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Na psicologia do desenvolvimento tem-se realizado pesquisas que buscam investigar os processos desenvolvimentais em suas dimensões cognitivas, sociais e biológicas em todo o ciclo da vida. Nesse contexto o presente trabalho buscou evidenciar o papel da afetividade como dimensão fundamental no processo desenvolvimental do sujeito, através da investigação das implicações entre a formação de vínculos intersubjetivos na primeira infância e o desenvolvimento da afetividade humana à partir do legado da obra de Merleau-Ponty. À vista disso, a presente investigação baseou-se nos estudos de Merleau-Ponty sobre a psicologia do desenvolvimento infantil, nomeadamente o diálogo que o filósofo estabeleceu em seus trabalhos com Henri Wallon e com a perspectiva psicanalítica. Também foi a proposta deste trabalho, prolongar esse diálogo com produções mais recentes nessas áreas citadas. Neste sentido, encontramos na Fenomenologia da Percepção de Merleau-Ponty e nos trabalhos sobre a emersão da consciência em Rochat (2002) descrições sobre a experiência afetiva do recém-nato em que esta é representada por um o Si corporal sustentado por funções anônimas e por uma experiência de generalidade. O egocentrismo infantil, sobretudo nas considerações de Bimbenet (2002), é entendido nesse contexto como uma experiência de abertura radical da criança ao mundo, fundada em uma relação de Ineinander, ou seja, de inerência e de mutua penetração de corpos entendida como uma experiência de indistinção baseada em uma intercoporeidade. Essa circunstância manifestaria-se sobretudo, nas considerações apresentadas por Meltzoff e Gallager (1996), Wallon (1959) e Bimbenet (2011) no âmbito das imitações neonatais em que estas são apresentadas em seu caráter não funcionalista e de identificação em profundidade com o outro, expressando-se como a manifestação privilegiada de um descentramento originário. Nesse sentido chegou-se a proposição de que tais fenômenos seriam sustentados por uma mimesis, uma vez que esta expressaria uma relação de ser dentro de uma perspectiva ontológica em que a alteridade tem destaque. O conceito de prematuração é apresentado por Merleau-Ponty (1949-52/2010), Bimbenet (2002) e Lacan (1984) nesse contexto como a expressão de uma relação de um exterior constitutivo do interior em que a ênfase recai nas relações da criança com o adulto, nomeadamente com a mãe. A mimesis se expressaria nesse contexto em um investimento afetivo, que seria deflagrado através de um processo identificatório com o representante materno, que passaria a expressar uma condição narcísica e da formação de uma imagem corporal pela criança e a decorrente assunção desta enquanto sujeito portador de uma vida oficial / In developmental psychology research has been carried out to investigate developmental processes in their cognitive, social and biological dimensions throughout the life cycle. In this context, the present work sought to highlight the role of affectivity as a fundamental dimension in the developmental process of the subject, through the investigation of the implications between the formation of intersubjective bonds in early childhood and the development of human affectivity from the legacy of Merleau-Ponty\'s work . Thus, the present investigation was based on Merleau-Ponty\'s studies on the psychology of child development, namely the dialogue that the philosopher established in his works with Henri Wallon and with the psychoanalytic perspective. It was also the proposal of this work, to prolong this dialogue with more recent productions in these areas. In this sense, we find in the Phenomenology of the Perception of Merleau-Ponty and in the works on the emersion of consciousness in Rochat (2002) descriptions about the affective experience of the newborn in which it\'s represented by a bodily \"Self\" sustained by anonymous functions and by an experience of generality. The child egocentrism, especially in the considerations of Bimbenet (2002), is understood in this context as an experience of radical opening of the child to the world, founded on an Ineinander relation, that is, of inherency and mutual penetration of bodies, understood as an experience of indistinction based on an intercoporeity. This circumstance would be manifested mainly by Meltzoff and Gallager (1996), Wallon (1959) and Bimbenet (2011) considerations in the context of neonatal imitations in which they are presented in their non-functionalist character and in-depth identification to the other, expressing itself as the privileged manifestation of an original decentering. In this sense, it has been proposed that such phenomena would be supported by a \"mimesis\", since it would express a relation of being within an ontological perspective in which the otherness stands out. The concept of prematureness is presented by Merleau-Ponty (1949-52 / 2010), Bimbenet (2002) and Lacan (1984) in this context as the expression of a relation of an exterior which is constitutive of the interior and in which the emphasis falls on the relations of the child with the adult, especially with the mother. The \"mimesis\" would be expressed in this context as an affective investment, which would be triggered by an identification process with the maternal representative, which would begin to express a narcissistic condition and the formation of a corporal image by the child and the consequent assumption of this child as a subject who sustains an official life

Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.

Academisch proefschrift--Filosofie--Amsterdam--Universiteit te Amsterdam, 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 225-235.

O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a questão da pintura na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty. Inicialmente inscrita nos quadros de uma filosofia da existência, e depois, com maior destaque, nos quadros de uma ontologia. A questão da arte, particularmente a pintura, surge como meio privilegiado de investigação das nossas relações mais surdas e secretas com o Ser, ou com isso que Merleau-Ponty chamava de camada pré-reflexiva de sentido de mundo, anterior às teses de nossa linguagem. Isso porque a atividade da pintura revela os meios da visibilidade, que nosso olhar cotidiano deixa para trás e esquece a favor do mundo constituído culturalmente. Ou seja, habitamos um mundo que esquece suas premissas, e a tarefa do pintor, especialmente a de Cézanne, é recuperar o contato do olhar com este mundo inabitual. Nesta relação originária do corpo com o mundo, destaca-se, na obra de Merleau-Ponty, uma nova concepção de profundidade, que não é apenas do espaço, mas do corpo, e também das coisas. Merleau-Ponty apontou para esta noção em seus ensaios sobre arte, na tentativa de recolocar em questão a atividade artística como atividade que revela a implicação entre o mundo percebido e a corporeidade. Percebeu na profundidade a implicação da reversibilidade do corpo: a visibilidade a que se abre o vidente é também a de seu corpo visível, que é ao mesmo tempo vidente e visível, senciente e sensível. O autor afirma que, uma vez que este entrecruzamento está dado, aí estão, igualmente, colocados todos os problemas da pintura. Sendo assim, a pintura revela o enigma do próprio corpo. Minha visão se faz nas coisas e me apreende ao mesmo tempo no meu olhar desdobrado diante de mim, entrelaçamento que possibilita uma visibilidade secreta, ou um duplo carnal. O filósofo desenvolve o termo ?carne? para denominar este ?entre? o vidente e o visível, abertura de um ao outro, e passagem de um no outro, que define nosso acesso ao Ser. Percorremos algumas questões: entre o mundo percebido e o ato expressivo, o que é a atividade do artista, senão uma coerência com a visibilidade que o provoca e, portanto, que mal se desprende do espetáculo do mundo? Como o pintor ou o poeta expressariam outra coisa senão seu encontro com o mundo? E o que buscam neste encontro, senão uma relação mais verdadeira, sem ser uma verdade que se assemelhe ao mundo, mas coerente em seu encontro, isto é, capaz de expressar o invisível que anima a relação do olhar com a visibilidade, ou do sentir com a realidade? Neste movimento de pensamento, que inicialmente enfatiza uma nova idéia de Razão ou de Verdade através da atividade do olhar, chega-se, por fim, à noção de desejo ou de corpo libidinal. Perceber é desejar, movimento inscrito na abertura do Ser sensível, que inaugura as trocas entre o corpo e as coisas, em que o olhar ou a visibilidade é um elemento privilegiado. / The aim of this study is the research of the problem of painting in the philosophy of Merleau Ponty. Originally enrolled in the frames of an existencialistic philosophy, aferwards it was put with more prominence, in the frame of an ontology.The problem of art, especially of painting, arises as a privileged way of research of our more deaf and secret relations with Being, or wich that what Merleau Ponnty nominated the pre-reflexive layer of the sense of the world, previous to the thesis of our language. This is so because the activity of painting reveals the means of visibility that our daily look leaves behind and forgets privileging the cultural constructed world. In other words, we live in a world that forgets its premisses, and the task of the painter, especially of Cézanne, is to recover the contact of the look on this unhabitual world. In this original relation of the body with the world we may emphasize, in the work of Merleau Ponty, a new concept of depth, that is not only of space, but of the body, and also of the things. Merleau Ponty pointed to this notion in his essays about arts, trying to question again the artist?s activity as an activity that reveals the implication between the perceived world and the bodyness. He perceived in the depth the implication of the revertibility of the body: the visibility which opens itself to the beholder is also that of his visual body, which is at the same time beholder and visible object, sensing and sensible. The author states that once this intercrossing is given, all the problems of painting are here placed in the same way. In being so, the painting reveals the enigma of the body itself. My look realizes itself in the things and grasps me at the same moment in my look unfolded in front of myself, this interlinking makes possible a secret visibility or a carnal double. The philosophe develops the term \"flesh\" to denominate this \"between\" the beholder and the visible, opening one to the other, giving passage from one to the other, which defines our access to Being. We will deal with some questions: What is the activity of the artist between the perceived world and the expressive act, other then a coherence with the visibility that it causes and, therefore, what harm does come from the spectacle of the world? How the painter and the poet would express other things than their meeting with the world? And in this meeting what they are looking for other than a more true relation, without being a truth which is similar to the world, but coherent in their meeting, this is, capable to express the invisible that cheers up the relation of the gaze with the visibility or of the feeling with the realityIn this movement of thoughts, which emphasizes initially a new idea of Reason and of Truth by means of the activity of looking, one arrives, finally to the notion of desire or of the libidinal body. To perceive is to desire, a movement graved in the opening of sensitive Being, that inaugurates the exchanges between the body and the things, in whicht he looking or the visibility is a privileged element.

O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a questão da pintura na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty. Inicialmente inscrita nos quadros de uma filosofia da existência, e depois, com maior destaque, nos quadros de uma ontologia. A questão da arte, particularmente a pintura, surge como meio privilegiado de investigação das nossas relações mais surdas e secretas com o Ser, ou com isso que Merleau-Ponty chamava de camada pré-reflexiva de sentido de mundo, anterior às teses de nossa linguagem. Isso porque a atividade da pintura revela os meios da visibilidade, que nosso olhar cotidiano deixa para trás e esquece a favor do mundo constituído culturalmente. Ou seja, habitamos um mundo que esquece suas premissas, e a tarefa do pintor, especialmente a de Cézanne, é recuperar o contato do olhar com este mundo inabitual. Nesta relação originária do corpo com o mundo, destaca-se, na obra de Merleau-Ponty, uma nova concepção de profundidade, que não é apenas do espaço, mas do corpo, e também das coisas. Merleau-Ponty apontou para esta noção em seus ensaios sobre arte, na tentativa de recolocar em questão a atividade artística como atividade que revela a implicação entre o mundo percebido e a corporeidade. Percebeu na profundidade a implicação da reversibilidade do corpo: a visibilidade a que se abre o vidente é também a de seu corpo visível, que é ao mesmo tempo vidente e visível, senciente e sensível. O autor afirma que, uma vez que este entrecruzamento está dado, aí estão, igualmente, colocados todos os problemas da pintura. Sendo assim, a pintura revela o enigma do próprio corpo. Minha visão se faz nas coisas e me apreende ao mesmo tempo no meu olhar desdobrado diante de mim, entrelaçamento que possibilita uma visibilidade secreta, ou um duplo carnal. O filósofo desenvolve o termo ?carne? para denominar este ?entre? o vidente e o visível, abertura de um ao outro, e passagem de um no outro, que define nosso acesso ao Ser. Percorremos algumas questões: entre o mundo percebido e o ato expressivo, o que é a atividade do artista, senão uma coerência com a visibilidade que o provoca e, portanto, que mal se desprende do espetáculo do mundo? Como o pintor ou o poeta expressariam outra coisa senão seu encontro com o mundo? E o que buscam neste encontro, senão uma relação mais verdadeira, sem ser uma verdade que se assemelhe ao mundo, mas coerente em seu encontro, isto é, capaz de expressar o invisível que anima a relação do olhar com a visibilidade, ou do sentir com a realidade? Neste movimento de pensamento, que inicialmente enfatiza uma nova idéia de Razão ou de Verdade através da atividade do olhar, chega-se, por fim, à noção de desejo ou de corpo libidinal. Perceber é desejar, movimento inscrito na abertura do Ser sensível, que inaugura as trocas entre o corpo e as coisas, em que o olhar ou a visibilidade é um elemento privilegiado. / The aim of this study is the research of the problem of painting in the philosophy of Merleau Ponty. Originally enrolled in the frames of an existencialistic philosophy, aferwards it was put with more prominence, in the frame of an ontology.The problem of art, especially of painting, arises as a privileged way of research of our more deaf and secret relations with Being, or wich that what Merleau Ponnty nominated the pre-reflexive layer of the sense of the world, previous to the thesis of our language. This is so because the activity of painting reveals the means of visibility that our daily look leaves behind and forgets privileging the cultural constructed world. In other words, we live in a world that forgets its premisses, and the task of the painter, especially of Cézanne, is to recover the contact of the look on this unhabitual world. In this original relation of the body with the world we may emphasize, in the work of Merleau Ponty, a new concept of depth, that is not only of space, but of the body, and also of the things. Merleau Ponty pointed to this notion in his essays about arts, trying to question again the artist?s activity as an activity that reveals the implication between the perceived world and the bodyness. He perceived in the depth the implication of the revertibility of the body: the visibility which opens itself to the beholder is also that of his visual body, which is at the same time beholder and visible object, sensing and sensible. The author states that once this intercrossing is given, all the problems of painting are here placed in the same way. In being so, the painting reveals the enigma of the body itself. My look realizes itself in the things and grasps me at the same moment in my look unfolded in front of myself, this interlinking makes possible a secret visibility or a carnal double. The philosophe develops the term \"flesh\" to denominate this \"between\" the beholder and the visible, opening one to the other, giving passage from one to the other, which defines our access to Being. We will deal with some questions: What is the activity of the artist between the perceived world and the expressive act, other then a coherence with the visibility that it causes and, therefore, what harm does come from the spectacle of the world? How the painter and the poet would express other things than their meeting with the world? And in this meeting what they are looking for other than a more true relation, without being a truth which is similar to the world, but coherent in their meeting, this is, capable to express the invisible that cheers up the relation of the gaze with the visibility or of the feeling with the realityIn this movement of thoughts, which emphasizes initially a new idea of Reason and of Truth by means of the activity of looking, one arrives, finally to the notion of desire or of the libidinal body. To perceive is to desire, a movement graved in the opening of sensitive Being, that inaugurates the exchanges between the body and the things, in whicht he looking or the visibility is a privileged element.

This dissertation interrogates the generation of novel sense and meaning in the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In taking up the theme of creative transformation prominent in his work, I show how the emergence of novel sense and the advent of meaning structures are made possible through the asymmetrical relation of adversity and cliché. While the scholarship focuses primarily on expression, institution, and reversibility as the three principal forms of creative transformation within the work of Merleau-Ponty, I maintain that this asymmetrical relation provides the originary ground on which these forms operate. To this end, this project consists primarily of the elucidation of three terms within the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thought – namely, novelty, cliché, and adversity – and the latter two notion’s roles in the generation of sense and meaning manifest in several fields of experience including perception, the aesthetic, and the political. The immediate import of this project is in its contribution to Merleau-Ponty scholarship through a description of the relation of adversity and cliché on the generation of sense and meaning which has received little attention to date. Subsequently, this project – like the inauguration of sense and meaning – institutes a trajectory for future research. This dissertation serves to describe a fertile field of interrogation both within and in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s work on adversity, cliché, and novelty.

Denna kandidatuppsats i teater- och dansvetenskap vid Stockholms universitet (VT 2012) undersöker den sensoriska nivån inom scenkonsten, hur den kan se ut och hur ett publikt deltagande i den kan förstås. Mitt material består av ett urval teoretiska ingångar som jag dels diskuterar sinsemellan, dels provar användbarheten av genom ett förstapersonsperspektiv av koreografin Epic av Mårten Spångberg. Genom detta skapar jag en begreppsapparat som kan fungera som tillvägagångssätt för en större studie av den sensoriska nivån. Min infallsvinkel är fenomenologisk, där Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phenomenology of Perception (1945) utgör min huvudkälla. Vid sidan om denna preciserar jag mitt perspektiv inom ett teater- och dansvetenskapligt fält genom Stanton B. Garner, Bert O. States, Susan Foster och Jana Parviainen. Min undersökning visar hur en fenomenologisk förståelse av människan som kropp situerad i tid och rum bildar ett material för att komma i kontakt med den sensoriska nivån. Jag lyfter fram hur den sensoriska nivån inrättar oss i ett utvidgat åskådarperspektiv där vi ser föreställningen från flera punkter samtidigt och genom att avstå från tecknets värde skapar en materialitet som når oss som intensifierad verklighet. Hur denna kropp är förbunden med omvärlden genom ett gemensamt förbund förklarar vidare hur vi deltar i en sensorisk upplevelse. Empatibegreppet visar hur ett deltagande i den sensoriska nivån kan skapa en expanderad jagupplevelse som sträcker sig över både tid och rum. Samtidigt smälter en upplevelse av den sensoriska nivån samman med den symboliska och bildar en hyperverklighet, vilket ifrågasätter den reella skillnaden mellan sensationer och symboler.

In the Sellarsian idiom, the space of reasons distinguishes rational beings as those invested in the game of giving and asking for reasons as set apart from beings merely susceptible to the space of causes, i.e. the realm of law. In this work I open a path toward perceiving and thinking that human beings characteristically live their lives in the space of motivations, an intelligible realm of perception, thought, and action whereby non-rational, non-causal descriptions and explanations of behavior serve as the primary and legitimating backdrop of those lives. The idea of motivations stems from the underdeveloped notion within the corpus of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In preparing a path toward the space of motivations, I argue for three claims. First, in the philosophy of mind, I argue for what I call the attentionality thesis (chapter 1), which states that the mind is primarily structured by attention in two senses: that consciousness has the capacity for re-direction toward different and multiple intentional objects, and that remaining directed toward an intentional object reveals different qualitative features of that object or mode of comportment. The attentionality thesis, which I draw from Merleau-Ponty's work, broadens the Brentano-Husserl intentionality thesis. I further argue that the attentionality thesis undercuts the distinction in kind between cognitive intentionality and motor intentionality (chapter 2), reveals shared problematic presuppositions of qualia theorists and functionalists (chapter 3), and challenges key concepts in Alva Noë's enactive theory of mind. Second, in light of the attentionality thesis, I diagnose concerns about whether perception is conceptual or nonconceptual, particularly with respect to John McDowell's conceptualism and Hubert Dreyfus's and Sean Kelly's nonconceptualism. I show that considerations of these arguments suggest an impasse between the claims that perception is conceptual, even in motor intentional comportments (chapter 2), and nonconceptual, in light of the fineness of grain argument (chapter 4). This leads to the final claim that the primary way to understand human perception, thought, and action is not via conceptual or nonconceptual considerations, but rather via motivations in the significance they lend (chapter 5). / Philosophy