Freedom of religion or belief is indisputable in Human rights discourse, more discussed is exactly what it is that is included in the concept of freedom of religion or belief (in Swedish: religionsfrihet). This thesis focuses on the freedom of religion or belief in a European context, in particular on the European court of human rights and article 9 in the European convention for human rights. Some criticism has been directed against the Court to the effect that its practice and verdicts don't answer to the pronounced desire to develop a pluralistic and inclusive form of freedom of religion or belief. My aim is to examine, analyse and test three different theories, which all try to develop alternatives to the expression freedom of religion or belief, in relation to six verdicts from article 9 in Europe convention. My basic purpose is to try to find new ways of talking about freedom of religion or belief that might lead to a more inclusive, pluralistic and equal interpretation of that concept. The three theories wich I use are elaborated by Richard Amesbury (associate professor at Claremont school of Theology); Hugo Strandberg (TD at Åbo Akademi) and Eberhard Herrmann (professor in philosophy of religion at Uppsala University); and Martha Nussbaum (professor of law and ethics at the University of Chicago). The six cases from the European court are: X v. Federal Republic of Germany, X v. United Kingdom, Chappell v. United Kingdom, Dahlab v. Switzerland, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Dogru v. France. The results of this thesis suggest that the use of alternative expression to the Swedish term religionsfrihet might to a great extent lead to a more inclusive, pluralistic and equal form of freedom of religion or belief – for example in such areas as: individuality, minorities and frames of reference in society as such.