This thesis empirically examines how lobby groups and activists respond to innovative forms of public participation. The study centres on processes that foster a particular kind of deliberative governance including citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and planning cells. These deliberative designs bring together a panel of randomly selected lay citizens to deliberate on a specific policy issue for a few days, with the aim of providing decision makers with a set of recommendations. While policy makers worldwide are attracted to these novel participatory processes, little consideration has been given to how well they work alongside more adversarial and interest-based politics. This doctoral research project examines this interface by studying what these processes mean to different kinds of policy actors such as corporations, advocacy groups, government agencies, experts and professionals. These entities are collectively referred to in this thesis as ‘interest organisations’ because in some way they are seeking a specific policy outcome from the state – even government-based groups.¶ The empirical research in this thesis is based on comparative case studies of four deliberative design projects in Australia and Germany. The Australian cases include a citizens’ jury on waste management legislation and a consensus conference on gene technology in the food chain. The German case studies include a planning cells project on consumer protection in Bavaria, and a national consensus conference on genetic diagnostics. Together the cases capture a diversity of complex and contested policy issues facing post-industrialised societies. In each case study, I examine how relevant interest organisations responded to the deliberative forum, and then interpret these responses in view of the context and features of the case.¶ The picture emerging from the in-depth case studies is that interest organisations respond to deliberative designs in a variety of ways. Some choose to participate actively, others passively decline, and a few resort to strategic tactics to undermine citizens’ deliberations. The empirical research reveals that though responses are variable, most interest organisations are challenged by several features of the deliberative design model including: 1) that deliberators are citizens with no knowledge or association with the issue; 2) that experts and interest representatives are required to present their arguments before a citizens’ panel; and 3) that policy discussions occur under deliberative conditions which can expose the illegitimate use of power.¶ Despite these challenges, the paradox is that many interest organisations do decide to engage in lay citizen deliberations. The empirical research indicates that groups and experts value deliberative designs if they present an opportunity for public relations, customer feedback, or advocacy. Moreover, the research finds that when policy actors intensively engage with ‘ordinary’ citizens, their technocratic and elite ideas about public participation can shift in a more inclusive and deliberative direction.¶ The thesis finds that, on the whole, weaker interest organisations are more willing to engage with lay citizens than stronger organisations because they welcome the chance to influence public debate and decision makers. It appears that powerful groups will only engage in a deliberative forum under certain policy conditions, for example, when the dominant policy paradigm is unstable and contested, when public discussion on the issue is emerging, when policy networks are interdependent and heterogeneous, and when the broader social and political system supports public accountability, consensus and deliberation. Given that these kinds of policy conditions do not always exist, I conclude that tensions between interest organisations and deliberative governance will be common. In order to create more cooperative and productive interfaces, I recommend that interest organisations be better supported and integrated into citizens’ deliberations, and that steps be taken to safeguard forums from strategic attempts to undermine their legitimacy.¶ The thesis also sends out three key messages to democratic theorists. First, the empirical research shows that different kinds of groups and actors in civil society vary in their willingness and capacity to participate to public deliberation. Second, the deliberative design model demonstrates that partisan actors, such as interest organisations, will engage in public deliberation when they can participate as strategic deliberators. In this role partisans are not expected to relinquish their agendas, but present them as testimonies before a group of deliberators. Third, the empirical research in this thesis should bring home to theorists that deliberative forums are closely linked to the discursive context within which they operate.