This thesis argues that Heidegger’s thought offers crucial insights into the structural challenges that modernity poses to being an ethical and religious person. I argue that these difficulties come down to an instrumentalist conception of truth, a denial or repression of finitude as the condition of meaningfulness, and a philosophical anthropology that is both too subjectivistic and too objectivistic. Yet while Heidegger was good on the diagnosis, he was reluctant to give more than digressive and opaque prescriptions to these problems. My thesis seeks to respond to this lacuna by putting Heidegger’s critical observations in the service of articulating a positive religious ethics. To that end, it seeks to locate—as well as redefine from an ontological perspective—the human dispositions and practices that expose truth in a non-instrumental light, that show finitude as a positive condition of meaningfulness, and that reveal the essence of the human being in non-subjectivist and non- objectivist terms. I argue that these include listening and gratitude—dispositions and practices I claim should form the backbone of any religious ethics, and yet which I also claim should not be limited to those who believe in a personal, theistic God. My thesis contributes to the fields of modern theology and Heidegger Studies in four ways. First, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Levinas and Adorno) are wrong to oppose ontology to ethics. Second, it shows that Heidegger’s critics (such as Marion and Jonas) are wrong to oppose ontology to theology. Third, it shows that Heidegger’s own ambivalence about the ethical and theological relevance of his thought allows for the development of a deeply ethical and theological posture. And fourth, it offers a unique, post-Heideggerian interpretation of gratitude, one in which it is understood as a structure of Dasein that is both “always already” and “not yet” operative.

This thesis for the first time critically and comparatively examines contemporary Christian and philosophical ethics of war. Thus it contributes to an investigation of current possibilities of moral-political action. Exploring various combinations of political ethics and the tenets of faith, it compares three Christian with two secular thinkers. Each chapter first shows how Just War ethics are constructed between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. The former prioritizes individual or national self-defence and power; the latter the universal value of each individual. Each analytical section reconstructs the author’s moral understanding of political authority, violent force and political reality. These foci are investigated in terms of how they understand, envision or reject the mediation between politics and Christian morality. As the inner logic of each Just War proposal is thus brought out, continuities and differences between authors can be explained. Part I looks at Christian authors. Jean Bethke Elshtain’s realistic, ‘naturalistic’ Just War ethic of the sovereign state rejects humanist idealism. For Paul Ramsey Christian agape provides a transformative ethic between idealism and realism. Developing this, Oliver O’Donovan’s evangelical approach practically fuses idealism and realism. Dogmatically, this is conditioned by moving from Elshtain’s modern theological dualism to Ramsey’s Christ-transforming the world, though still indebted to philosophical idealism. O’Donovan, however, suggests that after the singular mediation of the Christ event, moral-political categories disclose the divine order. Part II investigates the idealism-realism divide amongst philosophers. Both David Rodin’s idealist demand for a global state and Uwe Steinhoff’s individualist Machiavellianism seek to protect human rights. After Kant, they presuppose an unbridgeable division between politics and ‘religious’ morality. Theology, having become anthropology, replaces the mediation of Christ with immanent mediators: legal, statist or individualist moral agents. But this echoes and intensifies the Christian tradition. Whereas Rodin introduces a renewed, violent papacy, Steinhoff seeks to renew the liberal-democratic status quo through a secular ‘radical reformation’. It is concluded that both modern Christian and philosophical ethics of war can oscillate between impractical triumphant justice and the failure of tragic antagonism. If the singular mediation between Is and Ought in Christ is recognized as a universal paradox, doing justice effectively becomes possible.

The point of departure of this thesis is derived from a modern tendency to create a dichotomy between selfless love and human flourishing. Modern attempts to liberate the human being from heteronomous oppression and the moral norms promoting this have sometimes led to the conclusion that selfless love is harmful to human flourishing. Such a conclusion has gained momentum also through modernist re-conceptualisations of the self as an autonomous but empty consciousness which must guard itself against determination by the other. In effect, significant thinkers have replaced the notion of selfless love with a call for self-assertion over against the other, as key to the individual person’s well-being. This has been matched by Christian dismissals of the individual’s pursuit of human flourishing. In the face of modern insights into the ‘desirous’ nature of the human being, modern Christian theology has equally struggled to sustain the tension between the traditional Christian notion of selfless or self-giving love and human beings’ desire to affirm themselves and to find personal fulfilment in this world. Strands of Christian theology have, for instance, affirmed a self-surrendering love at the cost of dismissing the individual’s worldly desires entirely. In this thesis, I outline this situation in modern thought and its problematic consequences. With a view to discerning whether selfless love and human flourishing can be re-connected, I then undertake close studies of the theologian Paul Tillich’s and the moral philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch’s conceptualisations of the self and of love. As I will argue, Tillich’s and Murdoch’s engagement with modern thought leads them to develop accounts of the self, which correspond with understandings of love as both selfless and conducive to human flourishing. On the basis of their thought I thus argue that selfless love and human flourishing can be understood as interdependent even today.

This thesis examines the rationale for religious liberty in England and Wales. Currently, United Kingdom religious liberty literature shows very little sustained interrogation of the topic. Authors are likely to assume religious liberty is, most notably, a species of personal autonomy. This fails to explain why we should care about religious liberty and deepens religion’s privatisation, its separation from politics or public life. Drawing from a theological sensibility known as Radical Orthodoxy (RO), this thesis criticises current assumptions and argues that religious liberty discourse should be re-envisioned. The Introduction and Chapter One explore the current problems facing religious liberty discourse and map rationales given by prominent authors. Chapter Two argues that the main problem is that current discourse is shaped by a secularisation narrative: the differentiation of religious and secular spheres. Chapter Three relates the RO argument that this differentiation is underpinned by three themes, all of which have theological components: the rise of secular order as the protection of individual rights; the invention of private religion in modernity; and the contemporary shift to 'authenticity' or diffuse individual experiences as the hallmark of religion. Chapter Four contends that these three themes are echoed in religious liberty discourse and jurisprudence, leaving us with the question of why religious liberty matters. Chapters Five and Six explore the RO-influenced alternative, in theory and with reference to common questions in religious liberty discourse: the relationship between an individual claimant and the group; the reality of plural religious traditions; and the tension between sexual orientation non-discrimination and religious liberty. On the RO-influenced account, religious liberty concerns, against sphere differentiation, a commitment to the flourishing of multiple groups contributing to desirable social ends, understood ultimately as participating in the life of 'charity', the love of God and of others. This encapsulates two themes, both rooted in the Christian tradition: judgement against politics (as reflected in the secular order), and transformation of society along social pluralist lines. These two themes, the thesis argues, better explain why religious liberty matters.

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), perhaps the most remarkable dogmatician and intellectual of the Dutch Reformed (gereformeerde) tradition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, committed himself to what he called a 'Reformed' and 'catholic' theological task. For the modern dogmatician, this task is neither repristination nor abandonment of one's confessionalist tradition, but, being driven along by the Scriptural witness, to appropriate 'catholic' dogma to the grammars of modern conceptual frameworks. Such a task led Bavinck to a certain eclecticism in style and source for which he earned in twentieth century scholarship the pejorative label of dualism, applied both to his person and his theological content. Regarding his person, this thesis of the two Bavincks follows a biographical narrative of a student and blossoming theologian divided between the orthodox and modern. Regarding his content, interpreters move to and fro between Bavinck the scholastic and Bavinck the post-Kantian, subjectivist dogmatician. This study nuances this picture and participates in James Eglinton's recent call for an overturning of said dualisms applied to Bavinck's person and work by outlining the most significant example of Bavinck toiling to complete his 'catholic' dogmatic task: his appropriation of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In distinction from Bavinck's milieu, he did not demonize Schleiermacher, but, while willing to critique Schleiermacher's material dogmatics, regarded Schleiermacher as 'deeply misunderstood'. The two primary locales of Bavinck's appropriation of Schleiermacher include (i) the question of the epistemic ground of the unity of being and thinking; (ii) the grammar of subjective and objective religion. In both, Bavinck adopts Schleiermacher's concepts of 'feeling', 'absolute dependence', and 'immediate self-consciousness' to complete his own logic. Understanding Bavinck's adoption of Schleiermacher's conceptual framework, particularly that of the introduction from Schleiermacher's Der christliche Glaube, makes visible just how Bavinck determined to work as a modern theologian post-Kant and within the freeing confines of his orthodox, Dutch confessionalist heritage. His appropriation of Schleiermacher is the paradigmatic example of his commitment to be orthodox - yet modern.

This dissertation provides an analysis of the attempts by John Henry Newman to account for the historical reality of doctrinal change within Christianity in the light of his lasting conviction that the idea of Christianity is fixed by reference to the dogmatic content of the deposit of faith. The existing literature on Newman is enormous and wide-ranging but this present work fills a notable gap by treating Newman at any particular point in the account as a person with an open future, where his present acts are not determined by later events, and where any apologetic intent has to be identified and accounted for by reference to the immediate matter under consideration and the contemporaneous evidence. The argument of the thesis is that Newman proposed a series of hypotheses to account for the apparent contradiction between change and continuity, that this series begins much earlier than is generally recognised and that the final hypothesis he was to propose, contained in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, (‘Essay’), provided a methodology of lasting theological value. The introduction establishes the centrality of the problem of change and continuity to Newman's theological work as an Anglican, its part in his conversion to Roman Catholicism and its contemporary relevance to Roman Catholic theology. It also surveys the major secondary literature relating to the question, with particular reference to those works published within the last fifty years. In the first main chapter, covering the period to the publication of his first major work, The Arians of the Fourth Century, in 1833, Newman's earliest awareness of the problem and first attempts to solve it are considered. The growing confidence of Newman's Tractarian period and his development of the notion of the Via Media form the second chapter and the collapse of that confidence, the subject matter of the third. The fourth chapter is concerned with the emergence of the theory of development and the writing and content of the Essay. The conclusion considers the legacy of the Essay as a tool in Newman’s theology and in the work of later theologians, finally suggesting that it may offer a useful methodological contribution to the contemporary Roman Catholic debate about hermeneutical approaches to the Second Vatican Council.

This thesis seeks to offer a clearer understanding of the Jesuit theologians and philosophers who comprised the group known the 'Fourvière Jesuits'. Led by Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou, they formed part of the nouvelle théologie, an influential French reform movement that flourished from the 1930s until its suppression in 1950. After identifying a certain lacuna in the secondary literature, this thesis attempts to remedy certain historical deficiencies by constructing a history both sensitive to the wider intellectual, political, economic, and cultural milieu of the French interwar crisis, and that establishes continuity with the Modernist crisis and the First World War. Chapter One examines the modern French avant-garde generations that have shaped intellectual and political thought in France, providing context for a historical narrative of the Fourvière Jesuits more sensitive to the wider influences of French culture. This historical narrative of the Fourvière Jesuits follows four stages. Chapter Two examines the influential older generations that flourished from 1893 to 1914, such as the Dreyfus generation, the generation of Catholic Modernists, and two generations of older Jesuits, which were instrumental in the Fourvière Jesuits' development. Chapter Three explores the influence of the First World War and the years of the 1920s, during which the Jesuits were in religious and intellectual formation, relying heavily on unpublished letters and documents from the Jesuits archives in Paris (Vanves). Chapter Four analyses the crises of the 1930s, the emergence of the Fourvière Jesuits' wider generation, and their participation in the intellectual thirst for revolution. Chapter Five examines the decade of the 1940s, which saw the rise to prominence of the members of the generation of 1930, who, thanks to their participation in the resistance, emerged from the Second World War, with significant influence on the postwar French intellectual milieu.

Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) was a Uruguayan Jesuit priest who, I argue, based his liberation theology on his understanding of existentialism. The major contribution of this thesis is the exploration of unknown and unexplored sources in Segundo's work. These sources support my thesis of his basis in existentialism and are corroborated by his mature theology. This thesis is significant because the connection between existentialism and liberation theology has been widely overlooked. My starting point is Segundo's 1948 book, in which he combines existentialism with personalism and develops a transcendental method grounded in love and inter-subjectivity. The following three chapters develop my argument through his engagement with four existentialist thinkers: Berdyaev, Sartre and Camus, and Heidegger. Chapter 3 demonstrates how Segundo follows Berdyaev's primacy of freedom, which allows for human creativity, but Segundo takes it as a "quality of the will" and relates freedom to love. Berdyaev influences Segundo's preference for a methodology yielding consistent growth rather than a systematic approach to theology. Chapter 4 shows how Sartre's and Camus' understanding of freedom and limits influenced Segundo's sense that a person's lived reality must be the starting point for theological reflection (e.g. the hermeneutic circle). In chapter 5, I use an unpublished manuscript to show how Segundo uses the place of tradition in the Christian church and the role of tradition in Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein in order to build his theology of "liberative human seeking and divine revelation". In the final two chapters, I draw the new sources together with two of Segundo's widely read books: Faith and Ideologies (1982) in chapter 6 and The Liberation of Theology (1975) in chapter 7. In chapter 6, the transcendental method he first wrote about in 1948 returns and he addresses materialism and personalism. Chapter 7 serves as my conclusion and uses Segundo's hermeneutic circle as the fullest manifestation of my argument.

This thesis traces the ‘New Moment’ in Pauline reception in the writings of Alain Badiou, Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek. It explores how the Pauline epistles are read and feature in their thought. An answer to the question, 'why Paul?' prompts reflection on what it is to read and understand the Apostle. An introduction sets out the writers of this ‘New Moment’ [Jacob Taubes, Giorgio Agamben, Stanislas Breton, as well as Badiou, Eagleton and Žižek] before isolating the figures of this study. The reception of this ‘moment’ by mainstream New Testament studies is considered, and with it the charge of ‘appropriation’. The concept of ‘appropriation’ is explored, and a definition arrived at, for the purpose of evaluating the readings we will go on to discover. As part of this notion of ‘appropriation’, the turn to Gadamer in recent New Testament study is surveyed. We suggest another potential hermeneutical approach that derives from Gadamer is possible. Thus, the object of this study is both an instance of, and means by which to critique the understanding of, New Testament Wirkungsgeschichte. Each of our thinkers is then considered in turn. The outline for each chapter is the same. A brief introduction to the figure with bibliographical background salient to his Pauline reading precedes some textual examples indicative of that reading. We then move to analyse the manner of that reading and certain conceptual problems which are revealed in the course of the engagement with Paul. The conclusion analyses the approaches, and reasons for turning, to Paul on the part of these thinkers. Salient differences between each thinker's reading are noted and the charge of appropriation is evaluated afresh. The implications of such readings for conventional biblical criticism are considered, and the success of an approach which explores a Gadamerean-inspired interest in reception in the manner adopted by this thesis is judged.

The central aim of this thesis is to analyse the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer. This relationship has been almost universally recognized. And yet this area has received no comprehensive study, limited within the secondary literature to footnotes, digressions, and the occasional paper. Furthermore, what little literature there is has been plagued by several stereotypes. First, discussion is often limited to Discipleship. Second, Kierkegaard has been identified as an individualist and acosmist who rejected the church, leading many to consider Bonhoeffer the ecumenist and ecclesiologist as selectively agreeing with Kierkegaard, but ultimately rejecting his overall stance. This thesis will argue that neither stereotype is true, and suggest (a), that Kierkegaard’s influence can be found throughout Bonhoeffer’s work, and (b) that although a more stereotypical perspective may be present in SC, by the end of his life Bonhoeffer had gained a far deeper understanding across the breadth of Kierkegaard’s work. The importance of this thesis is not simply to ‘plug the gap’ of scholarship in this area, but also to suggest the importance of analysing Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer together. This will focus on three specific areas. First, alongside the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer, it will argue for the importance of using Bonhoeffer as an interpretive tool for understanding Kierkegaard. This thesis will show how Bonhoeffer adopted and adapted Kierkegaard’s work to his own situation, forcing Kierkegaard to answer questions that were not present during his own life. In this way, we are led to compare Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer as individuals, and not simply their static declarations. Secondly, against the tendency to consider Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer’s final attacks on Christendom as unfortunate endings to otherwise profound careers, it will be suggested that these attacks stand as the fulfilment of their earlier thought. It will be argued that despite their different contexts, both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer were led to the same conclusions concerning Christendom. Thirdly, given Kierkegaard’s submission to indirect communication and his somewhat 'prophetic' proclamations concerning one who will come after him and reform, this thesis will ask whether Bonhoeffer stands as something of a fulfilment to Kierkegaard’s thought in the guise of a Kierkegaardian ‘reformer’.