The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors -- fusion (or hydrogen) devices -- are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's "large technological systems" thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the "Super" -- the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period -- and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 673-700).

Harriet Hardy, protégé of Alice Hamilton, spent 1948 in the Health Division of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The contemporary campaign for federal legislation to compensate nuclear workers brought to the fore living retirees in whose cases of occupational illness Hardy had a role in diagnosis or case management. A third case is documented in archival records. Methods of participatory action research were used to better document the cases and strategize in light of the evidence, thereby assisting the workers with compensation claims. Medical and neuropsychological exams of the mercury case were conducted. Hardy’s diary entries and memoirs were interpreted in light of medicolegal documentation and workers’ recollections. Through these participatory research activities, Harriet Hardy’s role and influence both inside and outside the atomic weapons complex have been elucidated. An important lesson learned is the ongoing need for a system of protective medical evaluations for nuclear workers with complex chemical exposures.

Since the end of World War II the United States has grown and maintained a stockpile of nuclear weapons in the interest of preserving world peace, and with the specific intent to provide unparalleled national security to its citizens. It was a commonly held view during this time that a large diverse stockpile was a fundamental key to national security. However, in today’s ever-changing environment, Los Alamos National Laboratory finds itself with an infrastructure unable to quickly adapt to new national security needs and threats. Burdened by the management of a Cold-War-era stockpile, nuclear operations at Los Alamos will benefit from a reduced stockpile initiative. Contrary to previously held beliefs, Los Alamos can be the prime beneficiary to such an approach, and use such a monumental shift in strategy to modernize infrastructure, revitalize critical staff, and effectively manage critical materials and facilities while simultaneously reducing waste and environmental impacts to better support national security needs. / text