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From the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika : non-state armed actors in the Congo crisis, 1960-1967 / De la baie des cochons au Lac Tanganyika : les acteurs armés non étatiques dans la crise du Congo, 1960-1967Rookes, Stephen 16 October 2018 (has links)
Alors que la République Démocratique du Congo devient indépendant en juin 1960 seulement quelques semaines après le pays va connaitre une crise politique et sociale qui va durer sept ans. Cette "crise du Congo" qui durera sept ans voit l'arrivée de mouvements sécessionnistes, de rébellions populaires et des forces militaires externes. Dans le cas de le province de Katanga, le moteur économique de la DRC, ces forces militaires externes sont composées de mercenaires européens, sud-africains et/ou rhodésiens embauchés et payés par les sociétés minières belges. Bien que les Nations-unies obligent le départ des mercenaires et arrivent à restaurer l'intégrité de la DRC, dès leur départ en 1963 le pays sombre de nouveau dans le désordre. En effet, une rébellion rurale d'inspiration marxiste et soutenue par la République Populaire de Chine gagne deux tiers du pays. Pire, en juillet 1964, la deuxième ville de la DRC, Stanleyville, est capturé par les forces rebelles et ces Simba menacent la vie de quelques centaines d'Européens, la plupart des citoyens belges.Pour les Etats-Unis qui tentent depuis quatre ans de faire régner la stabilité au Congo, les Simba représentent un vrai danger du fait de leur soutien par la Chine et d'autres pays africains radicaux. Aux yeux des Etats-Unis ce soutien signale que le communisme risque de prend pied dans l'Afrique centrale. En respect des idéologies telles que de Containment et de l'Effet Domino ce n'est pas une situation qui peut perdurer.En manque de forces armées capables de lutter efficacement contre les rebelles tout en gardant leur intervention secrète, les Etats-Unis forment une alliance avec la Belgique et une Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) renforcée par le retour de centaines de mercenaires blancs. D'ailleurs, les Etats-Unis fournissent leurs propres forces clandestines constituées d'exilés cubains recrutés par la CIA. Ces Exilés ont participé dans un nombre d'opérations clandestines montées par la CIA et, notamment, l'invasion de la Baie des Cochons qui visait à déposer Fidel Castro. En participant à ces opérations en avril 1961, ils rejoignent la liste de combattants anti-communistes utilisée par la CIA en Chine, et au Guatemala.Composé de pilotes d'avion et aussi d'une petite force commando, ces Exiles nommées collectivement le Makasi contribuent aux opérations qui visent à libérer Stanleyville et vaincre la rébellion. D'ailleurs, à partir de septembre 1965, une force navale composée d'Exilés va aussi mener des opérations sur le Lac Tanganyika. Ces opérations consistent empêcher l'arrivée dans les zones rebelles des vives et de munitions nécessaires pour la suite de la rébellion. Fournies par les pays tels que la Chine et l'Algérie, les forces rebelles reçoivent de l'aide de la part de Che Guevara. Envie de provoquer une révolution populaire en Afrique, Guevara restera au Congo que six mois. Sa présence dans ce pays ayant été vite détectée par les Etats-Unis, les Exilés cubains en sont avertis et considèrent que la guerre au Congo leur offre la possibilité de prendre une revanche sur Castro et la défaite à la Baie des Cochons. / Whereas the Democratic Republic of the Congo became independent in June 1960 within a very short space of time the country will be torn apart by a series of secession and rebellions. In Katanga, secession is supported by the arrival of a mercenary army and the United Nations is sent to restore order by ridding the Congo of these foreign forces.The UN mission complete and its forces having been withdrawn by July 1963, the Congolese government will then be confronted by a popular rebellion in rural areas of the Congo. Supported by the People's Republic of China and radical African nations this communist-inspired rebellion makes rapid progress and soon two-thirds of the Congo is in the hands of the Simbas, the name adopted by the rebels. By August 1964 the Simbas have reached Stanleyville, the Congo's second largest city, and threaten to kill hundreds of mainly Belgian hostages. With the Congolese National Army being unfit to defeat the rebellion alone, it is reinforced by hundreds of white mercenaries. Seeing the rebellion and its communist support as a threat to its ideologies of Containment and the Domino Theory, the United States also provides military assistance in the shape of an air force and a small commando unit. Known collectively as the Makasi, these US covert forces comprise of Cuban Exiles recruited and paid by the CIA. Many of these Exiles took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. These Exiles join the list of CIA covert forces who have taken part in secret operations in China and in Guatemala. They will be joined by more veterans of the failed invasion in 1965 when a naval force is created to patrol Lake Tanganyika. It is from here that rebel forces are being supplied with food and weapons provided by communist-bloc nations and supporters. Moreover, from April 1965, the rebel forces will also be joined by Che Guevara who has hopes of starting up a popular revolution in the heart of Africa. Guevara's presence in the Congo being rapidly detected by the US, the Exiles are informed and see the Congo as an opportunity to gain revenge for the Bay of Pigs.
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Československo jako prostředník sovětského bloku v konžské krizi 1960-1963 / Czechoslovakia as a Mediator of the Soviet Bloc in the Congo Crisis 1960-1963Mikysková, Jitka January 2016 (has links)
The presented dissertation analyses the role of Communist Czechoslovakia in a period of so called "Congo Crisis" in the years 1960-1963, which began after the independence of the Belgian Congo had been declared. Czechoslovakia was the only Eastern Bloc country which had a representative office in the capital city of Leopoldville over a long period of time and had maintained business and diplomatic relations with the former Belgian Congo since the First Republic; therefore it was an irreplaceable mediator between the newly declared Republic of the Congo and Eastern Bloc countries. The individual chapters rely especially on archival documents and analyse the roles of Patrice Lumumba, UN, separatist government of Antoine Gizenga in the Eastern province, namely in the context of Czechoslovakian foreign policy toward African continent in the observed period. The dissertation is grounded especially on documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and archives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In order to set the dissertation to the international context, it was mainly French, Belgian and Soviet literature, which was used as it offers a very different perspective on the topic in question.
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Bringing Light into the Heart of Darkness? : A study of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's role as a mediator during the Congo crisis 1960-1961Larsson, Mats January 2017 (has links)
Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dag Hammarskjölds medlande och diplomatiska agerande under Kongokrisen 1960-1961. Uppsatsen är grundad i Thomas Princens teori om intermediärt medlande med taktiker och tekniker som metodologiska verktyg. Studiens resultat visar att Hammarskjöld aktivt medlade med en tydlig preferens för Léopoldville faktionen samt att han undvek att tydligt tillgodose FN:s rådgivande kommitté med information om en diplomatisk policy som han själv skapade. Denna bild skiljer sig från den tidigare forskningen som främst har idealiserat Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjölds diplomati var även karakteriserat av en ambivalent relation till medlarrollen där han vid tillfällen snarare var en disputant än en medlare. Genom analysen av Hammarskjölds medlande under Kongokrisen har forskningen om generalsekreterarens diplomatiska agerande utökats.
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Kubánské zahraniční mise v Africe v 60. letech 20. století a Československo / Cuban Missions in Africa during 1960s, and CzechoslovakiaKotrman, Václav January 2018 (has links)
1 Abstract A Group of revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro has been struggling to overthrow the Cuban President Fulgencio Batista since the half of 1950s. After they succeeded on New Year's Eve 1959 the Revolutionary Cuban Government changed strategy in all aspects of the state administration. One of the most visible change happened in the sector of foreign policy. Cuba began to act not only as a sovereign country in relation to the neighbouring states which led to the conflict with the United States, but also began to actively export her model of revolution. The main initiators in this turn were Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Fidel Castro. The first region where Havana attempted to export the revolution was Latin America. Nevertheless, all attempts failed during 1960s. At the same time, the process of decolonisation in Africa visited by Guevara in the middle of 1959 was in progress. In Egypt, he established his first contacts with revolutionary leaders and subsequently informed Havana about the situation. The socialist character of a number of revolutionary movements was close to Cubans, so they started to widen relationship with them. First aid to Africa was sent by Cuban government at the end of 1961 to Algeria which fought for independence on France since 1954. Strengthening of relations between Havana and...
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Trade follows Hallstein?Gülstorff, Torben 04 November 2016 (has links)
Die deutsche Außenpolitik zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges stellt in historischer wie politikwissenschaftlicher Hinsicht einen Gegenstand dar, der mit gutem Gewissen als wissenschaftlich erschlossen bezeichnet werden kann. Zahlreiche Aufsätze, Artikel und Bücher sind in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erschienen, welche die deutsche Außenpolitik in Europa, Afrika, Asien, Ozeanien, Amerika, oder auch gleich der Welt als Ganzem, in den Blick genommen haben. Dies gilt sowohl für die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als auch für diejenige der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Früh – wenn nicht sogar von Beginn an – kam hierbei eine zentrale These, eine Kernthese, zum Vorschein, die, ohne auf Widerstand zu stoßen, Eingang in den historischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Forschungskanon fand und ihn bereits nach kurzer Zeit zu dominieren begann. Die Rede ist von der die deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten angeblich bestimmenden Hallstein-Doktrin und dem mit ihr in engem Zusammenhang stehenden deutsch-deutschen Gegensatz. In dieser Arbeit wird dieser Kernthese, diesem ''Mythos'' der deutschen Außenpolitik, vehement widersprochen. Weder die Hallstein-Doktrin, noch der deutsch-deutsche Gegensatz, sondern nationale ökonomische und internationale geostrategische Interessen haben die deutsche Außenpolitik – und darüber hinaus auch die gesamten deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten, der BRD wie der DDR – maßgeblich bestimmt. Zur Stützung dieser Gegenthese werden in der vorliegenden Studie die staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten West- und Ostdeutschlands in neun zentralafrikanischen Staaten zwischen 1945 und 1975 kritisch dargelegt, umfassend analysiert und im Hinblick auf mehrere zentrale Thesen zu den deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten ausgewertet. / For decades articles and books have been published on the history of German foreign policy during Cold War. Regardless of whether Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, America or the world as a whole, the foreign affairs of the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern German Democratic Republic have been researched and analysed in context of a broad variety of locations. However, even though the list of publications continues to grow, the topic''s theses–especially its main thesis–do not show much progress. Already at an early stage, a central thesis–a core thesis–came to light, met no resistance and entered history''s and political science''s research canons on German foreign policy. This thesis reads: Inner German issues and the non-solved German question were so powerful, they dominated West and East German foreign affairs nearly right from the start. German foreign policy, that was the so-called Hallstein doctrine, that was the so-called German-German contradiction. And all studies–whether of history or political science, whether designed as a case study or as a global approach–confirm this thesis, use it as an integral part of their work–until today. But be that as it may. This study contradicts this thesis, this ''myth'' of German foreign policy. Instead it argues that neither the Hallstein doctrine nor the German-German contradiction, but national economic and international geostrategic interests dominated German foreign policy and German foreign activities–regarding the FRG, the GDR, and Germany as a whole. To proof this thesis, West and East German activities–of the two states, their economies and their societies–in nine Central African states between 1945 and 1975 are observed and analysed. More than a million file pages out of more than a dozen German archives were read to tackle this task–and shed some refreshing new light on the foreign policies of the two German states during Cold War.
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