Despite nearly twenty years of official peace in Guatemala since the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, violence continues to remain a grave problem throughout the country. In particular, extreme forms of gender-based violence have been reportedly problematic over the past two decades, with a conversation on femicide, the targeted killing of women by men based on their gender, emerging in recent years between activists, politicians and practitioners alike. To respond to the crisis around femicide, in 2008, the Law on Femicide and Other Forms of Violence Against Women was passed by Guatemala’s congress, mandating the creation of a specialized justice system to criminalize such acts. Guatemala’s legal innovations around femicidal violence is widely believed by many observers as a victory for human and women’s rights defenders in the country. However, despite these legal interventions, femicidal violence has continued unabatedly in Guatemala. In this thesis, I present a two-pronged argument. First, I will argue that the tensions inherent to neoliberalism in Guatemala create a landscape in which women are vulnerable to experiencing femicidal violence, beyond the scope explored by both the mainstream and critical literature, and moreover, beyond the scope of the Law on Femicide. Second, I posit that the Law on Femicide, which is inserted as a neutral, technical fix to the ongoing and pervasive issue of femicide and violence against women, depoliticizes femicide in Guatemala, removing it from neoliberal capitalist context and individualizing the responsibility of the crime to perpetrators, rather than the neoliberal state. Simultaneously, the rule of law as expressed through the Law on Femicide must be understood in the context of the neoliberal landscape in Guatemala, in particular, in the context of neoliberalism’s “crisis of social reproduction” (LeBaron and Roberts 2012, 26). / Thesis (Master, Global Development Studies) -- Queen's University, 2014-06-18 10:26:03.879

In Western thought, the concept of nature has a long history in relation to the question of what or who counts as the subject of politics. This thesis works in the relatively recent body of work that engages the possibility of ‘re-vitalizing’ nature; challenging the legitimacy of mechanistic conceptions of nature with the aim of offering the possibility of consciously different behaviour in relation to the more-than-human world. I engage with Michel Serres, Bruno Latour, and Jane Bennett, in their thinking on the agency or ‘subjectivity’ of the extra-human world, nonhumans, and matter itself. While each author offers an analysis of the shortcomings of current political givens, and each proposes alternative but demonstrably associated ways of conceptually, ethically, and practically relating with nonhumans, this thesis asks: when thinking about taking nature into political account, in what ways are we at risk of forgetting the history and politics that excluded, obscured, or collapsed peoples into ‘nature’, as the very operation of bringing the modern subject of politics into being? In a resonance that will gain meaning as my text proceeds, colonization (of lands and bodies), the subject, and nature can be seen to form a triad for thought. My question, specifically, is to ask if, and how, the political-ecological history of colonization is omitted in the recent ontological impetus to think an animate nature. / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [265]-280).

Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 137-144). Also available online in Scholars' Bank; and in ProQuest, free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (M.S.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 11, 2010). Directed by Nancy Hodges; submitted to the Dept. of Consumer, Apparel, and Retail Studies. Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-122).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1938. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 200-206.

Thesis (doctoral)--Frankfurt am Main, 1974. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-217).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Iowa, 2006. / Supervisor: T. Dwight Bozeman. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 296-300).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 227-240). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11615

This thesis examines late Ottoman discourses on the soul and emotions as reflected by a large corpus of psychological literature under the umbrella of ilm-i ahval-i ruh (the science of the states of the soul, psychology) in relation to the rise of the rhetoric concerning the 'new man' - an imaginary 'Ottoman individual' educated in 'new schools' to be in complete harmony with Ottoman modernization. It posits that the 'new man' was subjected to a process of design as a producing unit whether in possession of a soul or not, while the conceptual framework of the 'individual' was being formulated. The secondary literature on Ottoman modernization has illustrated intellectual efforts for designing the 'new man' in relation to the formation of national identity. In doing so it has focused on the process of indoctrination and the dissemination of normative accounts. Drawing on that literature, this thesis intends to complicate the picture and look beyond the normative accounts. By approaching the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a psychological argument and revolving the story around the metaphors of 'man as machine' and 'man as animal', it aims to display the influence of the scientific and technological changes that shaped the material as well as the intellectual culture these authors experienced. In an attempt to go beyond what lies beneath the national and religious underpinnings of the imagined 'new man', this thesis maintains a tight focus on the psychological writings of four intellectuals - all of whom gave serious thought to the debate about the soul: Abdullah Cevdet, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Baha Tevfik, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç. By shifting the centre of focus of the rhetoric about the 'new man' from national or religious identity formation to the pressing concerns about economic and technological progress, it shows an Ottoman entanglement with science and technology and a deeper Ottoman inquiry into the conceptual framework of the individual. Accordingly it argues that the psychological literature on the soul and emotions bears testimony to the acute concern for how to integrate individuals into the frenzy of progressive discourses in the late Ottoman Empire. This concern constituted common ground among intellectuals from different backgrounds. Yet they held different understandings of the notion of progress and often gave different answers to deeper philosophical questions pertaining to the new man's soul, emotions, will, and relations with collective units. Such complexity demonstrates that multiple trajectories were possible before national identity formation took concrete forms in a much later context, and that transnational patterns of 'constructing the subjects' through psychological studies played an equally important role.