This thesis concerns the ideas of ‘dialogue’ and ‘fragment’ in the work of the American liberal Roman Catholic theologian David Tracy (bn. 1939). Dialogue (or ‘conversation’) established itself as a dominant idea for Tracy in the 1980s, whereas the centrality of fragments first emerged for Tracy in the late 1990s, to complicate and refine his earlier thinking. Despite this historical sequence, however, the organisation of this thesis is thematic rather than essentially chronological. The first three chapters focus on how in the later 1970s and 1980s Tracy adapted his ideas of conversation-dialogue from the thought of the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. Chapter Four examines some serious objections to Tracy’s concept of dialogic reason, before defending his basic choices and gesturing towards his more recent work as perhaps resolving real previous difficulties. Chapter Five explores the ‘ontological`’ thinking of Martin Heidegger, valuable for evaluating Tracy despite the latter’s determination to put his own thinking on a more empirical and pluralistic footing. Chapter Six tackles this theme of Tracy’s ongoingly ‘empirical’ sensibility, as well as the importance he has attached to the experiencing human ‘self.’ Tracy’s ideas of human experience and selfhood owe much to William James and to Bernard Lonergan. Chapter Seven examines ‘correlational’ concepts that Tracy has forged to facilitate Christian theology over the course of his career since Blessed Rage for Order (1975). As Tracy became philosophically and theologically uncomfortable with theism as the supposed essential horizon for theology (around 1990), so the idea of the ‘mystical-prophetic’ emerged to open a door into new horizons of thinking. Chapter Eight highlights an easily overlooked antecedent of the hermeneutical negativity that Tracy’s recent ideas of ‘fragments’ imply: in Gadamer’s sense of the Christina negative ‘sign’ of the Ecce Homo. Chapter Nine then focuses on Tracy’s ideas of thinking through fragments: their adequacy and possible consequences.

The question guiding the argument of my thesis is whether it is possible to articulate a political theology in terms of the idea of freedom. This possibility is explored through an analysis and evaluation of the political dimension of the theologies of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Gustavo Gutiérrez. For both these theologians, the idea of freedom emerges from reflection on the process of historical experience, which itself delimits the horizon of political activity. The relevance of theology for politics consists in its competence in interpreting the individual desire for liberty within the context of our created finitude, whose deepest meaning is revealed only in God’s work of salvation. In discerning the concrete possibilities of freedom, theology has therefore to consider the role of the church as the community for learning freedom, a role already identified as part of its mission in Paul’s epistle to the Galatians. In a further step, it has to consider more directly the nature of political authority and its conditioning of the actualization of human freedom through concrete practices in the life of societies and states. In this respect it is the task of theology to establish the creaturely and eschatological contexts of political life in such a way as to ground a morality of political justice. This triple structure, because it finds material justification with both theologians, creates the possibility of a fair and balanced comparison between two visions which share theoretical concerns to a surprising extent, enriching the scope of the dialogue, yet differ radically in practical orientation and commitments. This marked divergence will allow some reflection on the role of intra-theological debate in the self-definition of theological tradition against the political with regard to the competence of interpreting human freedom.

This dissertation comprises three parts, setting forth the thesis that Karl Barth’s mature doctrine of election, though avowedly supralapsarian, is in fact basically the opposite. I trace the development of Barth’s lapsarian thinking from its inception in 1920 (Romans II) to its maturation in 1936-42 (Gottes Gnadenwahl to CD II/2), and further developments up to 1953 (CD IV/1). The thesis of my dissertation comprises two aspects, one concerning what lapsarian position, Christological and predestinarian, underlies the Christocentric doctrine of election Barth developed in 1936-42, and the other concerning how he came to develop this lapsarian view. Part I examines the lapsarian position of Barth’s mature doctrine of election set forth in CD II/2 against the background of the Lapsarian Controversy in seventeenth-century Reformed orthodoxy, arguing that he has misunderstood some seventeenth-century terms and that his position is in fact basically in line with infralapsarianism in that for him both election and the incarnation presuppose humankind’s fallenness. Part II traces the development of Barth’s lapsarian position from its inception in 1920 to its Christological reorientation in 1936-42. In a nutshell, my thesis in Part II is that Christology and predestination started out as two loosely related doctrines in Barth’s theology, but as predestination, which was inconsistently supralapsarian during the first phase of the development, was drawn closer to Christology, which carried infralapsarian tendencies at first and became infralapsarian in the 1920s, Barth’s doctrine of predestination became more and more infralapsarian, and then in 1936-42 the two doctrines merged and became inseparable, and he became basically infralapsarian in both Christology and predestination. Part III comprises two chapters exploring doctrinal implications and further developments of Barth’s Christological-predestinarian infralapsarianism up to 1953 (CD IV/1). I argue that in developing what I suggest we call his “purified infralapsarianism” in a deeply historical-actualistic direction, the basically infralapsarian character of Barth’s understanding of election in Christ becomes more radical in that he leaves no room for the possibility of homo nondum lapsus as the obiectum praedestinationis.

My study centres on Karl Barth’s pneumatology with special attention to its inseparable relationship with his vision of the Christian life. Many critics say that Barth’s emphasis upon the gracious God revealed in Christ improperly undermined both the role of the Spirit and the importance of human agency. In contrast, my research will demonstrate that it is possible to read Barth as offering a robust Spirit theology, which resulted in rich reflection upon the Christian life. More specifically, my thesis will first examine Barth’s pneumatology within the context of his incomplete doctrine of redemption. I will show that his unique understanding of redemption was largely shaped by his exegesis of Paul’s Spirit theology, in which he developed central pneumatological motifs, including the Spirit’s incorporation of humanity into the intra-divine fellowship, mediation in the form of pneumatic prayer, and the shaping of moral agency. I will, then, examine these redemptive works of the Spirit within a more comprehensive context of his theology, coordinating synchronic and diachronic approaches. In particular, I will read ‘through’ and ‘across’ Barth, tracing underpinning pneumatological themes, with special focus on the three modes of the Spirit’s work in the opera ad extra – the mediation of divine and human logic in revelation, the drawing of creation into God’s self-glorification movement through beauty, and the calling of individuals through community into God’s drama of salvation. In short, unlike criticisms that Barth reduced pneumatology to the subjective possibility of revelation, my study will show that his pneumatology is mainly about our prayerful participation in God, the constitution of human agency and a new vision of the Christian life under the direction of the Spirit.

The diploma thesis "The Question of History and Time in Modern Theology" aims to introduce the basic forms of thinking about history and time in modern theology. First of all, the work focuses on the initial forms of history and time outside of theology. Results are compared with a basic understanding of the same in Christianity. This is followed by a study of five selected theologians of the 20th century, who were interested in the problem of history and time. The study also reflects reactions to their scholar's conclusions too.

This thesis provides a theoretical framework that brings the unity of Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’ into relief. I will analyse Kierkegaard’s writings between 1846 and 1852 when, I argue, the socially constructive dimension of his thought comes to prominence, involving two dialectical aspects of religiousness identified by Kierkegaard: the edifying and the polemical. How these two aspects come together and get worked out in the lives of individuals form the basis of what can be called a Kierkegaardian ‘social praxis’. I conclude that the tension between the edifying and the polemical can be coherently maintained in a communicative life that is also characteristic of a militant faith. This militant faith and life is presented as a critical guard against absolutisms, fundamentalisms, and intellectual aloofness; but the ‘militant’ individual is also utterly dependent, in need of edification and critique, and therefore chooses the risk of encountering others, seeking relationships out of a commitment to the development of persons and communities in co-operation. Therefore, not only does this dialectic provide readers with an important theoretical framework for understanding Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’, but it is also a valuable resource for a constructive analysis of active social living suitable for theology in the twenty-first century.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer offers a vibrant, theological depiction of the self constituted by and for the other in responsibility. The thesis argues that the concept of orientation is crucial for understanding this self; the self is a being oriented to, or away from, the other. To grasp the distinctiveness of Bonhoeffer’s self this thesis aims to open up critical conversation with his historical contemporaries, Emmanuel Levinas and Simone Weil. Like Levinas, Bonhoeffer depicts the self as confronted by the other. Yet unlike Levinas, Bonhoeffer’s other does not render the self a ‘host-hostage’. An oriented self, grounded in Bonhoeffer’s theology, is neither dominating nor other-dominated. Bringing Bonhoeffer and Weil into critical dialogue with one another helps to describe the precise way in which the self is responsible for the other. Conversation with Weil refines Bonhoeffer’s account of responsibility by integrating her account of attention into his account of existing on behalf of another. It is also neither self-affirming nor self-negating. The first chapter outlines two recent conceptions of the self as oriented; but each, as will be demonstrated, does not recognise fully the ethical contours of the oriented self. The second chapter examines in detail Bonhoeffer’s contributions to a Christological account of the responsibly oriented self. Integral to this account are the images of ‘the heart turned in on itself’ (cor curvum in se) and Christ who is fundamentally ‘for’ the other. The third chapter converses with Emmanuel Levinas, both constructively and critically. Of help is Levinas’s reading of the other as a confrontation to the self. His rendering of the other as dominating, or holding hostage, the self is a serious issue. Such a construction resists positive elements of the self-other relation. The fourth chapter investigates what conversation with Simone Weil can offer to Bonhoeffer’s framework. Her concept of attention helps to articulate how the self becomes a self through engagement with another. The fifth chapter presents Adolph Eichmann, as portrayed by Hannah Arendt, as the supreme and pivotal opposite of attentive responsibility. In Eichmann’s irresponsibility and disunity [while doing his ‘duties’] one finds justification for a fundamental re-working of ethics in a Bonhoefferian vein. The image of the ethically blind cor curvum in se exposes Eichmann’s fundamental issue. In contrast, Bonhoeffer’s ethically oriented self both perceives the other and gives of itself as for that other.

In this thesis I examine Schelling’s construction of symbolic language in §73 of his Philosophie der Kunst. I approach this construction in three ways. First, I compare Schellingian symbolic language to other contemporary theories of the symbol and language (in particular, those of Goethe, Kant and A.W. Schlegel). While Schelling’s theory of symbolic language possesses properties similar to these other theories (the identity of being and meaning, organic wholeness, the co-existence of opposites), I show that it differs in how they are interpreted. Second, I excavate the metaphysical and epistemological principles from Schelling’s philosophy of the period which underlie this theory of language. Three tenets from the Identitätssystem (as it is called) are crucial: formation, quantitative differentiation and construction. They illuminate why Schelling interprets symbolic language very differently to his contemporaries. Third, I consider the theological significance of Schellingian symbolic language. This significance is twofold. First, his theory gives rise to a conception of discourse without reference, and so to the notion of a theology without reference. On this basis, Schelling criticises Christian theology for remaining too concerned with referring to God, when what is at stake is rather the degree of intensity to which it produces God. Theology therefore stands in need of reformation. Second, the way in which theology is utilised by Schelling in order to construct symbolic language in §73 of the Philosophie der Kunst itself provides a model for reformed theological practice. I argue that Schelling conceives of traditional theology as material for intensifying the production of God. In this way, an ‘absolute theology’ is engendered which has no concern for reference or for the integrity of the theological tradition.

This thesis is the first study of 'Christian radicalism' in the Church of England between 1957 and 1970. Radicalism grew in influence from the late 1950s, and burst into the national conversation with John Robinson’s 1963 bestseller, Honest to God. Emboldened by this success, between 1963 and 1965 radical leaders hoped they might fundamentally reform the Church of England, even though they were aware of the diversity of their supporting constituency. Yet by 1970, following a controversial turn towards social justice issues in the late 1960s, the movement had largely reached the point of disintegration. The thesis offers five central arguments. First, radicalism was fundamentally driven by a narrative of epochal transition, which understood British society in the late 1950s and early 1960s to be undergoing a seismic upheaval, comparable to the transition between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Secondly, this led radicals to exaggerate many of the social changes occurring in the period, and to imagine the emergence of a new social order. Radicals interpreted affluence as an era of unlimited technology, limited church decline as the arrival of a profoundly secular age, and limited sexual shifts as evidence of a sexual revolution. They effectively created the idea of the ‘secular society’, which became widely accepted once it was adopted by the Anglican hierarchy. Third, radical treatment of these themes was part of a tradition that went back to the 1940s; radicals anticipated many of the themes of the secular culture of the 1960s, not the other way round. Fourth, far from slavishly adopting secular intellectual frameworks, radical arguments were often framed using theological concepts, such as Christian eschatology. Finally, for all these reasons, Christian radicals made an original and influential contribution to the elite re-imagination of British society which occurred in the 1960s.

The explosive growth of technology today is causing extensive speculation about the future. These ‘technological futurisms’—especially transhumanism—are often imbued with religious value by their adherents. How should Christians respond to the content of technological futurisms and also the way the future is constructed? In this thesis I argue that Christian eschatology has a more robust understanding of the future than technological futurism, as championed by transhumanism, and can allow for radical hope while also maintaining important humanistic virtues which are ultimately lost in transhumanism. Christian eschatology does not only depend on what is actual to create its future. Rather, it is open to the God of possibility and promise who can bring the radically new in the Kingdom of God. This dissertation is broken into three major sections with an introductory and concluding chapter. The first section provides a history of our technological imagination today by looking at visionary approaches to technology and the future in both technological utopias and science fiction. This history provides the conditions for understanding the proposed future of transhumanism. The second section orients the final response by assessing technology and the future in the eschatologies of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Jacques Ellul. Both Teilhard and Ellul agree that the technological future without appeal to the Christian God is dangerous. The final section looks at the theological and philosophical issues surrounding technology and the future. Heidegger’s works are used to sharpen themes related to technology and the future; in particular, how technology is related to ontology and how the future is related to possibility. The final chapters construct a Christian response to transhumanism around the themes of possibility and promise by utilising the works of Richard Kearney, Eberhard Jüngel and Jürgen Moltmann. A Christian notion of possibility allows for the radically new in a way transhumanism does not and the Christian idea of promise safeguards human virtues by emphasising the interpersonal as ultimate rather than self-transcendence as with transhumanism.