Efficient enforcement of cartel law This thesis deals with the issue of effective enforcement of cartel law, focusing on the interaction between public and private enforcement. The aim of this thesis is to compare the enforcement systems of cartel law in Czech, European and American legal systems, in particular to compare the form and functioning of two key tools of public and private enforcement, i.e. the leniency program and the actions for damages, to analyse the interaction between them, reveal the main tension and finally to compare the solutions to this conflict that are offered by different legal systems. I am comparing the solutions offered by current legislation in the EU and the Czech Republic with the solutions of US antitrust law where both tools coexist and have been successfully operating for some time. On the basis of such comparison I will try to determine whether the current solution is effective or whether there exists a more suitable one. The thesis consists of three parts. The first part is divided into two chapters, where the first chapter defines the basic terminology that relates to the issue of antitrust law enforcement. Further it contains a description of relevant sources of law. The second chapter deals with various antitrust law enforcement models which operate within...

This thesis deals with a legal framework of leniency programme. The program provides imunity or fine reduction from government penalties to the first member of a cartel in exchange for cooperation. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate effectiveness and functioning of the Czech and European leniency program, effects in practice and current challenges the program is facing. In introduction thesis deals with general requirements for an effective leniency program, further with development of the program in the EU and the Czech Republic with focus on progress towards more efficient, transparent and attractive system and application practice of the Commission, and. Office for Protection of Competition. It briefly introduces the European Competition Network and Model Leniency programme. Another part deals with the private enforcement of competition law in context of the current case law concerning access to the file and protection of leniency materials.

Protection of business competition - agreements interfering with competition Agreements interfering with competition are a significant threat to proper functioning of the competition. Leniency programmes are a powerful tool for the purpose of detection and termination of cartels. This thesis focuses mainly on the regulation contained in the Czech national law. The Community law can not be ignored though as the national law is closely connected therewith. The first part of this thesis contains mainly a basic definition of agreements interfering with competition, their division according to their content as well as division to horizontal and vertical agreements which is important to assess agreements with an insignificant impact on the competition. When assessing the influence of an agreement it is also necessary to take legal and block exemptions into account. The most important cartel assessed by the Office for the Protection of Competition so far is an agreement on the gas insulated switchgear market. For this agreement having a form of bid rigging the Office imposed the highest fine in its history. But this case also demonstrates a frequent problem of significant delays in the court proceedings, which are often initiated by legal actions of undertakings against decisions of the Office for the...

Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der Marktmanipulation in komplexen Märkten aus kartell- und kapitalmarktrechtlicher Perspektive am Beispiel des deutschen Großhandelsmarktes für Strom (European Energy Exchange, EEX) mittels einer ökonomischen und rechtlichen Analyse. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Behörden bei der Anwendung des Manipulationstatbestandes auf mögliche Verstöße häufig vor Nachweisproblemen stehen, die im Ergebnis zu einer fehlenden Durchsetzung von Sanktionen trotz Tatbestandsmäßigkeit führen können. Dadurch kommt es zu Lücken in der Rechtsdurchsetzung, die den Abschreckungseffekt der Verbotstatbestände erheblich mindern. Zentrale These der Arbeit ist daher, dass das bestehende Sanktionensystem derart weiterentwickelt werden muss, dass es Rückwirkungen bereits auf die Tatbestandsebene entfaltet, die einen Verstoß gegen das Manipulationsverbot schon aus der ex-ante Perspektive unattraktiv machen. Im ersten Teil werden das Marktumfeld sowie der bestehende Rechtsrahmen untersucht und Manipulationsanreize für die Marktteilnehmer sowie das Fehlen effektiver Instrumente zur Rechtsdurchsetzung festgestellt. Die Sektoruntersuchungen der Europäischen Kommission sowie des Bundeskartellamtes bestätigen diesen Befund. Der zweite Teil setzt auf die positive Analyse auf und schlägt Regulierungsinstrumente zur Änderung des Anreizsystems vor. Dabei ist der Fokus anstelle stetig steigender Bußgelder auf Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit zu legen. Es wird vorgeschlagen, das bestehende Kronzeugenprogramm auf Manipulationsfälle auszudehnen und mit einem Belohnungssystem für Whistleblower zu kombinieren, um vermehrt Verstöße aufzudecken und den Abschreckungseffekt der Manipulationstatbestände zu erhöhen. Begleitend ist eine effektive Koordinierung der Maßnahmen staatlicher und privater Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts geboten, um Durchsetzungsdefizite zu beseitigen. / The work examines the problem of market manipulation in complex markets from an antitrust and capital market law perspective, using the example of the German wholesale market for electricity (European Energy Exchange, EEX) and applying the methodology of the economic analysis of law. It is shown that authorities applying the ban of market manipulations on potential infringements regularly face problems of proving a breach of the law which may result in a lack of enforcement of sanctions. Considerable gaps in enforcement result that may reduce the deterrent effect of the prohibition significantly. The central thesis of this work is therefore, that an evolution of the existing system of sanctions is required such that it exerts repercussions on market participants´ reasoning that make an offence unattractive already from the ex-ante perspective. In the first section, the market conditions as well as the existing legal framework are examined. As a result of this analysis, incentives for manipulation of the market by market participants and the lack of effective instruments for law enforcement are found. The sector inquiries of both, the European Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office confirm this finding. The second section of the work builds upon the positive analysis and proposes regulatory instruments to change the incentive scheme in the market. The focus is placed on measures that increase the probability of detection and punishment instead of the dogma of consistently increasing fines. The central proposal extends the existing leniency program for cartels on manipulation cases and combines it with a reward system for whistleblowers. This approach proposes an increased probability of detection of market manipulations and thereby boosts the deterrent effect of antitrust law. Also, the effective coordination of public and private antitrust enforcement efforts is a necessary accompanying measure to remedy deficiencies of law enforcement.

This thesis aims to analyze the efficiency of the leniency programme. This programme is currently the most important cartel fighting instrument in EU and Czech Republic. The first section deals with cartel agreements and their impact in general. It also shows reasons for implementation of the leniency programme and other cartel fighting instruments. Second section concerns on general principles of leniency programme and its position within current system of law. The next two parts contains description and history of leniency program in EU and Czech Republic. They also analyze decisions of European Commission and Office for the Protection of Competition in Czech Republic. This analysis creates the most important part of this section. The last section aims at juridical institutes able to endanger efficient functiong of leniency programme in future and defines their relation to this programme.

This thesis aims to provide a legal framework concerning Leniency Program which is by far one of the most successful tools in detection and prosecution of criminal cartel conduct, which has been recently perceived as one of the most important and dangerous anticompetitive conduct. Under the current system, an applicant making a leniency application will apply to seek full immunity from sanctions. If full immunity is not available, the applicant can apply for a reduction of any fine levelled against it. The study examines the level of transparency, predictability and effectiveness in the Czech Republic, European Union and United States. Chapter three provides an overview of a historical aspect of a Leniency Program including case law and recent development in each of abovementioned jurisdiction. In order to take all aspects into account, an impact of this program on human rights and recidivism is also discussed in this paper. Final chapter contains a recent development concerning Antitrust Damages Actions and rules on disclosure of evidence on leniency.

The final thesis deals with the Leniency programme, as one of the most important instrument of the Office for the Protection of Competition and the European Commission for detecting of cartel agreements. The aim of the thesis is to analyze regulation of the Leniency programme in the Czech Republic, from the practical point of view find out how participants of cartel agreements use the programme and whether it is effective from the view of the Office for the Protection of Competition. The thesis should also involve formation and development of the programme and how it is influenced by European law. The thesis is divided into 4 parts. The first part deals with cartel agreements. The second part focuses on cartel law enforcement which is divided in term of law regulation into public and private enforcement. The third part is the core of the theoretical part of the thesis, it presents in detail the regulation of the Leniency programme within the European Union and in the Czech Republic, there are problems of the program and their possible solutions outlined as well. The fourth part concerns the practical point of view of the Leniency programme, its harmonization among the member states of the European Union and its application in the Czech Republic in decisions of the Office for the Protection of Competition.