At the end of the Cold War some scholars argued that democracy is the only legitimate political system and that this needs to be acknowledged even by international law. This thesis rejects such arguments and takes the position that attributes of statehood are not dependent on type of government. As far as existing states are concerned, democracy is not an ongoing requirement for statehood. The end of the Cold War also coincided with the dissolutions of two multiethnic federations, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia followed shortly afterwards and subsequently Eritrea, East Timor and Montenegro also became independent states. Most recently, independence was declared by Kosovo. Some of these post-Cold War state creations were subject to significant international involvement, which might have had effects of (informal) collective state creations. This thesis argues that in such circumstances international efforts to create a new state were associated with attempts to implement a democratic political system. On the other hand, where the emergence of a new state was merely a fact (and the international community was not involved in producing this fact), recognition was normally universally granted without an enquiry into the (non-) democratic methods of governments of the newly-emerged states. Apart from democracy as a political system, this thesis is also concerned with the operation of democratic principles in the process of state creation, most notably through the exercise of the right of self-determination. An argument is made that the will of the people within the right of self-determination has a narrower scope than is the case within democratic political theory. Further, while the operation of the right of self-determination requires consent of the people before the legal status of a territory may be altered, a democratic expression of the will of a people will not necessarily create a state. Limits on the will of the people in the context of the right of selfdetermination stem from the principle of territorial integrity of states, protection of rights of other peoples and minorities, and even from the previously existing internal boundary arrangement. In the context of the latter it is concluded that the uti possidetis principle probably does not apply outside of the process of decolonisation. However, this does not mean that existing internal boundaries are not capable of limiting the democratically-expressed will of the people, especially where boundaries of strong historical pedigree are in question.

In 1937, the international community preliminarily agreed on a definition of international terrorism. A major World War and Cold War since that time have made impossible any such modern consensus. In particular, the U.N. principles of the equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples" have caused political and juridical confusion in that liberation fighters who utilize terror methods as one tactic in an overall political strategy to achieve self-determination are frequently termed "terrorists", and prosecuted as such. In order to regulate wars of self-determination under international law, and to control the means and methods of warfare utilized in them, international humanitarian law (IHL) was extended in 1977 to include armed conflicts for the right to self-determination, "as enshrined in ... the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Thus, acts of terrorism perpetrated during armed struggles for self-determination are separable from random acts of international violence, and when perpetrated by states or insurgent forces during wars of self-determination, may be prosecuted under IHL as war crimes. However, although states are obligated to seek out and prosecute the perpetrators of illicit acts of warfare, they rarely do so. Nevertheless, should IHL be fully utilized during wars of self-determination, if only for purposes of guidance, the separability of illicit acts of war would enable the international community to reach consensus more easily regarding a definition of terrorism in general, and a co-ordination of efforts to deter its occurrence.

The aim of this study has been to explore the political and legal significance of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, both within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and beyond. Within these parameters, the overall purpose of the study has been to examine, firstly, whether the ICTY has contributed to the restoration of peace and security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and secondly, whether, using the experience of the ICTY, it is reasonable to expect that the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) will make a similar contribution to international peace and security and the rule of law in international relations more generally. Therefore, the academic aim of the thesis is to use the results of the empirical research on the ICTY as a basis for reasoned speculation about the ICC. In seeking to answer whether the ICTY has contributed to peace and security in the former Yugoslavia, the thesis analyses the cooperation of the actors within and outside the former Yugoslavia, both state and non-state, arguing that the ICTY has not achieved its main objective. Using the lessons of the ICTY, the thesis seeks to modify expectations about the potential of the ICC to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by helping to manage similar conflicts in the future. In answering whether the ICTY has contributed to the rule of law in international relations, the thesis has contextualised the ICTY within the history of similar attempts to use international law and international institutions to prohibit and/or regulate the use of force in international relations. The overall conclusion is that the ICTY has not achieved this goal either.

The issue of piracy and maritime terrorism becomes complicated when it is discussed in relation to the rights of the coastal states regarding the right of passage in straits used for international navigation. One of the issues in this respect is the conflicting interests of littoral states that insist on sovereignty over the sea areas adjacent to their coast and the needs of user states to retain and indeed to have more freedom in navigation while passing through and overflying these straits. The Straits of Malacca is a region where the concepts of respective freedom have been tested. To further complicate the matter, in law and perceptions, the 11 September 2001 atrocities brought about an urgent need for more radical changes to the existing international law to deal with possible terrorist attacks at sea. This resulted in the rapid adoption under the IMO of the ISPS Code through amendments to the SOLAS Convention 1974. More radical changes affecting the basic rights of freedom of the high seas are taking place in the amendments of the SUA Convention 1988. Against this backdrop, the issue of maritime security and the way in which the littoral states deal with it while maintaining their rights and sovereignty has had fundamental effects in the Straits of Malacca. The main purpose of this thesis is to trace the legal developments and changes that have taken place in regional and international law since the September 11 atrocities, which have fundamentally affected the question of the littoral states' sovereignty and rights over adjacent maritime zones against the rights of user states and interested maritime powers as applied in new security outlooks and threats of international terrorism. Through case studies to examine fundamentals, this thesis attempts to answer the question as to whether the trend to further 'internationalise' the Straits of Malacca is justified under the international conventions and customary law. The thesis will trace the use of the issue of piratical attacks in the straits, which have enabled third parties to offer security arrangements to the littoral states, and how diplomatic negotiations on this question between the littoral states themselves are compounded by complex historical, legal and political issues and by related organizational structures at national, regional and international levels. These objectives can be achieved only by a rigorous evaluation of the law of the sea with respect to security, accompanied by examinations of actual processes and practices in the form of case studies. A summing up of the evidence so examined is provided in the final chapter of the thesis.

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to examine the legitimacy and procedural fairness of the asset-freezing legal systems1 as a counter-terrorism measure, in order to offer recommendations on how to reform the law in Jordan. To that end, it is argued that counter-terrorism measures generally undermine procedural fairness and relevant human rights. This thesis explores how sophisticated legal orders deal with the adverse effects of lack of legitimacy and procedural fairness in the asset-freezing counter-terrorism, in order to form a model that can resolve the defects in the application of the asset-freezing systems. To achieve this end, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. It starts with a brief introduction. Chapter 1, seeks to explore the development of the asset-freezing in the United Nations (hereinafter ‘UN’), the changes in its nature, and determines if the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter ‘UNSC’) is empowered to impose such asset-freezing obligations. Chapter 2, inspects the decision-making procedures involved in the asset-freezing against designated persons such as UNSCR.1267, and its descendants, and the observation of procedural fairness in the UN legal order. Chapter 3, examines the application of the UNSC asset-freezing systems by the European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) and its procedures, and the observation of procedural fairness in order to explore its inconsistencies and flaws. Chapter 4, looks at the legal challenge to the UN and EU legal orders, the lack of judicial protection in the UN, and the possibility of compensating for this lack by the EU Judiciary based on the autonomy of the EU legal order to see if the EU courts have the capability to provide effective judicial protection and the extent of such judicial protection . Chapter 5 deals with the approaches followed in applying the UN, EU and national asset-freezing systems and their procedure in the UK legal order, also the observance of procedural fairness in these contexts. Chapter 6 examines the right to effective judicial protection and the approach followed to accommodate the security considerations in proceedings before the UK court. Chapter 7 explores the application of the asset-freezing systems in Jordan, the lack of procedural fairness and the limited judicial protection offered. Finally, the thesis presents concluding remarks and recommendations for law reform in Jordan.

This is a thesis about the applicability of the jus in bello to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups. The thesis focuses on the thresholds of applicability. These are the definitions of actors and situations that activate the applicability of the jus in bello. The aim is to illuminate and critique the regulatory rationales behind the different definitions of actors and situations in the different thresholds. The evolution of the thresholds is reviewed chronologically. Accordingly, the enquiry ranges from the 19th century doctrines of recognition of belligerency and insurgency, through common article 3 and Additional Protocols I and II, to the law developed by the ICTY and included in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. While the thresholds constitute the centre of the enquiry, their meaning and function are further elucidated by the analysis of the process of their assessment, as well as the extent of the substantive legal regime they activate. The central question of the thesis is whether there has been a gradual shift from a status-based rationale to one focused on the humanitarian protection of individuals, in the evolution of the thresholds of applicability. A status-based rationale fits with a system of horizontal regulation of state-like collective entities and allows considerations and perceptions of the ascription of status through legal regulation to determine the threshold of applicability. A humanitarian-protection rationale is more related to a system of vertical regulation irrespective of status and links the applicability of the law to the individual and her protection. The argument proposed is that such a gradual shift is indeed visible, if tempered by the continuous role that considerations of status have in conflict situations and the still largely decentralised system of assessment of the applicability of the law.

International criminal courts do not operate to the exclusion of national legal orders, but co-exist with them. The present thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the above relationship. By examining the concepts of primacy and complementarity on the basis of which the ad hoc international criminal Tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court seize jurisdiction, the foundations of the interface are explored. As effectiveness is a key concept to international criminal justice, the relationship between international criminal courts and national legal systems is tested, by examining the co-operation regimes envisaged in the Statutes of both the Tribunals and the ICC, as well as the problems that arise in practice. Moreover, the way the UN Security Council affects State interplay with international criminal justice institutions is crucial for a holistic understanding of the limitations of the interaction. The final part of the thesis focuses on national incorporation efforts and provides a detailed analysis of implementing legislation of a number of key States with a view to discerning some common approaches and highlighting problem areas. The present thesis argues that despite the different constitutional bases of the Tribunals and the ICC, similar questions of interface with national courts arise and the challenges presented could be better tackled by aiming for a "functional or workable interaction". Overall, the originality of this thesis lies in its analytical approach. By scrutinising a number of crucial aspects of the relationship between international criminal courts and national legal orders an overview of the research question posed is achieved. Moreover, the examination of the legal principles and their practical application is complemented by a comprehensive discussion of national implementing legislation which has not previously been attempted in a similar manner. [Files associated with the accompanying CD-ROM (print version) are available on request to subject librarian.]

This thesis reviews in detail the powers, practice and effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security since its inception over forty years ago. The work not only contains an examination of the constitutional powers of the the two United Nations' organs responsible for this area - the Security Council and the General Assembly - and of how these powers have been developed in practice, but also of the significant political factors operating to limit the ambit and effectiveness of those powers. To this end Part 1 of the work examines the Security Council, Part 2 the General Assembly, whilst Part 3 contains a study of the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. Each Part is roughly divided into an analysis in terms of political factors, constitutional considerations and finally effectiveness. Peacekeeping is examined separately because it raises a host of particular problems - both constitutional and political – which would be difficult to encompass in the other two Parts. Generally, each chapter contains a conclusion at which point the various threads are drawn together not only to produce a summary but also to provide guidance as to the future use and development of the powers possessed by the United Nations in this field.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the conceptual foundations of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and scrutinise the pertinent practice within the identified lego-philosophical framework. The present study is organised into three major sections. The first section contains the theory of humanitarian intervention and it has been subdivided into four chapters which represent the main legal theories. The pursued analysis is, thus, manifold. It proceeds with a theoretical appraisement of natural law, positivism, realism, and critical legal studies by presenting and evaluating their main dispositions, inadequacies and interrelations. Additionally, those trends in the practice of humanitarian intervention which coincide with the identified theoretical tenets are also appraised. The thrust of the pursued analysis is, we hope, to rationalise the contradiction in legal doctrine which stems from the different philosophical stances adopted by legal theorists. These contradictions could be surmised in the antithetical poles of peace/justice; human rights/sovereignty. The next section could be introduced as the praxis of humanitarian intervention and contains two chapters. Having identified the arguments and contradictions, two articles of the United Nations Charter which attempt to control the notion of humanitarian intervention by legal means are analysed; that is, Article 2(4) on the non-use of force and Article 51 on self-defence. The diversified effectuation of humanitarian intervention renders the identified contradictions and opposing theoretical trends more evident. However, our aim is not merely to deconstruct the legal and philosophical milieu relating to humanitarian intervention but also to present a new framework for analysis. Consequently, the last two chapters contain our phronesis. They deal with the assumption of human dignity which transgresses the compartmentalisation of legal doctrine and its unreflective actualisation in the praxis of humanitarian intervention. At this point, the aim of the present research is to substitute a sterile lego-philosophical dogmatism and to submit under scrutiny a vision whereby the critical parameters of any humanitarian action are evaluated and accounted for. This, we hope, consists of the innovative aspect of this research. The existing lego-philosophical approach to humanitarian intervention – negative or positive - suffers from an unreflective automation. The negative approach submits any relevant action to strictly defined criteria compliance with which is conditio sine qua non for legality. On the other hand, the positive approach encounters greater difficulties. It weighs any humanitarian action according to certain criteria but disguises its value choices within the legal context. The fear of incommensuration in legal argument invites indecisive and restrained attitudes. In contradistinction, our approach entails an explicit aim of attaining human dignity which redirects our reflective nature towards distinguishing and deconcretising the manifold aspects which humanitarian actions contain. Instead of monolithic evaluations, one should see in any humanitarian action the values which are at stake and what should be done in order to ameliorate the situation.

The purpose of this study is an inquiry into the present state of customary international law on the use of armed force by individual States. It deals with the historical evolution of the law towards the current rule of the prohibition of the use of force, the content of this prohibition and the purported exceptions to it that are invoked in the practice of States as justifications of lawful resort to force. The present author does not deal with the use of force under the authority of competent organs of the United Nations and regional organisations, as well as questions of individual criminal responsibility for resort to armed force. The present author has adopted an analytical and empirical approach towards the phenomenon of the use of armed force by States. The study is based on an examination of the practice of individual States, both within and outside the framework of United Nations organs. More specifically it concentrates on the practice of States that perpetrated the use of force, the States that were the targets of this force and the reactions of third States (in the sense of not those directly involved) to instances of use of force. Moreover, the present author considers certain resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly as part of the practice of States and evidence of opinio juris of this practice. By this it is meant that the adoption (or not) of resolutions, especially in the Security Council, is not insulated from statements by individual members of these U. N. organs. Hence, in the case of the Security Council the lack of condemnation is not automatically considered as approval of the action that is the object of debate at the Council, beyond and apart from the attitude of individual Members. At the same time the adoption of a resolution is treated as a projection of the position advocated by individual States, while account is taken of the voting pattern and dissent or reservations expressed upon adoption. The study of State practice is compared with the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case (Merits) (the issues of use of armed force dealt with by the Court) with the aim of proving that the restrictive interpretation of the law on the use of force upheld by the Court corresponds to the actual practice of States as a component of general customary law. The position of the law of the use of force rests on a twofold basis. First, the rule of the prohibition of resort to armed force that constitutes the foundation and the starting point of the legal regulation of unilateral resort to armed force, and secondly, the purported exceptions to the rule. It is undoubtedly the case that the legal force of the rule of non-use of armed violence is not diminished. The numerous resorts to armed force by individual States have been justified either on the basis of restrictive interpretation of the content of the prohibition itself or of the purported exceptions to it. In the subsequent sections it is shown that State practice does not admit a restrictive interpretation of components of the rule and is unanimous only with regard to one of the purported exceptions to it : the right of defensive action. With regard to other exceptions, there exists extreme controversy as to their existence and scope. The content of the prohibition of the use of force, the scope of the "universally admitted" exception of defensive action, and, finally, the controversial exceptions to the rule of non-use of force constitute the three main thematic issues that are dealt with in this study. Hence the structure of the present thesis reflects this contingency. The present study considers the evolution of the law on the regulation of the use of force as marked by continuity from the period of the League of Nations to the present, and it is divided in three parts. Part One deals with the rule of the prohibition of the use of armed force by individual States. It considers the historical evolution of the rule and focuses greatly on the important developments in the practice of States during the period of the League of Nations that culminated in the total prohibition of armed force as a result of the Conclusion of the Pact of Paris (1928) and the establishment of the United Nations Organisation (Chapter 1). The remainder of Part One deals with the content of the prohibition of the threat or use of force by focusing, mainly, on the practice of States in the period 1945 - 19913. The issues that are dealt with are related to the phenomena of indirect use of force by way of armed bands (Chapter 2); armed reprisals (Chapter 3); the concepts of threat of force (Chapter 4); economic coercion (Chapter 5); anti-colonial armed struggles in relation to the rule of non-use of force (Chapter 6); and territorial integrity and political independence as the object of forcible action. Part Two examines the historical evolution (Chapter 8) and the content of the right of self-defence (Chapters 9& 10), as the only universally accepted ground for lawful unilateral resort to armed force. Chapter 9 deals with the content of individual defensive action and Chapter 10 concerns the concept of collective self-defence. Finally, in Part Three the present author considers justifications for lawful resort to armed force that are surrounded by controversy: Namely, the use of force by States for the protection of the lives and property of nationals or under the doctrine of "humanitarian intervention" (Chapter 11) and the concept of military intervention on the basis of the consent of the State on whose territory military action is taking place (Chapter 12). By way of last word it must be pointed out that in this study the term "intervention" is considered as wider than the concept of "armed force" - the latter is included in the former but not vice-versa. A study of intervention necessarily includes, in this writer's view, instances of nonforcible State activity detailed consideration of which was beyond the scope of this thesis.