This thesis provides an ethical analysis of imprisonment as a mode of punishment. Consisting in an introduction and four papers the thesis addresses several important questions concerning imprisonment from a number of different perspectives and theoretical starting points. One overall conclusion of this thesis is that imprisonment, as a mode of punishment, deserves more attention from moral and legal philosophers. It is also concluded that a more complete ethical assessment of prison conditions and prison management requires a broader focus. It must include an explicit discussion of both how imprisonment directly affects prison inmates and its negative side-effects on third parties. Another conclusion is that ethical discussions on prison conditions should not be too easily reduced to a question about how harsh or lenient is should be. Paper 1 argues that prisoners have a right to privacy. It is argued that respect for inmates’ privacy is related to respect for them as moral agents. Consequently, respect for inmates’ privacy is called for by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. Practical implications of this argument are discussed and it is argued that invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible, without compromising other important values or the rights to safety and security. It is also proposed that respect for privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment. Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the children and other close family members of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two perspectives in moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology, are then applied in order to assess whether these harms are permissible. It is argued that from either perspective it is hard to defend the claim that allowing for these harms are morally permissible. Consequently, imprisonment should be used only as a last resort. Where it is deemed necessary, it gives rise to special moral obligations. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are then categorized and clarified.                 Paper 3 focuses on an argument that has figured in the philosophical debate on felon disenfranchisement. This argument states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, a legitimate democratic collective has the collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons as a way of defining their political identity. Yet, such a collective’s right to self-determination is limited, since the choice to disenfranchise anyone must be connected to normative considerations of political significance. This paper defends this argument against three charges that has been raised to it. In doing so it also explores under what circumstances felon disenfranchisement can be permissible. Paper 4 explores the question of whether prison inmates suffering from ADHD should be administered psychopharmacological intervention (methylphenidate) for their condition. The theoretical starting point for the discussion is the communicative theory of punishment, which understands criminal punishment   as a form of secular penance. Viewed through the lens of the communicative theory it is argued that the provision of pharmacological treatment to offenders with ADHD need not necessarily be conceived of as an alternative to punishment, but as an aid to achieving the penological ends of secular penance. Thus, in this view offenders diagnosed with ADHD should have the option to undergo pharmacological treatment. / <p>QC 20170110</p>

This licentiate thesis consists of three essays which all concern the ethics of imprisonment and what constitutes an ethically defensible treatment of criminal offenders. Paper 1 defends the claim that prisoners have a right to privacy. I argue that the right to privacy is important because of its connection to moral agency. For that reasons is the protection of inmates’ right to privacy also warranted by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. I discuss the practical implications of this argument. Ultimately I argue the invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible without compromising other important values and rights to safety and security. In defending this position, I argue that respect for inmates’ privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment to better effect in the long run. Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the close family members and children of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two competing perspectives in moral philosophy are applied in order to assess whether the harms are permissible. The first is consequentialist and the second is deontological, and it is argued that both of them fails and therefore it is hard to defend the position that allowing for these harms would be morally permissible, even for the sake of the overall aims of incarceration. Instead, it is argued that these harms imply that imprisonment should only be used as a last resort. Where it is necessary, imprisonment should give rise to special moral obligations towards families of prisoners. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are defended, categorized and clarified. Paper 3 evaluates electronic monitoring (EM) from an ethical perspective and discusses whether it could be a promising alternative to imprisonment as a criminal sanction for a series of criminal offenses. EM evaluated from an ethical perspective as six initial ethical challenges are addressed and discussed. It is argued that since EM is developing as a technology and a punitive means, it is urgent to discuss its ethical implications and incorporate moral values into its design and development. / <p>QC 20140519</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Georges Amauri Lopes.pdf: 1318748 bytes, checksum: 7414a99112e9a61d311cc5e645cce46d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-09-04 / If it is true that the contemporary societies are extremely complex, formed by many subgroups owner of different values, there is no reason to deny that all of them agree on a minimum of morality and types of behaviors necessary to make any pacific union in the society possible. The elements which are in that agreement are learned by the socialization procedure, and are sustained and protected by the informal social control in a first moment. When this control is no longer effective those fundamental elements and social conditions are at risk, the State must bring to itself the formal social control, which is made by the penal law, one of the many instruments that exist for it. Many of the fundamental social conditions may be put on danger by acts in the economic activity specifically. This paper intends to legitimate the economic penal law as a way of protecting the fundamental social conditions necessary for a pacific, fair and equal social life, which may be offended by abusive acts of the economic power. / Em que pese ser a contemporaneidade caracterizada por uma sociedade altamente complexa, na qual podem ser encontrados diversos sub-grupos orientados por valores ou padrões comportamentais diversificados, não se nega haver um mínimo consenso ético sem o qual não se faria possível a existência de qualquer coesão pacífica. Os elementos espirituais que a compõem são ensinados no processo de socialização e assegurados, num primeiro momento, pelo controle social informal. Quando este não se mostra mais capaz a tanto e bens jurídicos essenciais estão sob risco, o Estado tem o dever de chamar para si o controle social formal, constituindo-se o direito penal em um dos instrumentos existentes. Vários daqueles bens jurídicos podem ser lesionados por atos manifestados especificamente na atividade econômica. Esta dissertação tem por escopo fundamentar o direito penal econômico como meio de proteção aos bens jurídicos essenciais à coexistência social pacífica, justa e igualitária que podem ser colocados em risco pelos atos abusivos do poder econômico.