Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1996. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [242]-248).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 94-97.

Thesis (PH.D.)--Columbia university. / Columbia university contributions to philosophy and psychology, vol. XVIII, no. 2.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-97).

Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2010. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 26, 2010). Advisor: David Odell-Scott. Keywords: qualia; Whitehead; self-organizing system; chaos; chaotic systems; dynamical systems; subjective experience; actual entity; actual occasion; eternal objects; god; phenomenal stance; process philosophy; hard problem; consciousness; cellular automata. Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-108).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1946. / Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 255-258.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1931. / Bibliography: p. [68]-69.

The object of this thesis is to consider the method to which reference is made by Bertrand Russell in The Lowell Lectures. Russell himself does not make clear the exact nature of the Logico-Analytic method. A study has therefore been made of Russell's earlier work in relation to that of Professor G.E. Moore. It is seen that Russell derived a certain theory of propositions from Moore. No doubt Russell was greatly influenced by Frege and Meinong but in this thesis it is his relation to Moore that has been considered. Certain difficulties entailed by the acceptance of this theory of propositions, led Russell to formulate the Theory of Descriptions, and the multiple relation theory of Judgment. The study of both of these theories, and the consideration of the general position Russell was holding by 1911, indicate the importance of the nature of the objects of acquaintance. These, namely sense-data and special reference to Professor Moore. The foregoing considerations suggest that for Russell, at least at this time, the objects of acquaintance were both metaphysically and epistemologically ultimate. Moreover it appears that the Logico-Analytic method is a way of approaching metaphysical and epistemological questions by the analysis of sentences expressing common-sense views into statements which refer immediately to objects of acquaintance. The conception of physical objects which Russell, believed that he would reach by this method is illustrated by reference to the Lowell Lectures and certain articles in Mysticism and Logic. In conclusion an attempt is made to state clearly the assumptions upon which the use of the method is based, perhaps the most important of which are: 1) There are certain common sense propositions which we all understand and which are certainly true. 2) There are final facts which make sentences expressing these propositions true; which final facts are absolutely specific facts about entities which should be regarded as incapable of further analysis. Some estimate of the significance of the method can be made in the light of its assumptions. Its more obvious value lies in stressing the importance of knowing exactly the reference of statements accepted as true, both to the facts that make them true, and to those facts we may regard as evidence for their truth. More shortly it suggests both the importance of avoiding, and a way of avoiding, mistakes and confusions due to the misunderstanding of language.

No description available.

This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us. The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. The first, 'what are essential properties?' is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, 'what essential properties are there?' is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters. Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question, introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provided. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed. Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis. Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best. An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis 'get the essential properties wrong', relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine's argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine's argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman. In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine's attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question. The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins' sortal essentialism, the position that objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins' essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism. Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine arguments concerning origin essentialism. It is shown that these arguments are either inconclusive - in that they do not entail origin essentialism - or assume origin essentialism at the out-set, leaving us little reason to accept origin essentialism. Chapter eight examines Mackie's minimalist essentialism. After laying out the position, I then examine a series of objections it faces. In particular, I show that even if we accept minimalist essentialism, it would not help us answer the Extension Question. As such, we have no reason to do so. I conclude that essential properties can best be understood as those sparse properties of an object which satisfy a specific modal criterion, as demonstrated in chapter five. However, the number of properties that satisfy this criterion might be quite small, as indicated by the results of chapters six through eight. This result is a mixed one for the essentialist: while we now know what essential properties are, it seems like we lost them all somewhere along the way.