the initiation and execution of that course-of-conduct. Intention is evidenced in a course-of-conduct dangerously close to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander. Existentially irrelevant, intention resumes its former, presumptive role. Liability is established on proof of mental elements both existentially relevant and contemporaneous with that course-of-conduct. The ability of chance to determine liability and punishment is virtually eliminated.

This study of systems for dealing with young offenders takes as its starting point the contrast between recent developments in the United States and Britain. These developments have occurred as a result of questions which have been raised, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the role of the juvenile court in combating delinquency. In the United States the resulting re-appraisal of the court’s function has been characterised by an emphasis on the fact that the court is part of the criminal justice system, and that it therefore cannot ignore the need to protect society against harmful conduct and to observe the requirements of due process. In England and Scotland, on the other hand, the movement has been towards the creation of tribunals which pay less attention to the child’s offence and which exercise a jurisdiction which tends to blur the distinction between offenders and non-offenders. From an analysis of this contrast the thesis moves to an examination of a significant similarity between the emerging Anglo- American systems. Although different solutions have been adopted to the problem of re-defining the role of the Juvenile court, the reforms in each of the countries studies have been accompanied by a desire to narrow the jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion which emerges from an examination of British and American experience is that, instead of seeing the juvenile court as an all-purpose delinquency-control agency, it should be viewed as an agency whose inherent limitations must be recognised if best use is to be made of its distinctive capabilities. This conclusion raises four related problems which the thesis considers in detail. First, attention is given to the task of attempting to define the court’s role, and an effort is made to determine which functions it can effectively and appropriately perform. Second, on the basis of this analysis, consideration is given to the formulation of criteria which indicate with precision the types of case which should be referred to court. Third, the design of an effective sieving device is discussed: machinery must be created which will ensure that the court receives only those cases which are appropriate to its re-defined role. Fourth, reference is made to the types of informal services which are required to deal with the cases diverted from the court. Against this comparative and theoretical background aspects of New Zealand’s system for dealing with young offenders are considered. This part of the study takes the form of an historical analysis of its development and a description of the system in operation. Because of the conclusion reached regarding the importance of limiting court intake particular attention is focused on the procedures and criteria employed in making the decision as to whether or not a child should be prosecuted. Hence the fieldwork on which much of the New Zealand material is based concentrates on the Youth Aid/Social Welfare conference. An attempt is made to describe and analyse the day-to-day working of this type of sieving device. The findings are discussed, and certain features of the conference system are criticised. The thesis concludes with comments on some of the difficulties which must be taken into account in implementing a policy which emphasises the informal handling of young offenders.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / The matrix of this thesis is that the determining of liability according to the occurrence of the actual harm which results from the actor's course-of-conduct permits chance to determine criminal liability. The criminal law is posited on the notion that proof of two elements constitutes an offence: a mental element, mens rea and a physical element, the actus reus. Neither element is defined. An analysis of the offences comprising the four categories of offence identified in Part One indicates that - - the mens rea necessary of proof in the majority of these offences is translated loosely to mean intention; - intention is future-oriented and result-focussed; - the determining of liability according to proof both of actual harm and of intention (or, to a lesser degree, recklessness) takes no account of the hiatus which exists in time and in space between the actor's mental element and the actual harm which results; - circumstances beyond the actor's knowledge and control can determine liability and punishment. The object of Part Two is the formulation, within the context of existential philosophy, of a scheme whereby the ability of chance to influence liability and punishment is virtually eliminated. The scheme proposed modifies the doctrine of attempt liability. The analysis of that doctrine in the Second Part indicates that the word "intention", used in its pre-meditative, result-focussed and future-oriented sense, refers to the offence the actor has in mind. Liability is incurred when the actor makes sufficient progress in pursuit of that intention to be dangerously close to completion. The modified theory of attempt liability in Part Two reduces the ability of chance to determine liability in these ways: - the actor's intention to commit an offence is evidenced in her progress in her course-of-conduct to a stage dangerously proximate to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander; - the actor's liability is dependent upon proof of her knowledge (or belief) and control of the circumstances immediately surrounding the initiation and execution of that course-of-conduct. Intention is evidenced in a course-of-conduct dangerously close to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander. Existentially irrelevant, intention resumes its former, presumptive role. Liability is established on proof of mental elements both existentially relevant and contemporaneous with that course-of-conduct. The ability of chance to determine liability and punishment is virtually eliminated.

This study of systems for dealing with young offenders takes as its starting point the contrast between recent developments in the United States and Britain. These developments have occurred as a result of questions which have been raised, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the role of the juvenile court in combating delinquency. In the United States the resulting re-appraisal of the court’s function has been characterised by an emphasis on the fact that the court is part of the criminal justice system, and that it therefore cannot ignore the need to protect society against harmful conduct and to observe the requirements of due process. In England and Scotland, on the other hand, the movement has been towards the creation of tribunals which pay less attention to the child’s offence and which exercise a jurisdiction which tends to blur the distinction between offenders and non-offenders. From an analysis of this contrast the thesis moves to an examination of a significant similarity between the emerging Anglo- American systems. Although different solutions have been adopted to the problem of re-defining the role of the Juvenile court, the reforms in each of the countries studies have been accompanied by a desire to narrow the jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion which emerges from an examination of British and American experience is that, instead of seeing the juvenile court as an all-purpose delinquency-control agency, it should be viewed as an agency whose inherent limitations must be recognised if best use is to be made of its distinctive capabilities. This conclusion raises four related problems which the thesis considers in detail. First, attention is given to the task of attempting to define the court’s role, and an effort is made to determine which functions it can effectively and appropriately perform. Second, on the basis of this analysis, consideration is given to the formulation of criteria which indicate with precision the types of case which should be referred to court. Third, the design of an effective sieving device is discussed: machinery must be created which will ensure that the court receives only those cases which are appropriate to its re-defined role. Fourth, reference is made to the types of informal services which are required to deal with the cases diverted from the court. Against this comparative and theoretical background aspects of New Zealand’s system for dealing with young offenders are considered. This part of the study takes the form of an historical analysis of its development and a description of the system in operation. Because of the conclusion reached regarding the importance of limiting court intake particular attention is focused on the procedures and criteria employed in making the decision as to whether or not a child should be prosecuted. Hence the fieldwork on which much of the New Zealand material is based concentrates on the Youth Aid/Social Welfare conference. An attempt is made to describe and analyse the day-to-day working of this type of sieving device. The findings are discussed, and certain features of the conference system are criticised. The thesis concludes with comments on some of the difficulties which must be taken into account in implementing a policy which emphasises the informal handling of young offenders.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / The matrix of this thesis is that the determining of liability according to the occurrence of the actual harm which results from the actor's course-of-conduct permits chance to determine criminal liability. The criminal law is posited on the notion that proof of two elements constitutes an offence: a mental element, mens rea and a physical element, the actus reus. Neither element is defined. An analysis of the offences comprising the four categories of offence identified in Part One indicates that - - the mens rea necessary of proof in the majority of these offences is translated loosely to mean intention; - intention is future-oriented and result-focussed; - the determining of liability according to proof both of actual harm and of intention (or, to a lesser degree, recklessness) takes no account of the hiatus which exists in time and in space between the actor's mental element and the actual harm which results; - circumstances beyond the actor's knowledge and control can determine liability and punishment. The object of Part Two is the formulation, within the context of existential philosophy, of a scheme whereby the ability of chance to influence liability and punishment is virtually eliminated. The scheme proposed modifies the doctrine of attempt liability. The analysis of that doctrine in the Second Part indicates that the word "intention", used in its pre-meditative, result-focussed and future-oriented sense, refers to the offence the actor has in mind. Liability is incurred when the actor makes sufficient progress in pursuit of that intention to be dangerously close to completion. The modified theory of attempt liability in Part Two reduces the ability of chance to determine liability in these ways: - the actor's intention to commit an offence is evidenced in her progress in her course-of-conduct to a stage dangerously proximate to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander; - the actor's liability is dependent upon proof of her knowledge (or belief) and control of the circumstances immediately surrounding the initiation and execution of that course-of-conduct. Intention is evidenced in a course-of-conduct dangerously close to completion whereby the fear of the imminent occurrence of actual harm is engendered in the hypothetical, objective bystander. Existentially irrelevant, intention resumes its former, presumptive role. Liability is established on proof of mental elements both existentially relevant and contemporaneous with that course-of-conduct. The ability of chance to determine liability and punishment is virtually eliminated.