Spelling suggestions: "subject:"methodenspektrum"" "subject:"methoden""
1 |
Terence Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodologyHart, John Slater, 1954- 28 February 2002 (has links)
Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical
positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he
introduced Popper into economics.
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist,
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics.
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)
|
2 |
Terence Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodologyHart, John Slater, 1954- 02 1900 (has links)
Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical
positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he
introduced Popper into economics.
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist,
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics.
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)
|
3 |
Terence Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodologyHart, John Slater, 1954- 28 February 2002 (has links)
Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical
positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he
introduced Popper into economics.
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist,
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics.
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)
|
4 |
Terence Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodologyHart, John Slater, 1954- 02 1900 (has links)
Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical
positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he
introduced Popper into economics.
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist,
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics.
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)
|
5 |
Politique de la théorie et conceptualisation économique dans la méthodologie de Max WeberAubry, Philip-Emmanuel 04 1900 (has links)
No description available.
|
6 |
Spor o pozitivismus v německé sociologii. Vývoj, hlavní myšlenky a pokračování / The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology. The development, main ideas and continuationVondráková, Renáta January 2012 (has links)
Diplomová práce Spor o pozitivismus v německé sociologii. Renáta Vondráková. 2012. Abstract The main theme of the work is the issue of positivism dispute, which is commonly referred to discussions that occurred in German sociology in the sixties. It was a debate between advocates of critical theory, which were Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, and the concept of critical rationalism of Karl R. Popper and Hans Albert. The discussion initially was confined to issues related to the logic of the social sciences, for many reasons, but rather applied to differences between the concepts and challenges of science from the perspective of both the above approaches. Also the description and discovery purposes and contexts that led to the overturning topic discussion are devoted to this work. The aim is to describe the external influences as widely as possible and how it affected the final understanding of the dispute, but also how well the positivism dispute turned the concepts of science in the following period. The first part is concerned with social and historical situation in which the dispute arose. Followed by an outline of key terms that in connection with a dispute likely occur, in fact it is the analysis of major issues. Emphasis is placed on a thorough description of the first two contributions to the...
|
Page generated in 0.102 seconds