Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Marburg, 1900. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [8]-10).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 349-356). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Concordia Seminary, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-147).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-73).

Zugl.: Marburg, Univ., Diss., 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1963. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 248-257). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

No description available.

This thesis seeks a reappraisal of Martin Luther’s complex understanding of theology’s place in the social and political reformation of sixteenth century Germany. Here I seek to reintroduce an element of that theology that has been largely absent from mainstream scholarship: music. Building on Robin Leaver’s influential 2007 work, Luther’s Liturgical music, wherein he argues that Luther’s liturgical song-writing ought to be understood theologically, I will demonstrate how the reformer sought to use a musically expressed theology to build a foundation of faith among the German laity- a prerequisite, he believed, to a successful reformation of Christian religion and society. I will place the genesis of this idea both in Luther’s participation in the Indulgence Controversy, and in the failed ‘Leisnig Experiment’, in which he promoted the adoption of a congregationalist model of spiritual self-regulation. Luther’s answer to the failures of Leisnig was an educational program centered on teaching a theology of the Psalms through music. In his teachings, we will see that Luther saw theology as not only a path to salvation, but as a practical remedy to broader social problems arising from greed and false teaching. This discussion will conclude with an explanation of why this educational program of teaching theology through music did not feature prominently in Lutheran pedagogy once the process of confessionalization was begun in the late 1520’s. / Graduate

Martin Amis remains on the outer fringes of the modern literary canon because his novels have not been appreciated in the context within which they were written. This is, basically, a postmodernist experimental mode which self-consciously tests (but does not abandon) the boundaries of form and content in the traditional English novel. The principal contention here is that Amis "challenges" but does not "change" the human subject as it exists in literature. Hyper-self-consciousness, the signature mark of postmodernism, does not mean simply that Amis's characters are just one-dimensional pawns of literary gamesmanship, even though this is a valid point of inquiry (examined in Chapter One). Rather, the presentation of subjectivity allows for a polyphonous critique and affirmation of literary and moral value. Such critiques and affirmations can be analysed when one examines Amis's inscription and parody of past value systems (such as modernism, described in Chapter Two), and those of the present, nuclear age (described in Chapter Three). As these three inquiries show, Amis does offer a portrait of the human subject, but it is bruised and abused by both the author and the world. Value, in other words, exists here, but its packaging is distinctly different. Amis is therefore not an immoral pop-cultural icon, but a serious postmodernist writer that deserves to be judged accordingly.

The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.