In 2015, the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) and the African Tax Institute at the University of Pretoria launched a project to identify the links between corruption, money laundering and tax crimes in Africa. The project promotes the concepts of good tax governance and the importance to economic development of a tax system that is transparent and free of corruption. The project explores how law enforcement agencies and tax authorities can best cooperate to counter corruption and bribery. The project was initially aimed at three focus countries, namely, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, but soon was extended to other African countries. This is a joint initiative with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and is also supported by the World Bank. This book brings together a series of background papers prepared for the Conference on Inter-Agency Co-operation and Good Tax Governance in Africa held at the University of Pretoria in July 2016. After a rigorous double peer-review process, the papers were revised by the authors. We express our gratitude to and acknowledge the services of the following peer reviewers: Tom Balco; Carika Fritz; Leon Gerber; Willem Jacobs; Benjamin Kujinga; Thabo Legwaila; Annet Oguttu; Dirk Scholtz; David Solomon; and Xeniya Yeroshenko. Finally, we express our sincere gratitude to all the research and administrative assistants who contributed to the Good Tax Governance in Africa Project. This book pays tribute to their efforts. Jeffrey Owens, Rick McDonell, Riël Franzsen and Jude Amos (Vienna and Pretoria, November 2017)

Magister Legum - LLM / The law relating to money laundering is not a new branch of law although it seems to be just emerging in this modern era of advanced technology and organised crime. It evolved in the 18th century with the case of Rex v William Kidd et al1 from the so-called golden age of piracy. With the increase in the sophistication of the world economy, the techniques of money laundering have become correspondingly complex, leading to incoherent and uneven prosecutorial policies with regard to crimes related to money laundering. This is specially so in developing African countries like Zambia, where the legal system is still evolving on this terrain. Inevitably, a lot of pertinent legal issues and impediments remain unresolved, particularly when prosecuting highcalibred white collar perpetrators such as former heads of state.

Doctor Legum - LLD / This thesis investigates the legislative measures employed in South Africa to combat the implication of lawyers in money laundering schemes. Criminals make use of sophisticated technological means to transfer money and launderers routinely approach lawyers to assist them in their illegal endeavours. The legal profession is almost tailor-made for abuse by launderers, because lawyers work with huge amounts of money, clients are entitled to legal professional privilege and the right to legal representation is guaranteed constitutionally. The South African anti-money laundering regime, for the most part, is contained in two statutes, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA). Whilst FICA and POCA require the legal profession to be vigilant and accountable in the fight against money laundering, unfortunately they also infringe on hard-won rights, such as legal professional privilege, the right to legal representation and attorney-client confidentiality. The study considers South Africa’s efforts to fulfil its international anti-money laundering obligations whilst upholding the criminal procedural rights guaranteed in the Constitution. It is suggested that certain sections of FICA and POCA fail to find the required balance between protecting citizens from the harms of money laundering and protecting the fundamental rights of attorneys and their clients. Lawyers are in a unique position of trust and in some instances have access to information that may incriminate their clients. Unfortunately, in its quest to combat money laundering, Parliament did not consider seriously enough the position of lawyers and took the easy option of criminalising fees paid with tainted funds, as well as the non-submission of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and cash transaction reports (CTRs). As a result, the South African legal profession is saddled with unacceptable constraints.

Magister Legum - LLM / Money laundering is a global problem that has adverse effects on both the developed and developing countries. If unchecked, it accelerates crime and criminal activities, affects the economy, undermines the integrity of financial markets, undermines the legitimate private sector, causes loss of revenue, poses security threats to privatisation efforts and brings about reputational risks as well as social costs.1 Given the transnational and cross-border nature of money laundering, the fight against it is global. This is why in 1989 the G72 countries decided to set up the FATF3 as a global standard-setting body for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and combating of terrorist financing (CFT). The FATF has since developed standards for countries across the globe to adopt so as to facilitate this global fight. The standards are in the form of recommendations, and so far there are Forty Recommendations on money laundering (hereafter referred so as the Recommendations), Eight Special Recommendations on CFT, and a Ninth Special Recommendation on cash-couriers. In order to enhance its work and the adoption of its Recommendations, the FATF has also facilitated the establishment of FATF- styled regional bodies (hereinafter referred to as FSRBs) across the world. One such group is ESAAMLG, which was established in 1999. Its mandate is to coordinate and guide its member countries in the implementation of the Recommendations and guidelines. Currently, it has 15 member countries.8 Over the first ten years of its existence, among other things, ESAAMLG has through its members, achieved the following in its mandate: all members except Uganda have enacted AML legislation and some have set up structures that are essential for the implementation of the Recommendations Despite the above-mentioned achievements, the overall implementation of the Recommendations has been generally slow and low. Most of the member countries have not yet enforced their enacted AML legislation as evidenced by low rate of money laundering prosecutions in the region. Some have not yet established financial intelligence Units (FIUs) nor ratified or domesticated important AML related international legal instruments, let alone train personnel adequately. The international instruments comprise the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) and the1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention). There are also inordinate delays in the passing of AML legislation as well as the amendment of other domestic legislation, which is necessary in order to harmonise such laws with the AML standards. This gives rise to unevenness, disconnectedness and time variability in the implementation of the Recommendations among the member countries. The main question this paper seeks to answer is this: Are there obstacles to the implementation of the Recommendations in Eastern and Southern Africa?

The prevalence of the money laundering crime has prompted the introduction of customer due diligence (CDD) measures. CDD measures facilitate the prevention of money laundering and promote the introduction of certain detective skills. Several international institutions champion the introduction of the detective skills in general and the performing of CDD measures in particular. These institutions acknowledge the cumbersome (administrative and financial) effects of introducing the detective skills and the performing of CDD measures. However, these institutions concedes that the aforementioned burden can be alleviated or lessened if the institutions that are responsible for performing CDD measures, i.e. Accountable Institutions (AIs), can exchange and rely on third parties’ (CDD) data. The exchange and reliance on third parties’ data must however consider the divergent threats or risks that might be associated with the data or third parties. The view regarding the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data is shared by, amongst others, the FATF and the UK. However, South Africa appears to be lagging behind in this respect. In other words, the South African FICA and FICA Regulations omit to encapsulate express and lucid provisions permitting the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data for purposes of performing CDD measures. The aforementioned omission, it is argued, creates a legal vacuum in the South African scheme of anti-money laundering. In other words, the aforesaid vacuum lives the South African AIs in a state of doubt regarding the manner and extent of exchanging and relying on third parties’ data. However, the aforesaid vacuum, this study concedes, can be rectified by introduction provisions that are line with the draft Regulation 5A and 5B that are proposed in chapter seven of this study. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

The work includes a theoretical definition, ways and methods of money laundering, Czech and International anti money laundering (AML) law. The second part is devoted to the fight against money laundering. It describes the main AML organizations. And as an example is given the program of one banking institution.

The prevalence of the money laundering crime has prompted the introduction of customer due diligence (CDD) measures. CDD measures facilitate the prevention of money laundering and promote the introduction of certain detective skills. Several international institutions champion the introduction of the detective skills in general and the performing of CDD measures in particular. These institutions acknowledge the cumbersome (administrative and financial) effects of introducing the detective skills and the performing of CDD measures. However, these institutions concedes that the aforementioned burden can be alleviated or lessened if the institutions that are responsible for performing CDD measures, i.e. Accountable Institutions (AIs), can exchange and rely on third parties’ (CDD) data. The exchange and reliance on third parties’ data must however consider the divergent threats or risks that might be associated with the data or third parties. The view regarding the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data is shared by, amongst others, the FATF and the UK. However, South Africa appears to be lagging behind in this respect. In other words, the South African FICA and FICA Regulations omit to encapsulate express and lucid provisions permitting the exchanging and relying on third parties’ data for purposes of performing CDD measures. The aforementioned omission, it is argued, creates a legal vacuum in the South African scheme of anti-money laundering. In other words, the aforesaid vacuum lives the South African AIs in a state of doubt regarding the manner and extent of exchanging and relying on third parties’ data. However, the aforesaid vacuum, this study concedes, can be rectified by introduction provisions that are line with the draft Regulation 5A and 5B that are proposed in chapter seven of this study. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted

Purpose: Apply selection theory to the subject of money laundering. The aim of the study is to examine why auditors report few money laundering reports to the finacial intelligence. Method: Qualitative interviews for data collection. Frame of reference: Selection Theory formulated by the National Council for Crime Prevention, audit-expectationgap and the money laundering act. Results and conclusions: Money laundering reports from auditors to the financial intelligence police have been few, both presently and in the past. There are many causes for the few reports, a short conclusion reads as follows: Laundering is difficult and time-consuming to examine. Auditors do not consider it a part of their duties. They have a high threshold for reporting suspected money laundering, higher than the money-laundering act prescribes. It is fairly safe for auditors to avoid reporting without consequences for themselves. Some auditors fear the customer can claim a compensation charge if they send in an erroneous report. Through the study the author understood that auditors tend to be more loyal towards their employers than towards law enforcement authorities. The author finds it likely, that, to a large extent, auditors are happy to discontinue their mandate, when they find irregularities, rather than to report to the law enforcement authorities (FIU or Swedish Economic Crime Authority).    Some shelf-corporation company auditors could probably prevent money laundering to a greater extent than they do today. Some shelf corporation divestments carried out are probably sold to persons who intend to commit tax offences, false accounting and fraud. The coordinator at the Financial Intelligence (FIU) police unit stated that unfortunately shelf-corporation auditors do not obey the money laundering act. / Syfte: Tillämpa selektionsteori inom ämnet penningtvätt. Huvudutgångspunkten är att undersöka varför revisorer avger få penningtvättsrapporter till Finanspolisen. Metod: Kvalitativa intervjuer (13 stycken) för insamling av data.  Referensram: Brottsförebyggande rådets selektionsteori, revisions-förväntningsgap samt penningtvättslagen. Resultat och slutsatser: Revisorer gör i dagsläget, och har även historiskt, gjort få penningtvättsrapporter till Finanspolisen. Många orsaker ligger till grund för rapporteringsgraden, nedan följer en kort sammanfattning. Penningtvätt är svårt och tidsödande att granska. Revisorer anser att det inte ingår i deras arbetsuppgift. Revisorer har en hög rapporteringströskel för misstänkt penningtvätt, högre än penningtvättslagen föreskriver. Det är tämligen riskfritt för revisorer att undvika rapportering, vissa revisorer upplever dessutom att risken för att kunden yrkar skadestånd vid en felaktig anmälan är stor. Författaren har genom studien förstått att revisorer är mer lojala mot sina uppdragsgivare än gentemot rättsvårdande myndigheter. Författaren finner troligt att revisorer i större utsträckning nöjer sig med att avsluta sitt uppdrag genom revisorsavsägelse då dessa finner oegentligheter än att anmäla till myndigheter (Finanspolisen eller Ekobrottsmyndigheten).        Vissa lagerbolagsföretags revisorer kan sannolikt stävja penningtvätt i betydligt större utsträckning än de gör idag. En del lagerbolagsförsäljningar som genomförs, säljs troligen till personer som ämnar genomföra skattebrott, bokföringsbrott och bedrägerier. Tyvärr upplever samordnare på FIPO att lagerbolagsrevisorer inte följer penningtvättslagen.

For a better understanding of relevant issues, in the introduction of the thesis contains a brief historical excursus to that topic, and there are explained the general features of the process of legalization of proceeds from crime, including putting illustrative examples from the area of the criminal law, as well as in the area of financial law. As examples have been selected major bank cases which were related to AML/CFT, but also had much wider impact. The diploma thesis deals with measures against the legalization of proceeds from crime in area of banking and credit institutions and focuses primarily on the measures arising from major law Act no. 253/2008 Coll., on certain measures against the legalization of proceeds from crime and terrorist financing. Consequently, the thesis deals partly with law of the European Communities, which was reflected into national legislation by the Act no. 253/2008 Coll. Following this, the diploma thesis also mentions other sources that have been adopted not only at national level but also in the context of international law. In addition the diploma thesis also identified some selected authorities which are involved in AML/CFT, where attention is aimed to the Financial Analytical Unit, which holds a key position in this specific field. Money laundering is a...