Thesis (M.S.)--University of Montana, 2006. / Title from title screen. Description based on contents viewed Mar. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-65).

This thesis studies the impact of sequential auction design on participant behavior from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. In the first of the two analyses, three sequential auction designs are characterized and compared based on expected profitability to the participants. The optimal bid strategy is derived as well. One of the designs, the alternating design, is a new auction design and is a blend of the other two. It assumes that the ability to bid in or initiate an auction is given to each side of the market in an alternating fashion to simulate seasonal markets. The conditions for an equilibrium auction design are derived and characteristics of the equilibrium are outlined. The primary result is that the alternating auction is a viable compromise auction design when buyers and suppliers disagree on whether to hold a sequence of forward or reverse auctions. We also found the value of information on future private value for a strategic supplier in a two-period case of the alternating and reverse auction designs. The empirical work studies the cause of low aggregation of timber supply in reverse auctions of an online timber exchange. Unlike previous research results regarding timber auctions, which focus on offline public auctions held by the U.S. Forest Service, we study online private auctions between logging companies and mills. A limited survey of the online auction data revealed that the auctions were successful less than 50% of the time. Regression analysis is used to determine which internal and external factors to the auction affect the aggregation of timber in an effort to determine the reason that so few auctions succeeded. The analysis revealed that the number of bidders, the description of the good and the volume demanded had a significant influence on the amount of timber supplied through the online auction exchange. A plausible explanation for the low aggregation is that the exchange was better suited to check the availability for custom cuts of timber and to transact standard timber.

Thesis (M.S.)--Mississippi State University. Forest Products Department. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 453-468). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

The relationship between government and business during the New Deal can best be understood as one based on mutual dependence rather than endemic hostility. This is demonstrated with reference to the Northwest lumber industry and its response to New Deal labor standards and labor union legislation. The Northwest lumber industry during the 1920s and 1930s was beset by the problems of overproduction and cut throat competition which plagued much of American industry during the Great Depression. Industry leaders strove for ways in which to regulate a fiercely competitive marketplace. Attempts to foist higher production standards on marginal competitors through the promotion of voluntary trade associations failed because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms within the associational structure. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) similarly failed to provide a disciplined framework for competition in the region because the federal government failed to fulfill its role as an enforcement agent, although the experience of the NRA did suggest to the industry the potential benefits of stabilizing the marketplace through the regulation of labor costs, which were such a significant and vulnerable item in the business calculations of lumber operations. The problem of enforcement, however, remained. Labor unions had a record under the NRA and in the coal and clothing industries as an effective regulator of labor standards, but the memory of radical unionism in the early lumber industry combined with a concern for managerial prerogatives to forestall any voluntary support on the part of Northwest lumber leaders for unionisation in the region. The elevation of unions under the National Labor Relations Act, however, prompted versatile lumber executives to use the empowered unions for their own regulatory purposes. Never entirely comfortable with the potential costs of strong unions, the Northwest lumber industry turned to the federal regulation offered under the Fair Labor Standards Act as an additional, effective and less risky method of securing much needed stability in the industry.

Thesis/Project (M.A.)--Humboldt State University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-113). Also available via the Internet from the Humboldt Digital Scholar web site.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Texas State University-San Marcos, 2006. / Curriculum vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-220). Also available on microfilm.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The relationship between government and business during the New Deal can best be understood as one based on mutual dependence rather than endemic hostility. This is demonstrated with reference to the Northwest lumber industry and its response to New Deal labor standards and labor union legislation. The Northwest lumber industry during the 1920s and 1930s was beset by the problems of overproduction and cut throat competition which plagued much of American industry during the Great Depression. Industry leaders strove for ways in which to regulate a fiercely competitive marketplace. Attempts to foist higher production standards on marginal competitors through the promotion of voluntary trade associations failed because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms within the associational structure. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) similarly failed to provide a disciplined framework for competition in the region because the federal government failed to fulfill its role as an enforcement agent, although the experience of the NRA did suggest to the industry the potential benefits of stabilizing the marketplace through the regulation of labor costs, which were such a significant and vulnerable item in the business calculations of lumber operations. The problem of enforcement, however, remained. Labor unions had a record under the NRA and in the coal and clothing industries as an effective regulator of labor standards, but the memory of radical unionism in the early lumber industry combined with a concern for managerial prerogatives to forestall any voluntary support on the part of Northwest lumber leaders for unionisation in the region. The elevation of unions under the National Labor Relations Act, however, prompted versatile lumber executives to use the empowered unions for their own regulatory purposes. Never entirely comfortable with the potential costs of strong unions, the Northwest lumber industry turned to the federal regulation offered under the Fair Labor Standards Act as an additional, effective and less risky method of securing much needed stability in the industry. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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