Hur ska resultatet av ett krig mätas, på vilket sätt är det möjligt att opartiskt bedöma vem som vunnit eller förlorat. I många fall är resultatet uppenbart, ingen tvivlar t.ex. på att Storbritannien vann Falklandskriget, utfallet på slagfältet motsvarar uppfattning av vem som vann kriget. Men i många moderna krig är situationen en annan, utgången kan vara omtvistad, eller så är det svårt att uppfatta om kriget överhuvudtaget har avslutats. I uppsatsen används score-keeping teorin som är ett sätt att analysera resultatet av ett krig, vilken aktör vann? Fallet som analyseras är Libanonkri-get 2006 som utkämpades mellan Israel och Hizbollah och är intressant då resultatet dels är om-tvistat samt att det skedde mellan en stat och en organisation som är grupperad inom och verkar ifrån en annan stat. Uppsatsens syfte är därför att utifrån score-keeping teorin analysera Libanonkriget 2006. Den vetenskapliga frågan som skall besvaras är: Vilken aktör kan sägas ha vunnit Libanonkriget 2006 utifrån score-keeping teorin. Designen för undersökningen är en teorikonsumerande studie av Libanonkriget 2006 där av teorin givna variabler operationaliseras för att kunna ställas mot ett urval ur empirin. Undersökningens resultat visar att utifrån score-keeping teorin kan Hizbollah anses vara vinnare i Libanonkriget 2006. Vidare visar undersökningen på ett antal utmaningar med att tillämpa score-keeping teorin på Libanonkriget 2006 med hänsyn till den asymmetri som rådde mellan aktörerna. / How can the outcome of a war be measured, in what way is it possible to impartially determine who won or lost. In many cases the result is obvious, as there is no doubt that Great Britain won the Falklands war, the outcome on the battlefield was equivalent of the perception of who won the war. But in many modern wars the situation can be different, the outcome may be disputed, or it is even hard to understand if the war has finished at all. This essay is using score-keeping theory, which is a way to analyze the outcome of a war, who won? The case analyzed in this essay is the Lebanon war in 2006 which was fought between Israel and Hezbollah and is interesting because the result is both much-disputed and it was fought between a government and an organization that was deployed within and acting from another state. The purpose of this essay is therefore to analyze the 2006 Lebanon war by applying the score-keeping theory. The scientific question to be answered is: Which participant can be stated to have won the 2006 Lebanon war on the basis of score-keeping theory. The design of the study is a theory-consuming survey of the 2006 Lebanon war, where the given variables from the theory are operationalized to be set against a selection from the empirics. The survey´s result shows that according to the score-keeping theory Hezbollah is considered to have won in the 2006 Lebanon war. Furthermore, the survey shows a number of challenges in applying the score-keeping theory in the 2006 Lebanon war, given the asymmetry that prevailed between the participants.

There are two types of air forces; the US, and the others. Most of what is written today concerning airpower comes from the pens of large nations. This has led to small nations view of airpower is being characterized by the theories of larger nations. Shaun Clarke questions whether such writings are applicable to the airpowers of the world’s small nations. Clarke’s theory explores the potential of offensive airpower in the context of small sized defense forces. His airpower theory has often been praised with the exception that it’s not empirically substantiated. The aim of this study is to test and analyze the explanatory power of Clarke’s theory on the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006 with the purpose of creating empirical evidence in support of, or against, Clarke’s theory.   The results of the study are mixed. Clarke’s theory has a relatively high explanatory power about Israel’s success during the Yom Kippur War and low explanatory power during the Second Lebanon War. Finally, this study argues that smaller nations shouldn’t be discouraged from applying offensive airpower in a strategic manner.