In 1917, a mere thirty years before India gained independence from Britain, Indians were alIowed into the officer corps of the colonial Indian Army, thus initiating its " Indianization ". Yet, as an issue of British military policy, Indianization had been debated for a hundred years before 1917. This thesis delineates the contours of that debate, the myriad schemes for Indianization that it engendered, the reasons for the faHure of each of these, as weIl as the reasons why the bar on Indians in the Indian Army's officer corps was finally broken. In analysing the debate, attention will be paid to factors that influenced and channelled the discussions. The most important of these were: Anglo-Indian strategies of Imperial politics, such as the need to seek out and collaborate with certain sections of Indian society as a means of holding India to the Empire; British ideological and intellectual formulations, such as the "Gentleman-Ideal" and the Martial Races theory; and Indian political developments, such as the emergence of Indian public opinion and nationalism .

This study examines the use of graduated escalation in Vietnam under the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson and attempts to discover the underlying causes that led to the enactment and the continuation of this policy throughout his administration.Factors studied include Johnson's perception of his place in history, his personal style of control, his dual loyalties to expanding "The Great Society" as well as stopping communism through military pressure, and his limited cultural understanding of the needs of the Vietnamese people and the intentions of their leaders.The conclusion is that, while Johnson was a canny politician in his own arena, his controlling personality probably prevented him from considering all of the options open to him in resolving the Vietnam problem and his simplistic, frontier type of diplomacy closed other doors and forced him along a path of frustration and defeat. / Department of Political Science

As part of a major defence review meant to streamline and re-prioritize the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in 1969, the Trudeau government decommissioned Canada’s last aircraft carrier, HMCS Bonaventure. The carrier represented a major part of Maritime Command’s NATO oriented anti-submarine warfare (ASW) effort. There were three main reasons for the government’s decision. First, the carrier’s yearly cost of $20 million was too much for the government to afford. Second, several defence experts challenged the ability of the Bonaventure to fulfill its ASW role. Third, members of the government and sections of the public believed that an aircraft carrier was a luxury that Canada did not require for its defence. There was a perception that the carrier was the wrong ship used for the wrong role. In sum, the decision to decommission the Bonaventure was politically attractive because of economic reasons, but was made based on strategic rationale.

The study of the war against Revolutionary France (1793-1802) has always been rather overshadowed in British history by the attractions of the second part of the struggle with France, the more successful Napoleonic Wars (1803-15). This is to see events out of perspective. Moreover, in both wars attention has usually been concentrated on the actual military operations rather than on the factors influencing the formulation of war policy and on the essential position of international diplomacy in this struggle. Although four (arguably five) European coalitions were organized against France in theSa wars, only the final, successful, combination has been studied in detail, yet, as this last coalition proved, the only way to defeat France was by such combinations. This thesis therefore examines both the handling of the Revolutionary War by the government of the Younger Pitt between 1793 and 1801, and the course of its diplomacy through its attempts to form a workable combination with the European Powers against France. It does this through a detailed study of British relations with Austria in particular. Austria was chosen because the connection with Vienna provides the key to British policy on the continent throughout the war. Although Ministers desired a general European Coalition, they came to realize that in practice their best hope of success lay in close co-operation and alliance with Austria, the Power with whom they appeared to have most in common and who possessed the largest and most efficient army facing France. Moreover, even in the period of disagreement with Austria between 1797 and 1799 the fact of this disagreement had a decisive effect on British policy and its execution. Such a study also has a wider perspective in that it marks the final revival of the Old System: the union of Britain, Austria and (to an ever decreasing extent) Holland, the efficacy of which as a barrier against France constituted one of the basic tenets of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century. The System had been in existence from 1689 to 1756, at which date the Austrians had dropped it, but British governments had never lost faith in it, and successively they had vainly attempted to restore it ever since. Its revival and failure in the 1790s therefore represents the passing of an era in British foreign policy, and the reasons for its passing are fully considered in this thesis. In order to place the Austrian alliance of the 1790s in its proper setting, both as an integral part of British war policy and as the major factor in British diplomacy, it has been necessary to consider Britain's relations with the other major European Powers besides Austria, and also the close relationship of diplomacy with three other factors: military considerations, finance, and public opinion. Attention has therefore been paid not only to diplomatic archives, but also to private correspondence among members of the government, to the state of the money market and foreign exchanges, to parliamentary debates and political pamphlets. Finally, in order to understand the path taken in Anglo-Austrian relations it has also been necessary to investigate policy and reactions to British policy in Vienna. Such a study reveals the immense difficulties faced by British Ministers in trying to pursue a coherent foreign policy in this war. Not only did they have to satisfy public opinion at home, but they also had to reconcile their natural wish to engage as many Powers as possible in the war with the obvious fact Austria was the most necessary Power to the implementation of their plans. The need to steer a delicate balance between a grand coalition and an Austrian alliance, at a time of conflicting interests in central and eastern Europe, was an insurmountable problem. Equally, the difficulties, both physical and personal, in trying to cooperate with an ally whose capital was anything from two weeks to two months away were immense. Moreover, even the best-laid plans were at the mercy of events elsewhere and of chance on the battlefield. As a result Ministers very rarely held the initiative and were often hurriedly reacting to ever-changing situations and problems. It was as a result of these factors that diplomatic needs in Britain's relationship with Austria dominated British strategy in the 1790s, constantly forcing Ministers away from their original intention of pursuing a maritime war. The truth of Dundas's observation that 'all modern wars are a contention of purse 1 is also apparent: from 1794 onward finance was at the heart of Anglo-Austrian relations and it held British policy in a straight-jacket. The legend of the limitless flowing of 'Pitt's gold' cannot be sustained when the paucity of British resources and the government's caution in using them is seen, but neither can the more recent myth of Pitt's niggardliness towards Austria. Pitt was quite willing to subsidize Austria, but having burnt his fingers on the disastrous Prussian subsidy of 1794, he wished to impose strict conditions which Austria was unwilling to accept. Consequently it was Austria, wishing to retain some freedom of action, and not Pitt, who insisted on the policy of loans which so much plagued Anglo-Austrian relations. The thesis begins -with, an examination of the factors which drew Britain and Austria into a close cooperation in the first year of the war. It shows that Britain became committed to Austria because of the circumstances in which the war began. The British government wished to ensure its dominance over that of Holland, it wished to protect its trade and security interests in the Netherlands, and it believed that the best way to attain these ea££ was by keeping the latter independent of France through their continued possession by Austria. In order to encourage the reluctant Austrians to retain the Netherlands, it had politically to hold out the hope of enlarging them at France's expense and militarily to commit its forces to a 'Flanders war' to obtain such an enlargement. Austria, which wished in any case for a British alliance to escape from its diplomatic isolation, took the bait and so assumed the leading part in the war on the continent. Despite difficulties caused by Britain's attempts to hold the rest of the Coalition together and by Austria's sudden financial demands in the summer of 1794, this cooperation developed into alliance because the British Ministers came to realize that of all the European Powers Austria was the most earnest in the war, contributed the largest and most effective army, and constituted the best barrier to France on the continent. In Vienna the Austria Foreign Minister, Baron Thugut, wanted the alliance because he hoped for conquests from France and needed British money to continue the war, and also because he saw the chance of a Triple Alliance of Austria, Britain, and Russia which would isolate Austria's rival Prussia and enable it to make gains in Poland at Prussia's expense. The thesis goes on to show that one of the basic reasons for the failure of the alliance, as in 1756, was Austria's rivalry with Prussia. For Britain the alliance was directed exclusively against France; for Austria it was directed as much against Prussia as France. Thugut became increasingly disstisfied when British Ministers not only refused to accept this interpretation but actually began to negotiate with Prussia to bring it back into the war. British Ministers became both annoyed and alarmed when they realized that Thugut, in his rivalry with Berlin, was neither interested in the Netherlands nor devoting his whole attention to the French war. As the war went from bad to worse the alliance fell apart because all bonds of common rnterest and mutual trust disappeared.

The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known as the Oboronnyi Promyshennyi Kompleks (OPK), was called into question following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Industry experts cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry's economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia's workers into the sector. It was a crippling blow. However, the industry's export customers in China, India and Iran during those early years became the OPK's saving grace. Their orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success to date or are still required to ensure its long term endurance. Domestically, continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, further consolidation of the defence industry and continued development of the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long term OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum vital for the OPK's progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, Russia's accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the proverbial 'phoenix from the ashes'. China and India constitute approximately eighty percent of the total Russian arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programmes for military hardware. However, post 2015, the Chinese market will be nearing total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active foreign policy under Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing campaigns into the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America. The strategy has already begun to pay dividends with large contracts being signed by Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The Russians hope that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result. The short term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK's most important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and air defence systems as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new markets such as Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least the next decade.

This thesis makes an assessment of the factors influencing the involvement of the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) in homeland security roles since 11 September 2001 (9/11). This is approached on a largely empirical basis, using document analysis and case studies supported with interviews with key individuals and experts. The thesis commences with an Introduction that provides brief context for the thesis and specifies its central question as ???what factors have shaped the role of the ADO in Australia's response to the homeland security environment that has emerged since 11 September 2001.??? Chapter One provides an historical and theoretical context for the key concepts of homeland security and the challenges confronting Western governments in the homeland security arena. Chapter Two explores the implications of those challenges for Australia, before outlining the research method and providing a literature review. Chapter Three is an historical exposition of homeland security in Australia from British settlement in 1788 until 2001. The Chapter examines events in increasing detail in the 30 years immediately prior to 2001, including a detailed case study of ADO support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, before drawing some broad conclusions on the Australian experience of the involvement of its Defence Organisation in homeland security pre-9/11. Chapter Four establishes the pre-9/11 status quo in relation to the ADO???s involvement in homeland security role before analysing the general pattern of those roles. Chapter Five analyses and draws conclusions about the reasons for the ADO???s pre-9/11 involvement in homeland security roles, introducing an hypothetical construct to explain causal factors. Chapter Six examines the ADO???s involvement in homeland security roles post-9/11, including cases studies of ADO support to the conduct of the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. Chapter Seven analyses and identifies the factors led to the ADO???s pattern of involvement in homeland security post-9/11, further developing the hypothetical construct introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter Seven also contains supporting case studies on the ADO???s contribution to Australia???s national chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response capability and on the state of New South Wales??? homeland security capabilities. Chapter Eight draws overall conclusions, including recommendations for Australian policy development and areas for further research. The essential conclusion reached is that the ADO???s involvement in homeland security roles, both before and since 9/11, has been shaped mostly by pragmatic political and managerial considerations of governments. Developments have normally occurred in an episodic and incremental fashion in response to ???trigger events,??? although 9/11 altered this pattern somewhat by acting as a ???threshold??? event that re-calibrated demands and expectations for ADO involvement. Supporting Appendices provide detail on the Australian Government???s strategic guidance on ADO involvement in homeland security since 1973; on Australia???s policy for Defence Assistance to the Civilian Community and Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authorities; and on the involvement of former Department of Defence employees in non-Defence homeland-security related roles. A Bibliography provides details of sources used.

The intent of this study is to assess the role of fundamental Japanese security policy objectives in driving the significant shifts in Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation with the United States from 1993 to 2003. In studying the relative influence of the objectives that guided Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation, this thesis seeks to address a gap in the literature. A debate has occurred over the direction of Japanese security policy that is based on widely different assumptions on the importance attached to various fundamental security objectives. At the same time, Japan???s approach to missile defence has been the subject of considerable analysis that identified the crucial importance of the issue for the attainment of these fundamental security policy objectives. But no linkage has been established between these two levels of analysis. In particular, there has been an absence of assessments of what Japan???s decisions on missile defence cooperation indicate about the relative influence of the various objectives. This thesis developed an analytical framework to enable such an assessment by examining the structure of missile defence cooperation undertaken. Japan possessed a range of options in the level and type of involvement in missile defence cooperation. That involvement would determine the eventual type of benefits and costs incurred against the affected objectives. Cooperation agreed to (or rejected) over the ten year period thereby provides a means to determine the influence of key objectives on Japan???s approach, and in particular those objectives that restrained involvement. The thesis finds that a clear hierarchy existed in the influence of the various objectives on Japan???s approach with changes in their influence explaining the evolution of Japan???s commitment. The desire to strengthen the alliance, weakening domestic political constraints, and disregard of China???s opposition provide the key explanations. These findings not only point towards the respective strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches employed to explain Japanese security policy, but they also suggest the value of greater attention to the state???s ability to overcome domestic constraints in determining policy in order to fully understand the broader transformation of Japanese security policy.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1994. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "January 1995." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 11/3/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Pray/pray.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1992. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "June 1993." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 10/27/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Gunzinger/gunzinger.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Daniel J. Moran. Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-101). Also available online.