Thesis advisor: Eileen Sweeney / This paper combines principles from aesthetic cognitivism with phenomenological embodiment as explained by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to construct both an argument for video games as a form of art as well as a method for appreciating them. I argue that the unique status of video games as interactive fictions warrants an adjusted set of aesthetic criteria. My proposed method of examination involves the concept of "fictional embodiment" in which an appreciator imaginatively undergoes the experiences of the video game character. After establishing this framework the paper applies it to narrative and emotion in video games before moving on to extended examples. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

詮釋馬勞龐蒂的身體理論 / 論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1994. / 參考文獻: leaves 119-121 / 趙子明. / 符號說明 --- p.ii / 全文摘要 --- p.iii / 前言 --- p.iv / 目錄 --- p.viii / 導論: --- p.2 / Chapter §1 --- 感知經驗及以感知為首要的身體理論 --- p.3 / 身體結構的分析: --- p.13 / Chapter §2 --- 感知中的身體──充滿歧義的在世存有 --- p.14 / Chapter §3 --- 身體活動與活動意向 --- p.38 / Chapter §4 --- 說話和會說話的思想者 --- p.68 / 結論: --- p.94 / Chapter §5 --- 身體結構及以感知為首要的哲學理論 --- p.95 / 註釋 --- p.106 / 參考書目 --- p.119

文潔華. / 稿本複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Gao ben fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 203-204. / Wen Jiehua. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu.

The phenomenological approaches to embodiment presented by Levinas and Merleau-Ponty cannot provide an adequate account of bodily identity because their methodological commitments forbid them from admitting the central role that sensation plays in the constitution of experience. This neglect is symptomatic of their tradition's suspicion toward sensation as an explanatory concept, a suspicion stemming from Kant's critique of empiricist metaphysics and Husserl's critique of psychologism and objectivism. By contrast, I suggest that only with a robust theory of sensation can the integrity of the body and its relations be fully captured. I therefore develop--contra Kant and Husserl's idealism--a realist conception of sensation that is at once materialist and phenomenological. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.

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Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Philosophie--Nice, 2002.

Using a phenomenological account of perception drawn largely from the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Gibson (1966; 1974), this thesis explores how perceptual experience is created and modified through practices and discourses. The project examines how a specific perceptual experience--the taste of beer--is formed through the practices and discourses of production. It investigates how both the nuanced taste experiences of brewmasters and the less precise taste experiences of their customers are cultivated in relation to a set of production concerns surrounding the manufacture of a consistent brand. Ultimately, it is argued that the production of brands--the urge to produce products which are identical to themselves--is a characteristic of consumer-oriented late capitalism which illustrates how mechanical reproduction influences the formation of contemporary sensory experiences and lifeworlds.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1982. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 28-29).