Inaug.-Diss.--Bern. / Bibliography: p. [4]-7.

This thesis investigates the moral permissibility of military privatization. My analysis focuses on two distinct concepts: the authorization of war and the supply of war. Entities that authorize war decide that military force will be used and by whom; entities that supply war then execute the various tasks that have been authorized for performance. Part I argues that private actors may not justifiably authorize war. The reason is that, in so doing, they would impose considerable risks on individuals who lack a say in authorization—particularly fellow countrymen who may suffer from retaliatory military action—and we ought not to impose considerable risks on individuals who lack such a say. Public actors have a right, and indeed a duty, to prevent private actors from authorizing military force. Moreover, public actors have a further duty to authorize military force when their constituents are threatened. Part II then seeks to show that public actors who authorize military force may rely upon private contractors to an extent in military supply. Public actors may not rely upon private contractors to exercise command. The reason is that commanders must be able to punish their subordinates in intrusive ways (e.g. imprisonment) to ensure the prosecution of just wars. Such intrusive forms of punishment should only be dispensed by public actors. In addition, public actors may not rely upon private contractors to serve above commanders on the chain of command. Such high-ranking military officers exercise substantial political power over civilian decisions of military authorization and supply; moreover, these officers make weighty decisions in battle that substantially affect the well-being of others. Public actors, however, should be permitted to rely upon private contractors to serve below military commanders on the chain of command in rank-and-file military roles so long as these contractors are properly constrained and regulated.

This thesis seeks to investigate the short- and long-term socio-economic impact of the First Punic War on Carthage and its people. It will do so by exploring three parts of the Carthaginian political and socio-economic system during the fourth through the second centuries BCE. The first is its navy, and specifically the costs – in both material and man – of its use. This will be the subject of the first chapter. The second analyses the additional expenditures which the war extracted from Carthage, such as the outlays to recruit, maintain, and provide for the land army. The final chapter focuses on the long-term ramifications of the war, which will be explored by means of an in-depth analysis of the last few battles of the First Punic War from an economic angle.

This paper addresses the relationship between Private Military Contractors and their use, whether operationally active or strictly training, on civil war recidivism. The paper aims to contribute to the wider research on Private Military Contractors, and specifically whether their use can cause commitment problems or information asymmetries that can hamper peace-making. To do this, the hypothesis that the use of Private Military Contractors in an active, operational role leads to a higher probability of civil war recidivism than the use of Private Military Contractors in a training, non-operational role is examined. The hypothesis is tested by applying Mill’s method of agreement on a pair of across-case, structured, focused comparisons between two cases with operationally active Private Military Contractors on the one hand, and two cases of strictly training Private Military Contractors on the other. The operationally active Private Military Contractor cases are Executive Outcomes in the first half of the Sierra Leonean Civil War and Wagner Group in the War in Donbas, and the strictly training Private Military Contractor cases are Sandline International in the second half of the Sierra Leonean Civil War and MPRI in the Croatian War of Independence. The first two cases had seen civil war recidivism and operationally active Private Military Contractors, and the latter two had not experienced civil war recidivism yet had seen training Private Military Contractors operate. The cases were selected to be as different as possible in other relevant factors. The empirical data is gathered from many different sources including the UCDP, the World Bank and a vast variety of reputable news media. This paper’s empirical findings do not lend support for the hypothesis, nor unequivocal support for the proposed causal mechanism.

Alors que la République Démocratique du Congo devient indépendant en juin 1960 seulement quelques semaines après le pays va connaitre une crise politique et sociale qui va durer sept ans. Cette "crise du Congo" qui durera sept ans voit l'arrivée de mouvements sécessionnistes, de rébellions populaires et des forces militaires externes. Dans le cas de le province de Katanga, le moteur économique de la DRC, ces forces militaires externes sont composées de mercenaires européens, sud-africains et/ou rhodésiens embauchés et payés par les sociétés minières belges. Bien que les Nations-unies obligent le départ des mercenaires et arrivent à restaurer l'intégrité de la DRC, dès leur départ en 1963 le pays sombre de nouveau dans le désordre. En effet, une rébellion rurale d'inspiration marxiste et soutenue par la République Populaire de Chine gagne deux tiers du pays. Pire, en juillet 1964, la deuxième ville de la DRC, Stanleyville, est capturé par les forces rebelles et ces Simba menacent la vie de quelques centaines d'Européens, la plupart des citoyens belges.Pour les Etats-Unis qui tentent depuis quatre ans de faire régner la stabilité au Congo, les Simba représentent un vrai danger du fait de leur soutien par la Chine et d'autres pays africains radicaux. Aux yeux des Etats-Unis ce soutien signale que le communisme risque de prend pied dans l'Afrique centrale. En respect des idéologies telles que de Containment et de l'Effet Domino ce n'est pas une situation qui peut perdurer.En manque de forces armées capables de lutter efficacement contre les rebelles tout en gardant leur intervention secrète, les Etats-Unis forment une alliance avec la Belgique et une Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) renforcée par le retour de centaines de mercenaires blancs. D'ailleurs, les Etats-Unis fournissent leurs propres forces clandestines constituées d'exilés cubains recrutés par la CIA. Ces Exilés ont participé dans un nombre d'opérations clandestines montées par la CIA et, notamment, l'invasion de la Baie des Cochons qui visait à déposer Fidel Castro. En participant à ces opérations en avril 1961, ils rejoignent la liste de combattants anti-communistes utilisée par la CIA en Chine, et au Guatemala.Composé de pilotes d'avion et aussi d'une petite force commando, ces Exiles nommées collectivement le Makasi contribuent aux opérations qui visent à libérer Stanleyville et vaincre la rébellion. D'ailleurs, à partir de septembre 1965, une force navale composée d'Exilés va aussi mener des opérations sur le Lac Tanganyika. Ces opérations consistent empêcher l'arrivée dans les zones rebelles des vives et de munitions nécessaires pour la suite de la rébellion. Fournies par les pays tels que la Chine et l'Algérie, les forces rebelles reçoivent de l'aide de la part de Che Guevara. Envie de provoquer une révolution populaire en Afrique, Guevara restera au Congo que six mois. Sa présence dans ce pays ayant été vite détectée par les Etats-Unis, les Exilés cubains en sont avertis et considèrent que la guerre au Congo leur offre la possibilité de prendre une revanche sur Castro et la défaite à la Baie des Cochons. / Whereas the Democratic Republic of the Congo became independent in June 1960 within a very short space of time the country will be torn apart by a series of secession and rebellions. In Katanga, secession is supported by the arrival of a mercenary army and the United Nations is sent to restore order by ridding the Congo of these foreign forces.The UN mission complete and its forces having been withdrawn by July 1963, the Congolese government will then be confronted by a popular rebellion in rural areas of the Congo. Supported by the People's Republic of China and radical African nations this communist-inspired rebellion makes rapid progress and soon two-thirds of the Congo is in the hands of the Simbas, the name adopted by the rebels. By August 1964 the Simbas have reached Stanleyville, the Congo's second largest city, and threaten to kill hundreds of mainly Belgian hostages. With the Congolese National Army being unfit to defeat the rebellion alone, it is reinforced by hundreds of white mercenaries. Seeing the rebellion and its communist support as a threat to its ideologies of Containment and the Domino Theory, the United States also provides military assistance in the shape of an air force and a small commando unit. Known collectively as the Makasi, these US covert forces comprise of Cuban Exiles recruited and paid by the CIA. Many of these Exiles took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. These Exiles join the list of CIA covert forces who have taken part in secret operations in China and in Guatemala. They will be joined by more veterans of the failed invasion in 1965 when a naval force is created to patrol Lake Tanganyika. It is from here that rebel forces are being supplied with food and weapons provided by communist-bloc nations and supporters. Moreover, from April 1965, the rebel forces will also be joined by Che Guevara who has hopes of starting up a popular revolution in the heart of Africa. Guevara's presence in the Congo being rapidly detected by the US, the Exiles are informed and see the Congo as an opportunity to gain revenge for the Bay of Pigs.

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This thesis addresses the growing privatization of the US forces through the Revolution in Military Affairs and the War in Iraq and its implications for the purpose of mobilization and individual military commitment conceptualize by the US warrior ethos. Creating a dialogue between the literature on Private Military Companies and the US warrior ethos, this thesis aims at providing a comprehensive understanding of the values sustaining the warrior ethos and how they are jeopardized by the emergence of new actors in the battlespace. I argue that this commercial turn in the US military erode the warrior ethos by placing business consideration ahead of great personal risk and ultimately raises doubts about civic responsibilities and democratic control of US military affairs.

Zugl.: Fribourg, Univ., Diss., 2007

This thesis addresses the growing privatization of the US forces through the Revolution in Military Affairs and the War in Iraq and its implications for the purpose of mobilization and individual military commitment conceptualize by the US warrior ethos. Creating a dialogue between the literature on Private Military Companies and the US warrior ethos, this thesis aims at providing a comprehensive understanding of the values sustaining the warrior ethos and how they are jeopardized by the emergence of new actors in the battlespace. I argue that this commercial turn in the US military erode the warrior ethos by placing business consideration ahead of great personal risk and ultimately raises doubts about civic responsibilities and democratic control of US military affairs.