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Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, June, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 289-296)

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.

Magister Commercii - MCom / The South African banking industry is relatively sound and adequately capitalized high-tech service industry. It provides services to 51% of the economically active population. In the late 2001, 2002 and,2003, a number of small banks failed·due to liquidity crises, which subsequently spurred the momentum of consolidation in the industry. During this period, a great deal of mergers and acquisitions has taken place in the industry. The regulatory environment is in line with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) guidelines. The regulations regarding foreign banks are evidently a barrier to foreign bank entry, which could spur the level of competition in the industry In this thesis the level of market concentration is calculated using concentration ratios, CR. and CRs, for four product markets. The concentration ratio R. ranges from 77% for investment products, 79% for deposit market, 89% for installment sales market to 95% for credit card markets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (RH!) as calculated by reserve bank is 1750 by the end of year 2002, compared with the thresholds set by American Department of Justice; this falls short by only 50 from the range of the highly concentrated markets, which is above 1800 points. The methodology used to test competition, one of the new empirical industrial organization models, is the Panzar-Rosse reduced form revenue function. The P-R reduced form revenue function estimates the competitive conduct by the extent to which changes in factor price is reflected in revenue. The reduced form revenue function is estimated based on unbalanced panel of 15 banks for the period of 1993 to 2002 using fixed effects panel data econometrics. The estimated H-statistic is 0.516,

The telecom industry is moving from a stable environment to a very dynamic industry where the entrance of new players and the macro economic factors like crisis have been pushing it towards commoditization. In spite of the fact that the Telco consumer base is increasing the value generation capability of this industry has been challenged in the past years. The management is well aware of the situation but due to the traditionally monopolistic nature of these organizations finds it difficult to push any radical change. The purpose of the study is to identifying those factors which contributed to the success of these firms in past and later identifying those elements which are needed for these organizations to foster an innovative culture capable of bringing the needed changes. The major objectives of the research include identifying the main reason behind the need for innovation today and factors that have been hindering the innovation process in these firms. The next step was to study the best practices outside the Telcos industry which have helped other firms to be the Innovation leaders. Finally the study identifies those strategies and best practices which are viable in the Telecom industry. It has been found that the size and political nature of these organizations makes it difficult to push ideas to reality. Therefore the first need is the need of a culture change and a separate path (apart from the traditional line management) for the escalation of ideas. Secondly the Telco industry is not able to keep pace with the innovation of its complementing industries and therefore there is a dire need make innovation a priority from exploring new revenue sources to the innovation of business models with its existing partners. In the past the industry has tried the industrial silos model by decentralizing and given complete autonomy to its major revenue generating services but now it needs to demolish these departmental silos and be open to provide services which cut across many of its existing services without thinking too much about cannibalization.

O esporte hípico cresceu significativamente nos últimos anos no Brasil, embora pesquisas sobre o funcionamento e relevância deste setor sejam ainda escassas. Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo realizar estudo exploratório do mercado e da produção de cavalos da raça Brasileiro de Hipismo (BH) no Estado de São Paulo, com o intuito de levantar informações sobre a produção e o mercado dos animais registrados; determinar o custo médio de produção e manutenção dos cavalos da raça; determinar o destino dos cavalos e propor uma tipologia dos usuários do cavalo BH. Para a obtenção dos dados foram aplicados formulários e questionários específicos aos ofertantes e aos demandantes do Cavalo Brasileiro de Hipismo. A pesquisa contemplou seis criadores da raça e 25 demandantes. Verificou-se que, até 2013, havia 8.631 animais registrados, com uma queda significativa a partir de 2011. Os preços dos animais vendidos em leilões realizados pela associação da raça registraram valores que oscilaram entre R$ 18.000 e R$ 40.000 e os preços dos animais vendidos pelos criadores variou entre R$ 18.000 e R$ 80.000, dependendo da faixa etária dos animais e de outras características. A maioria dos criadores declarou que variações nos custos de produção dos animais não alteram a quantidade produzida e que os proprietários possuem outra fonte de renda. Nas propriedades entrevistadas, as biotecnologias de inseminação artificial e transferência de embriões são frequentemente utilizadas na busca do melhoramento genético dos animais. O tamanho do plantel dos criadores entrevistados variou entre 12 e 180 animais. Com base nos dados obtidos, chegou-se ao custo médio mensal de manutenção de um animal, por parte dos criadores, de R$ 475,81. O custo médio mensal de manutenção e treinamento de um animal dispendido pelos demandantes do Cavalo BH foi de R$ 2.587,80. A maioria dos animais é alojada em hípicas e é destinada para o uso pessoal, principalmente em competições, em sua maioria nas modalidades do CCE (Concurso Completo de Equitação) e do salto. Dos entrevistados, a maior parte possuía faixa de renda familiar acima de R$ 11.820, apresentou idade entre 9 e 65 anos; eram amadores e consideravam o cavalo que possuíam como \"membro da família\". Estudante foi a profissão mais frequente entre os entrevistados. Como motivação para a compra dos animais, o determinante principal foi a qualidade dos mesmos e não o seu preço. O estudo atendeu aos objetivos propostos e concluiu que o mercado do Cavalo Brasileiro de Hipismo se aproxima da concorrência monopolística, na qual a qualidade de cada animal produzido, conseguida por meio da utilização das tecnologias existentes e também com o emprego de mão de obra especializada no treinamento, faz com que cada produtor tenha certo poder de monopólio, no sentido de interferir nos preços de seus produtos. / The equestrian sport has grown significantly in recent years in Brazil, although research on the functioning and importance of this sector are scarce. This research aimed to carry out exploratory study of the market and the production of horses Brazilian Equestrian race (BH) in São Paulo, in order to gather information on the production and marketing of registered animals; determine the average cost of production and maintenance of BH horses; determine the destination of horses and propose a typology of BH horse users. To obtain the data were applied forms and specific questionnaires to offerors and users of the Brazilian Equestrian Horse. The survey considered six creators of the race and 25 consumers. It was found that by 2013 there were 8.631 registered animals, with a significant drop from 2011. The BH\'s prices sold at auctions held by the race\'s association recorded values that ranged from R$ 18.000 to R$ 40.000 and the price of animals sold by breeders ranged between R$ 18.000 and R$ 80.000, depending on the age of the animals and other factors. Most breeders said that variations in animal production costs do not change the quantity produced and that the owners have another source of income. In interviewed properties, the biotechnologies of artificial insemination and embryo transfer are often used in the search for genetic enhancement. The squad size creators of respondents varied between 12 and 180 animals. Based on the obtained data, the study came to the average monthly cost of maintenance of an animal. The average creator\'s cost was R$ 475,81. The average monthly cost of maintenance and training of one animal spent by the Horse BH\'s consumers was R$ 2.587.80. Most animals are housed in an equestrian centre and is intended for personal use, especially in competitions, mostly in the modalities of eventing and jumping. Of those interviewed, most had family income above R$ 11,820, presented age between 9 and 65, were amateurs and considered the horse as a \"family member\". Student was the most common occupation among respondents. As motivation for the purchase of animals, the main determinant was the quality of the animal and not its price. The study met the proposed objectives and concluded that the market of the Brazilian Equestrian Horse seems to be structured as monopolistic competition, in which the quality of each animal produced, achieved using existing technologies and with the use of skilled labour, makes each producer has some monopoly power, to interfere in the prices of their products.

The market conditions in the banking sector, the corporate governance structure of banks, and the financial accounting practices have been highlighted among the key causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. In this thesis, I analyse the ‘dark side' of competition by casting the spotlight on the relationship between competition, corporate governance, financial stability, and financial misreporting. I also bring corporate governance into the fray by analysing its link to financial misreporting. Probing the interplay between banking sector competition, corporate governance, financial stability and financial misreporting provides a fantastic setting to tap into and provide unique insights across the accounting, banking and finance domains. In putting together this piece of work, I extracted data from sources including Bankscope, Compustat, SEC enforcement releases and the World Bank Doing Business survey among others. In the 1st chapter, I regress financial stability proxies against various competition/concentration proxies using the GMM estimator with an instrumental variable technique to address potential endogeneity. In the 2nd chapter I use difference-in-difference analysis to analyse how changes in the competitive landscape in the US financial services industry instigated by the financial crisis as an exogenous factor led to an increase in misreporting incidences. The 4th chapter is an evaluation of how five corporate governance dimensions impacted on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2016. I uncover strong evidence to support the competition-fragility view, without yet being able to disprove the competition-stability view. My results suggest that greater banking competition yields riskier loan portfolios, but this increased risk is more than offset by banks holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. I also study the link between competition and incidences of financial misreporting in the US financial services industry and the results suggest a significantly positive association between competition and financial misreporting. Furthermore, there is evidence that an exogenous increase in competition because of the financial crisis also fuelled financial misreporting incidences in the financial services industry. I then investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. My results are mixed across the five corporate governance dimensions utilised for this study. Consistent with the ‘agency cost' hypothesis, I find a negative association between board size and financial misreporting, yet CEO power asserts a positive association with financial misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship' and ‘entrenchment' hypotheses. The equity-based portion of executive compensation is negatively related with misreporting, whereas there is a positive association between the cash-based portion and misreporting. My research not only contributes to literature on competition, market power, bank risk, financial stability, corporate governance, and financial misreporting; but also provide several practical and theoretical implications for regulators, academics, governments and policymakers on the effective and efficient regulation of the governance and competitive landscapes in financial services. I specifically shine the spotlight on emerging literature on the pervasive effects (dark side) of competition from a purely financial services perspective and within the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010.

Saskatchewan has good growing conditions, much land and water resources, minimal pest pressure and the expertise necessary for growing high-quality commercial vegetables. Statistics show, however, that commercial vegetable production occupies a relatively small place in the agricultural economy of Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan production accounts for less than 10 per cent of the total provincial market for fresh vegetables, the other supplies of fresh vegetables marketed in Saskatchewan come from sources outside of the province and imports from the southern United States, Mexico, and other warm regions. The majority of Saskatchewan produced vegetables are sold through market gardens, farmers’ markets and consumer contract sales. In light of the increasing importance of fresh vegetable demand, examining the role of a new marketing organization in the province is important as it might bring about major realignment of the Saskatchewan fresh produce market. Recently, a project supported by the Agriculture Council of Saskatchewan Inc. (ACS) encouraged producers to organize themselves into picking zones and to work together to supply larger retail markets. The Grocery People (TGP) (a retailer) has agreed to purchase vegetables grown in Saskatchewan for their distribution centre in Saskatoon. This new organization, Prairie Fresh Food Corporation (PFFC), despite its numerous benefits, will test the farmer participants’ resolve to cooperate rather than proceed alone. This poses a real opportunity for producers to expand and develop the infrastructure required, as produce can be pooled. This study uses Transaction Cost, Agency and Monopolistic Competition theories to analyze the factors that hamper farmers from participating in contracts and taking advantage of these potential opportunities. It considers the advantages and barriers or potential challenges to wholesalers and retailers cooperating with this plan. In particular, an economic model of economies of scale through collective action is developed. The model assumes that small growers can access higher market share through collective action and achieving economies of scale. The results of personal interviews with eleven members of PFFC are presented and analyzed in a case study format. The case study analysis of PFFC reveals that the organization could provide positive benefits to its members in the early period of its establishment. The results show that the market share of the PFFC is still relatively small throughout the province, but its members expect it to expand in the future. The results suggest that high relative prices in the market and trust in the buyer have a positive effect on the probability of farmer participation in the project.

Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-147).